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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Kokoshin Proposed as Russian Defense Minister

92UM0630A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Feb 92 p 2

[INTERFAX: "Demrossiya Proposes a Candidate for Minister of Defense"]

[Text] The Coordinating Council of the "Democratic Russia" movement and "Soldiers for Democracy" have proposed to President Boris Yeltsin and to the Chairman of the Russian Parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov that Andrey Kokoshin be named Minister of Defense. He is a Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Deputy Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada and Director of the Center for Conversion and Privatization.

In the appeal it is noted that A. Kokoshin participated in the development of variants of the new military doctrine, and was one of the originators of military reform. He is well known abroad as a specialist on defense questions.

Maj Gen Kryshko on Future Status of Borders

92UM0625B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 13 Feb 92 p 3

[Interview with Maj Gen Andrey Kryshko, deputy chairman of the Committee for Guarding the State Frontier, by Sergey Doronin, military reviewer at RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA: "If We Don't Spend on the Frontier Now, We Shall Pay Triple in the Future"]

[Text] What is the state frontier of the former Union to be like? Will it be unitary or multitiered according to the number of independent states? If it is not the former, then how, without harming the political, economic, military and other interests of the near and far neighbors in the Commonwealth, can we provide the greatest openness for the border conditions?

These and other questions have not been settled now, while individual politicians take their own view of the problems of reorganizing the system for guarding the external frontiers of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], without very much considering the realities and the opinion of professionals. For this reason, the views of the Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Guarding the State Frontier, Maj Gen Andrey Kryshko, will be of interest to the readers of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA.

[Doronin] Andrey Yakovlevich [Kryshko], what is happening now on the frontiers of the CIS?

[Kryshko] I can't say that control has been lost over the situation, but with every passing day it becomes harder and harder to guard the frontier. The reason for this is to be found both in the bad condition of the economy, in

the political instability in the states of the Commonwealth, and in some places in the overt extremism shown toward the personnel of the Border Troops.

There is no need to dwell in detail on the day-to-day situation. You can judge what is happening, for instance, in the Transcaucasus from the TV and radio broadcasts and from the newspaper articles. Here the Border Troops have been made to surrender their weapons, ammunition and combat equipment. The patrols have come under attack and the families of the officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik"] have been threatened with physical harm.

The Central Asian sector of the frontier has been marked by intense activity. The psychological pressure has not let up in the Baltic or Moldova.

All this cannot help but have its effect on the attitude of the personnel. They rightly are demanding guarantees for the safety of themselves and their families. In the Transcaucasus, one out of every three officers is ready to move to another place. The sovereignization processes are also felt here. Around 150 officers in the Western Border District refused to take the oath to the people of Ukraine and they should be replaced by personnel who do want to serve here. There are also those who long to return to Belarus and Moldova.

[Doronin] Certainly because the western sector is calmer.

[Kryshko] Well, at least they don't shoot at you. But having taken over the troops, the leaders of a number of states have taken decisions on the status of the frontiers at times without considering either the situation on the spot or the opinion of neighbors. For example, Moldova has put into effect with Romania an agreement on reciprocal trips by citizens using their internal passports. The result? The crossing points cannot handle the human traffic, no one is monitoring the stay of Romanian citizens on Moldovan territory and they illegally make their way to the other states of the CIS to engage in speculation and smuggling activities...

[Doronin] Well and good, but just what does the frontier cost the ordinary taxpayer?

[Kryshko] In last year's prices, the cost of a 15-kilometer sector of the land frontier was from 7 million to over 12 million rubles. The construction of a border post costs even more, approximately 15 million rubles. Some 17 million rubles must be invested for purchasing a helicopter. So, figure it up.

I am certain that few politicians have given any thought to this, and for some reason they all assume that the property and equipment, once it is privatized, will serve forever. Let us return to the example of Moldova. Here the sector of the land frontier with Romania of some 692 kilometers is guarded by one border detachment. Should the need arise to guard the frontier with Ukraine, Moldova will need to find an additional one billion

rubles in the state budget for its engineering and equipment and for organizing two border detachments.

[Doronin] But a frontier is primarily people.

[Kryshko] Above all... And they must be trained somewhere. A majority of states do not have such VUZes. Should they be trained somewhere else? That also is costly. The tens of thousands of rubles annually for each man—this also must come from the pockets of the workers.

Separate, disassociate, if you wish. But first, with a pencil in hand, figure out just what this sovereignty will cost.

[Doronin] Fine, but what if the leaders of the Commonwealth states concur to maintain a unitary system for guarding the frontier? Does your Committee have a program which could satisfy all the parties?

[Kryshko] I would assume that the previously elaborated plan for reforming the guarding of the state frontier contains much that is to the point. Of course, there is still work to be done on it. But it contains the main thing—new approaches to organizing the border service and to its scientific and technical support. It would be easier and much cheaper to carry out the planned together.

Number of "Political" Deserters Grows

92UM0418A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Lt Col A. Vorobyev: "No Matter What the Situation in the Army Is, There Is No Excuse for Desertion"]

[Text] Information for Thought

More than 6,000 deserters were under investigation in the USSR Armed Forces in November 1991. They have been counting since 1983. More than 1,600 service members have been under investigation since 1 November 1991, since the rest have been granted amnesty by decree of the former USSR President.

Presently, more than 10,000 service members have refused to take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine, and some of them have gone AWOL [absent without leave].

An unusual story was told to me by Mikhail Lopatin, who went AWOL from his missile unit in the Transcaucasus on 4 January of this year. Traveling with him in the railcar were 35 (!) soldiers who had done precisely the same thing from various units.

"You see, I understand perfectly well that I am a deserter according to the law," Lopatin says. "But on the other hand, I had to do something. I left because I did not want to swear allegiance to Azerbaijan. They were firing on our unit all the time. We remained one of the few in our area whom the Azerbaijani fighters had not been able to disarm. The barracks was all shattered after the shellings."

I do not wish to excuse in any way those who went AWOL. Nevertheless, I am trying to understand those who today are being sent to Moscow to the address of 1st Krasnokursantskiy Proyezd, d. 1/4, the assembly and rehabilitation point under the garrison commandant's office. In the last 2 months, a stream of "self-determining" soldiers not wishing to take an oath of allegiance to Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Nagornyy Karabakh, and the Dniester-region republic has flowed here. Hundreds of them have passed through this point in Moscow only recently.

In old civilian clothing and remnants of military uniforms, in short and long hair (even with lice), they are a sorry sight, the result of the first steps of the hasty and rash dividing up of the Army and Navy. Against the background of nationalization of the Army, desertion may appear to some to be natural, assumed. You cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs. That is true, but we are talking about people. We must not regard desertion for political reasons as a passing, temporary phenomenon, especially since the number of those who are deserting for political reasons is not decreasing, but increasing. So, it may be a question of the unpredictable, of legal boundlessness towards anarchy, and of social upheavals, unless, of course, common sense prevails in the military policy of today's sovereign states that have united in the Commonwealth.

In the past, so-called relations contrary to regulations were linked to desertion in the USSR Armed Forces. There were also other reasons for AWOLs—the unsettled state of living, friendly association of people from the same area, illnesses, simply a reluctance to serve, and so forth. And here against the background of this long-known phenomenon with which the Army and Navy have been fighting as best they could, a new wave is emerging.

But then, why not let the deserters themselves who, as it turns out, do not at all consider themselves to be such have their say.

Aleksandr Loginov, private:

"I left my unit which was stationed in Moldova. I left on 10 January. I left my unit because I had lost the feeling of the Motherland. Whom was I protecting there on the territory of a foreign sovereign state? Before, I knew that we were subordinate to the Odessa Military District; later, it turned out that no one knew if we were subordinate to Moldova, Ukraine, or Russia. The Azerbaijanis were the first to leave our unit, then the Georgians. Now it is the Russians' turn. It is all because President Snegur seems to have said that those on his territory will be at his command. But in that case, let him command the equipment that is left, the weapons. But we are people. How can we be privatized?"

Aleksey Shelukhin. Private. He went AWOL from his unit in Belaya Tserkov, which is in the environs of Kiev. Like Loginov, he had served 1 1/2 years:

"I was to be discharged in the spring. I served honorably. But I left my unit because I could not pledge allegiance to another state. I have a place to live and relatives in Russia, where I will hide from them. In a word, the Motherland. I tried to fill out a request, but my friends told me it was useless."

Col Justice A. Korotkov, deputy chief of the Main Military Procuracy Directorate:

"Service members going AWOL from their units is a dangerous phenomenon not only for the Army but for society as a whole, particularly if it occurs during periods of political struggle and instability. It is doubly dangerous now, when politicians are striving to divide the Army. And it does not want to be divided, as the All-Army Officer Assembly showed, advocating a unified system of security, a unified military-strategic space, and a unified system of command and control."

Moreover, the lack of clarity of the legal status of the armed forces is making the situation worse. Many of the difficulties, if not all, come from this. There is no normal legal basis for functioning of the armed forces of the Commonwealth, no coordinated laws on defense, military service and status of service members and their families, housing and daily support, and material and financial support of service members, including those being transferred to the reserve.

For the present, the number of people evading service is not decreasing. The well-known decree of former USSR President Gorbachev on granting amnesty to service members also has not proved to be worthwhile. What is more, I will say frankly that it merely intensified the centrifugal tendencies in the Army and the lack of execution and disregard for the law.

I will take the liberty of citing the well-known words of Gen A. Denikin: "In 1917 the Army played a decisive role in Russia's fate. Its involvement during the course of the revolution, its life, decay, and death should serve as a great and warning lesson for the new builders of Russian life."

Politicians should remember this historical lesson. While they are making arrangements, there is nothing left to do but to appeal if only to the good sense of the soldiers themselves, to their self-control, composure, and, finally, simply common human decency. It is not worth putting oneself in the position of a deserter. To be sure, desertion is unhappiness; you will not find justification for it, for the Army has always been supported by the concepts of honor, conscience, and oath.

Central Apparatus to be Reduced 30 Percent

92UM0524B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Jan 92 p 1

[INTERFAX: "Cuts in Armed Forces"]

[Text] An INTERFAX correspondent has been told by informed sources in the General Staff of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces that the central apparatus of the CIS Armed Forces will be cut by 30 percent, with the reduction to be made by 1 July of this year. Additional cuts may in all likelihood be made in the near future.

Also provided were the news that approximately 160,000 to 170,000 men out of the total 700,000-man reduction previously announced will come from the officer corps. The officers are to be discharged by 1 January 1993.

Northern Group Commander Press Conference

92UM0526A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 5 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by F. Labutin, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent: "Billions Counted in Someone Else's Pocket"]

[Text] The Northern Group in Legnica held a ceremony to turn over the district Officers' Club to the Polish Roman Catholic Church. Annexes of the Legnica diocese and a branch of the Papal Geological University are to be located there. The opening of a school for managers for Soviet and Polish officers discharged from the army also took place.

The Northern Group Commander Colonel-General V. Dubynin announced at a press conference that all combat units will be withdrawn from Polish territory by November 15th, 1992. Only technical forces will remain to insure the security of the Central Group of Soviet troops as they depart from the territory of the former GDR.

The withdrawal of sub-units is going strictly according to schedule. To date the number of troops in the Northern Group has been reduced by 23,000. As of yet, financial and property settlements have not been effected for housing and other real estate that belong to the Soviets. There is also heated controversy over compensation for possible ecological damage. The Poles are citing approximately 4.5 billion dollars that the Northern Group must pay.

In connection with the known economic difficulties that our country is now experiencing, the Northern Group has incurred debts for foodstuffs, gas, electricity and heating. The Polish side unilaterally plans to cut off the supply of all types of fuel, and to stop supplying housing and military garrisons.

As of yet, no experts have been sent from our country who could work out a procedure for calculating possible

ecological damage. The Poles adhere to the so-called zero variant for financial settlement. In short, this would entail leaving all real estate to Poland, which in turn, would be obligated to make no counter demands. For the time being, however, firms in Poland, as well as in other countries, are prohibited from buying material-technical assets from the Northern Group.

In response to the question posed by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA concerning social welfare for military service members, V. Dubynin remarked that there essentially was none. Germany has committed itself to raising a housing fund for officers in the Central Group, as it is not possible for us to do this.

Dubynin Interview on Withdrawal from Poland

92UM0548A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Feb 92 First edition p 2

[Interview with Col-Gen Viktor Petrovich Dubynin, commander of the Northern Group of Forces, by Lt Col A. Bugay, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place and date not given: "Much Depends on the Polish Side"]

[Text] The majority of Poland's mass media called the statement made by Colonel-General V. Dubynin, commander of the Northern Group of Force [NGF], at a press conference in Legnica that all NGF combat units would leave Poland by 15 November 1993 the main news of January. The 6,000 servicemen of the NGF remaining to support the transit of the Western Group of Forces will be withdrawn to the territory of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] before the end of 1993, even if the the Polish side does not sign an agreement on the withdrawal by this time.

We are offering our readers the interview with Colonel General V. Dubynin, NGF commander, by our correspondent.

[Bugay] Viktor Petrovich, you held a similar press conference last April. At that time it was devoted to the start of sending a Soviet missile brigade to the homeland. It seems to me that your wish to meet again with representatives of the mass media on the opening day of the "managers' school" is merely grounds for clarifying the NGF command's position in the matter of the troop withdrawal.

[Dubynin] You are absolutely right. The scheduled withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Poland is already in its third year. Objective and unbiased politicians and journalists cannot but regard this process solely as good will by our side, as a demonstration of the kindest feelings towards the Polish people. However, in their pursuit for sensationalism, some of the mass media are misleading their viewers, listeners, and readers, unsubstantiatedly accusing us of of deception. The facts are being distorted or tendentiously juggled. They say that one train and two dozen servicemen left Poland and that the Russians presented this event to the whole world as the withdrawal of a full-strength large missile unit.

I will cite other facts. For example, a commentary on Polish television recently noted that as of the start of Polish-Soviet negotiations on the withdrawal of the NGF in December 1990, the NGF personnel strength was about 70,000. And now supposedly about 50,000 Soviet servicemen remain in the Republic of Poland. It was emphasized that not a single major unit was withdrawn from Poland since September of last year.

Also surprising is an article in the newspaper POLSKA ZBROJNA, in which Colonel S. Golembewskiy maintains that 4,300 Soviet servicemen left Poland in 1991. According to his data, the number of servicemen and combat equipment of the NGF virtually has not been reduced since September.

As the NGF commander, I am officially reporting to you the figures characterizing the planned withdrawal of our troops from the territory of the Republic of Poland. From the start of the withdrawal to the present, more than 23,000 servicemen have left Poland. There are 35,000 personnel left in the NGF. For those who know arithmetic, it is not hard to calculate that the overall contingent of our troops in Poland was 58,000 prior to the start of the withdrawal. In this case, however, the Polish press persistently uses the figure of 70,000 for some reason.

During this same time period, 10,250 pieces of weapons and equipment and 250,000 tons of various supplies have been withdrawn. Just since April 1991, 10,000 servicemen, 20 missile launchers, about 400 tanks, 200 armored combat vehicles, 250 guns and mortars, and 4,000 motor vehicles and other equipment have been withdrawn from Poland. The number of aircraft has decreased by 47, and 39 of them are strike aviation combat aircraft.

In the fourth quarter of last year, which the Polish press is holding against us, we dispatched 1,739 railcars which carried 886 pieces of combat equipment, including 266 tanks, 188 artillery systems, and 25,000 tons of supplies.

In addition, I want to report that as of 1 January 1992, 97 military installations, 11 garrisons, and 8 airfields have been transferred to the Polish side. Our units have completely left three provinces. Later we are planning to transfer 285 more installations.

[Bugay] Comrade commander, how does the future process regarding the existence of the NGF appear?

[Dubynin] By 15 November of this year we plan to withdraw to the homeland all combat units and large units and the majority of technical support and service subunits and facilities. As of the beginning of 1993, a grouping of about 6,000 people will remain in Poland. These are our plans. They are based on a precise calculation. It is impossible to withdraw troops from Poland more quickly. The existing front of loading work and the technical capabilities of the Polish railroads will not permit acceleration of the withdrawal. But implementation of these plans largely depends on the Polish side.

Up to now, our countries have not signed an agreement on the withdrawal of the NGF or a protocol on settling property, financial, and legal issues, which must stipulate the terms of mutual payments. We have received nothing for the installations and facilities already turned over to the Polish side. The time allotted for resolving these and other issues is being dragged out.

Probably, the Polish side is counting on our property being given to them free of charge. But relations in a civilized society should not be built on such principles. In this regard, I would like to remind you that the diplomats' position, in which not a realistic consideration of the long-term mutually beneficial cooperation but immediate advantage that prevails, does not benefit the Polish people. Due to totally inexplicable obstinacy of individual members of the Polish delegation at government-to-government negotiations, the Polish treasury has not received a sum 4 billion German marks already just from the loss of the transit of the troops of the Western Group of Forces through Polish lands.

[Bugay] Viktor Petrovich, incidents of disconnecting our military installations from energy- and water-supply systems have become more frequent recently. How do you regard such actions by local Polish authorities?

[Dubynin] Today our state, which until recently the entire world considered a superpower, is experiencing difficult times. Like it or not, we must admit that its prestige on the international arena is also declining. Six months ago, it not likely that a local Polish administration would have risked shutting off the water or electricity being supplied to our military installations. If that would have happened, there would have been an international scandal. Today, unfortunately, such a thing has become possible. They are also finding explanations for such anti-humane actions: they say, you are in debt to us...

It seems to me that it is not at all a matter of indebtedness. I do not doubt for a minute that our debts will be paid. Rather, it is what oriental wisdom explained long ago: even a monkey will pull on the tail of a dead lion.

Such outrages have become possible as a result of the fact that we as a group of forces have survived the period of transition of an army, yesterday called the "Soviet" Army, into a different quality. Now, when we have been officially taken under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, it has assumed an obligation to protect our interests. I think some people should be reminded that we are in Poland not of our own free will but on the basis of intergovernmental agreements. It is obvious that those agreements have lost their political meaning, of which our planned departure is a result. But we should not hasten events, creating for a former allied army and its people unbearable conditions for existence. I do not think such actions will help strengthen Polish-Russian cooperation.

[Bugay] Comrade colonel-general, one last question. What can you say concerning the opening of the "managers' school" in Legnica?

[Dubynin] Polish instructors will conduct classes at the university of economic knowledge of the NGF, training Polish and our officers. This is the first educational institution in Poland created as a result of the progressive Polish public's understanding of the problems of servicemen discharged into the reserve due to reductions in the armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Polish Army. This understanding was expressed in the desire to help officers prepare for a new life and for the market relations taking shape in our countries. The NGF command regards this event as a positive political act, as counter steps of good will aimed at strengthening trust and mutual understanding between the Northern Group of Forces and the Polish public.

Withdrawal from Baltics in February

92UM0524A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 92
Morning Edition pp 1-2

[Article by Nikolay Lashkevich (Vilnius) and Irina Litvinova (Riga): "Baltic Troop Withdrawal to Start in February"]

[Text] Official delegations from Lithuania, Latvia, and Russia have met in Vilnius and Riga to discuss the withdrawal from the Baltic countries of troops of the former USSR.

Withdrawal of Russia's Armed Forces from Lithuanian soil will commence this February. That was the decision made during a meeting of official delegations of the Russian Federation and the Lithuanian Republic.

The Russian delegation was headed by Vice Prime Minister and government adviser S. Shakhrai; the Lithuanian, by Deputy Chairman of the Republic Supreme Council C. Stankevicius. After discussions of more than 12 hours in duration, both sides agreed that the process of redeployment to Russian soil should be carried out on the basis of a suitable agreement. That is the purpose of a meeting of working groups of experts to be held on 10 February. The problem of presence of troops, which now come under the jurisdiction of Russia, is linked largely to the times and rates of withdrawal and assurance of social guarantees. There is a possibility that Lithuania may, in case of necessity, render assistance by supplying builders to erect housing at new troop locations, but that country is not expected to provide equipment and building materials.

The above topics will be discussed in greater detail in future meetings of experts, who will draft other documents concerning relations between the governments of Lithuania and Russia. All these issues will most likely be put in order in time for B. Yeltsin's visit to Lithuania, if it takes place, of course. During V. Landsbergis' January

visit to Moscow, the President of Russia accepted an invitation offered by the head of the Lithuanian Parliament to visit Lithuania.

Representatives of both sides with whom we were able to speak in the lobby at the time of the above meeting were inclined to downplay any differences of opinion. They said that the Vilnius meeting was constructive, that it proceeded in a spirit of mutual understanding, with all issues resolved in a manner that was mutually satisfactory.

The Vilnius meeting concluded with the release of a joint communique.

Minister Yanis Dinevich, who led the Latvian delegation, and Vice Prime Minister Sergey Shakh-ray, who headed the Russian delegation, were satisfied with the talks and the resulting accords.

The decree issued by the President of Russia places the Armed Forces under the jurisdiction of Russia. This clearly had the effect of permitting the Balts to breathe a sigh of relief. The problem was that they were in a quandary: the Union is no more, but with whom to hold talks on troop withdrawal? As Yanis Dinevich stated, the decree furnished the legal basis for presenting Russia with new conditions of payment for services which Latvia will render the Group of Forces.

The first meeting dealt with the views the sides hold relative to the issues. Here and there certain views do coincide, but there are differences. For example, the Latvian side holds to the decision made by the Parliament relative to the nationalization of army property of the former USSR located on Lithuanian soil. The Russian delegation is of the opinion that Russia is not only taking on the responsibility of 100,000 servicemen (of which about 40,000 are officers and warrant officers), but that it should also take all the military equipment and other property, which comprise an integral part of the Armed Forces.

"The legal contention relative to military property should be resolved by the talks," said S. Shakh-ray. "We intend to be guided by world practice: An international agreement is superior to national law."

The Russian side recognized the Latvian Republic's claim to buildings and other structures erected before 17 June 1940 and in use by the Armed Forces. It was agreed that the sides will hold discussions relative to transferring to Latvia ownership of certain amounts and types of armaments, military equipment, and ammunition.

The talks have removed the tension surrounding the unilateral decisions made by the Baltic countries relative to the former Soviet Army. It is pointed out in the joint communique that all arrangements will henceforth be made within the context of measures designed to assure security and trust in Europe and in constructive participation of Russia in continued promotion of the general European process.

Also included in the communique are the priorities of both countries. In the case of Latvia they involve security; for Russia, the aim here is social protection of servicemen during withdrawal from Latvian soil. The sides agreed that the Armed Forces are to be considered as foreign, as troops being withdrawn from a sovereign state. During the withdrawal period, the units of the North-Western Group of Forces will be guided by Latvian laws. Latvia, in turn, has accepted for this period the obligation of protecting the honor and dignity of servicemen and their families.

The journalists had a question: why will troop withdrawal from Lithuania start in February, but from Latvia in March? Sergey Shakh-ray explained the timetable as Russia's intention to act responsibly in carrying out her obligations; the schedule as set reflects realistic capabilities. It is not possible to state—not even approximately—the times of completion of troop withdrawal from the Baltics. The times, conditions, and procedure of troop withdrawal, and the legal status of the latter during this period, are topics that will be discussed in special talks to be held by Latvia and Russia.

Russia will provide Latvia with regular reports on manpower figures for Armed Forces located on Latvian soil.

An interesting question was asked at the press conference by a correspondent from the People's Front newspaper *ATMODA*: "Does Russia have any national interests in Latvia?" "Yes, she does," responded S. Shakh-ray. "To reside side by side in a peaceful and neighborly manner."

Sergeants Being Used as Platoon Commanders

92UM0524C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Feb 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col O. Bedula in the "More on the Subject" column: "Platoons Commanded by Sergeants"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported that the officer shortage in a number of military districts prompted the commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces to issue a directive that cleared the way for appointing conscript sergeants as platoon commanders after the latter have received a period of training. The experiment is not a resounding success. There are however some positive results. In this connection, the military council of the Volga-Ural Military District has taken a look at the training year and written its comments on first sergeants functioning as platoon commanders.

It was one year ago that the first large group of sergeants was designated as commanders of motorized rifle, tank, and engineer platoons and in subunits of other combat

arms. The idea was to stabilize the training process by filling the gaps in the tables of organization.

To begin with, the agencies responsible for implementation took various approaches to the preparation and conduct of this experiment. An example of this is the issuing of the Ground Forces Headquarters "Program for Training Conscript Sergeants and Warrant Officers as Commanders of Motorized Rifle (Tank) Platoons," which was taken virtually in its entirety from the draft "Program for Combat Instruction of Motorized Rifle Training Subunits," of 1989 vintage. It is true that it was not long before this fact was uncovered in line units, with the result that the District Combat Training Directorate developed a fundamentally new document, one more suitable to training this particular category of service personnel.

Units also devised their own approaches to handling this requirement. In some units, such as the one in which Major V. Podmarkov serves, sergeants were selected on the basis of complex testing, conversations with a military psychologist, and ratings achieved in gunnery, tactics, and technical studies. Other units took another route: If the selectee could call a formation and perform administration, he was judged suitable for appointment to platoon commander.

The sergeants after completion of a month-long training course and passing of tests were promoted to the rank of first sergeant and given command of a platoon. In this status, the newly-designated first sergeants were granted the privilege of occupying living quarters that were separate from those of the men, taking their meals in the officers' mess, leaving the post on a daily basis, attending meetings of officers, and serving as commanders of guard and patrol details. Their pay and allowances were increased several-fold.

After three months had passed, district authorities examined the record of sergeants from the "first group." Quite a few of them adapted well to their new assignment. The results were not as satisfactory with respect to administrative performance on the part of the first sergeants. The results of their classroom study in this area also indicated that they were experiencing difficulties. An adjustment was made by effecting a seven-fold increase in number of hours devoted to classroom instruction for sergeants of the "second group" entering the summer session.

The abovementioned methodological deficiency problem lent itself to relatively rapid solution, but there were other troubles, of a psychological nature. In this case, some officers found it difficult to accept the presence of first sergeants at officer training sessions and service meetings. The reason is quite obvious: The junior commanders, in their conscientious and zealous interest to do well, caused lazy and indifferent officers psychological discomfort, forcing the latter to exert more effort.

Thus, conscript first sergeants made a noticeable contribution to promoting combat readiness of their units.

This contribution could have been even greater, of course, if commanding officers and chiefs would have gone a little further in fulfilling their obligations, but that was not the case. Some commanding officers used various excuses to prevent granting first sergeants permission to leave the premises of the post. The inglorious "something might happen" was often a more potent device than the word of an officer or common sense. In addition, the fact that the problem with headquarters of posts was not resolved ahead of time did cause misunderstandings to arise.

Commanding officers chose not to designate first sergeants as commanders of guard and patrol details or range officers. Also apparent were problems related to providing separate quarters and payment of the larger pay and allowances. This particular development was reported to the editors by first sergeants in the unit in which officer V. Novitskiy serves.

In the final analysis, the above problems could cast a shadow over the applicability of the experiment; only intervention by the district made it possible to complete it.

"All the problems and troubles we encountered are a thing of the past," Major General Yu. Proshin, district deputy commander for combat training, said to me. "We plan to enlarge the experiment. The main thing for the present is to complete the program of training for the third complement of sergeants. In this regard, we are allowing units a large amount of freedom and independence in their candidate selection. We intend to reorganize the training of commanders serving in specialized subunits: engineer, motor transport, communications, chemical protection, since the general training approach does not provide the necessary skills."

Soldiers Refusing Oath Not To Be Discharged

92UM0538A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
6 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Nikolay Panyukov under the rubric "As Rumor Has It and on Good Authority": "Going Home Early Not Foreseen"]

[Text] Among the many questions of our readers related to taking the new military oath in units and subunits located in Ukraine, this one is met most frequently: "Is it true that soldiers who have refused to take the oath there will receive early discharges for home?"

As became clear in conversation on this topic with Lieutenant General V. Bondartsev, deputy chief of administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the rumors which have aroused soldiers' parents turn out to be strongly exaggerated.

"No one ever intended to resolve the issue in this manner," Vladimir Timofeyevich emphasized. "A special commission is presently at work in troop units of the Kiev, Odessa, and Carpathian Military Districts. It is

determining the number of individuals refusing to take the oath and organizing them into detachments. It is envisaged that these soldiers will complete their terms of service mainly in military units stationed in the territory of the republics in which they were conscripted."

Grozny Attacks Continue, Curfew Declared

Garrison Appeals to Dudayev

92UM0569A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondents Captain First Rank A. Pilipchuk and Captain Third Rank V. Yermolin: "It Is Time To Understand That Pressure Against the Army Is Coming to a Critical Point"]

[Text] Motorized Infantry Division

When we arrived in the Chechen Republic, Major General P. Sokolov, chief of the Grozny Garrison and at the same time a division commander, informed us about nighttime looting at a regiment of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. The following day the same lot befell air defense units. Having been utterly plundered, they, in fact, ceased to exist. On the same day the general suggested that we move from the territory of the military establishment to a hotel. Petr Alekseyevich explained: "This is for your own safety. I do not think everything will end with that."

Attacks on two military establishments of the training motorized infantry division began almost simultaneously on 8 February. At 1730 hours illumination flares soared over the division headquarters; tracer rounds cut through the dusk. The headquarters went over to a wartime footing. Information came to the effect that a large crowd was beginning to infiltrate through the checkpoint. Division Commander Major General P. Sokolov called the office of the president of the Republic, D. Dudayev, and lodged a resolute protest against a bandit attack. Some time later the division commander was asked to get in touch with the minister of internal affairs of the republic. Hope appeared that the authorities would take resolute measures against the attackers. However, the situation continued to deteriorate.

Reports came in to the general's office one after another to the effect that a crowd which included women and children continued to spread through the compound. The servicemen did not open fire. New hopes for a triumph of common sense appeared when a mullah emerged in front of the crowd.

However, the respite did not last long. The attackers, who were breaking down the gates of another checkpoint, demanded that the division commander come to negotiate. The general, several officers, and one of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents went to the meeting. The attackers shouted demands to leave the settlements, abandoning weapons. By all signs, the

weapons were precisely the main "prize" they hoped to gain. Incidentally the market value of one automatic weapon here comes to a six-digit figure.

Still new reports reached the headquarters: The signal battalion and the building of the rear services of the division had been seized; the guardhouse was in danger of being seized.

At 1945 hours General P. Sokolov talked to D. Dudayev, briefed him about the existing situation, and asked him to influence the course of events. Ten minutes later the guardhouse was seized. Automatic weapons were fired increasingly in the compound. The servicemen still did not open fire. Meanwhile, quoting the republic leadership, television stated that the servicemen should respond to bandit excesses by shooting to kill.

A small garrison consisting of two dozen officers was left in the unit headquarters.

Meanwhile, warning shots notwithstanding, the crowd first surrounded the headquarters and subsequently, threatening to use grenades, began to demand that the servicemen surrender their weapons. Some of the people got inside the building through the windows on the first floor.

At approximately this time representatives of the national guard and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Military Commissar of the Republic Captain First Rank I. Deniyev, chairman of the Council of Servicemen-Afghan Veterans S. Asuyev, and others arrived. Through their efforts passions were quelled at least somewhat, and events were made controllable. Only one random shot rang out in the headquarters when two "contenders" for the same assault rifle began to grab it from each other. On the whole, 50 assault rifles from the military establishment were added to the arsenal of the criminal underworld.

The events in the compound of the second military establishment, located on the other side of Grozny, took an even more dramatic turn. In the event of success, the booty in this case amounted to fabulous riches: After all, more than 20,000 firearms, and tremendous stocks of rounds and grenades were held at the depot.

They had tried to capture the establishment as early as the day before. It did not work out. The military did not waver. At 0300 hours the attackers dispersed to rest before the next assault. By the evening of 8 February, a crowd of approximately 500 to 600 swirled aggressively at the gates of a checkpoint.

To be sure, members of the Executive Committee of the National Congress of the Chechen People, members of parliament, and, of course, elders made continuous appeals there. Later a mullah said his part. They were heard out but, as could be seen, some did not heed them.

Heavy automatic weapons fire which broke out on one occasion, drove all of us crowding around the checkpoint

in different directions. A man clutched his head and blood dripped from under his hand. They grabbed the wounded man and dragged him around a corner. Apparently this was a wound from a ricocheting bullet because they were clearly firing over the heads of the people. However, the fear wore off quickly, and soon the crowd was already rocking the metal gates of the military unit.

When one of us managed to break through to the checkpoint after all, it came out that the Chechen special forces stood guard there. The small but quite resolutely minded special forces detachment had been providing defense for the settlement together with its garrison. The army personnel stayed somewhat back behind the trees. They responded to my questions agitatedly:

"Are we going to shoot to kill? Of course we will not. It is easy to fight when a great state stands behind you. Meanwhile, who stands behind us? Who is going to evacuate us from here together with our families? Who needs us?"

There is no argument—the mood of many was far from combative. As came out later, it was also due to a complete lack of clarity as to whether the republic would help defend the arsenal. After all, preventing mafia from laying its hands on such a cache of weapons was a function of not only the military. Meanwhile, reinforcements from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Chechnia were represented by a small OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachments] detachment which, however, was actually unarmed. The deputy commander of the OMON detachment periodically tried to plead with his superiors for reinforcements, but he did not get any, be it in terms of personnel, weapons, or materiel.

In addition, in the combat formations of the defenders there were several dozen poorly trained, ethnic Chechen cadets from the same training unit, as well as another unarmed detachment—about 10 people from the Committee for the Defense of Civil Rights, and volunteers representing various public organizations. Naturally the latter demanded automatic weapons and ammunition from the officer in charge of the defense of the settlement, which they finally received.

By 1900 hours the attackers succeeded in massing on the approaches to the guardhouse. Make-believe fire had no effect on them anymore. Their tactic was well known: pressure by unarmed people and single shots fired from behind the crowd. Later they used grenades. The guard detail was supported by a few OMON and special forces personnel. Apparently it was right there, in the course of an assault on the depots, that the attackers sustained their main losses. It is hard to give accurate numbers at present. However, we were told at the Government House yesterday morning that according to preliminary data, six people were killed and about 15 wounded.

The bitterness of the attacking side grew by the hour. The guardhouse was seized and they began tunneling under one of the depots. It was obvious that the forces of the defenders were desperately small. Even the permanent

personal representative of the president of the republic in the defense headquarters was beside himself at times, failing to understand where the promised water cannons, militia detachment, and guardsmen were. For their part, the military did not have anybody at all to count on, with the exception of General Sokolov, himself under siege, promising to send three tanks. In the morning the tanks arrived after a 50-kilometer forced march. Prior to this an attempt had been made to throw grenades at the headquarters. However, it came down to two explosions next to the building. Fortunately, nobody was hurt.

We spent the whole night waiting for another assault, this time an armed one. In the morning national guardsmen arrived following the tanks. However, officers and warrant officers who had not slept in three nights continued to stand guard next to the depots and guarded approaches to the establishment.

In the parliament of the republic, we were told that supposedly there was an agreement on the withdrawal of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] troops with weapons and materiel from Chechnia without hindrance, and at the time the military establishment was under attack, Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov and President D. Dudayev were on the phone talking.

On Sunday evening D. Dudayev appealed on television to the residents of Chechnia. He stressed that "an extremely alarming situation has emerged; bandit elements are attacking military units. They want to provoke an extensive conflict like the one in Georgia. We will do everything in order not to draw the servicemen, their families, and citizens of the republic into this conflict."

As far as the servicemen are concerned, they have already been drawn into this conflict. At present, the most important task is to remove them from under the blow. Bursts of automatic weapons fire are still being heard in front of our windows at the time we are transmitting this article.

PVO Unit Attacked

92UM0569B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Feb 92 p 1

[From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent Major A. Ivanov in Grozny: "Air Defense Units"]

[Text] All units and subunits of the Air Defense came under simultaneous bandit assaults on 7 February. Between 1500 and 2200 hours, large crowds of people together with armed groups attacked military establishments, seized weapons and materiel, and stole property and petroleum products.

A total of 1,050 firearms, 46 tons of ammunition, 186 motor vehicles, 48 tons of gasoline and diesel fuel, and 20 railway carloads of foodstuffs, clothing, and technical equipment were seized and stolen from the Air Defense units. Total losses came to approximately R180 million.

The servicemen displayed tenacity and self-restraint in this most difficult situation; they did not give in to provocations, and did not use their weapons. Thirteen servicemen were beaten by the attackers; the injured were taken to the hospital.

Dudayev Removes Regimental Commander

92UM0569C Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Feb 92 p 1

[From KRSNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent Major A. Petrov in Grozny: "An Internal Troops Regiment"]

[Text] The officers of an armed escort regiment of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia were called together on 3 February and informed of the decision of President of the Chechen Republic D. Dudayev removing the commander of the regiment and his deputies from their positions. All personnel were transferred to the training center of the Armed Forces, and the military compound together with its depots and combat materiel were placed under a guard detail of the republic OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachments]. In the evening of the same day, communications with the regiment were lost.

A large group of armed individuals broke into the unit compound on 6 February in broad daylight. They drove back the OMON guard detail and "took charge" of the military compound. According to preliminary data, about 2,000 units of firearms and materiel were seized—mainly cars, combat vehicles (including a PT-76 tank and armored personnel carriers), and 4,000 pieces of assorted ammunition.

On Sunday the personnel of the internal troops regiment, which had long been under siege by Chechen armed detachments, was withdrawn from Grozny. As the press center of the Internal Troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs reports, no servicemen were injured in the course of redeployment.

Dudayev Sets Grozny Curfew

92UM0569D Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Feb 92 p 1

[From ITAR-TASS correspondent Sh. Asuyev in Grozny: "As the Issue Was Being Typeset"]

[Text] The president of the Chechen Republic, Dzokhar Dudayev, signed a ukase on 10 February imposing a curfew in Grozny effective 11 February. The curfew will be in effect from 2200 to 0600 hours in the entire territory of the city.

Nationality Stresses Dividing Officer Corps

92UM0594A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Feb 92 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel V. Zhitarenko, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Loyalty Card, or How the Internationalist Officer Corps Is Becoming Nationalized"]

[Text] Relatively recently they had served together in the Kantermirovskiy tank division—division deputy commander Viktor Koshevoy, regiment commander Yuriy Pakhomov, and battalion commander Aleksandr Papakin. I had met with them dozens of times and written about these highly professional officers and people of duty and honor. It seemed as through a future as extraordinarily promising specialists awaited them. And strictly speaking, that is what happened. But the beginning of this year had some drastic changes in store for the fate of at least two of them.

Koshevoy was chief of the Baku Combined Arms Command School, and three months ago he was promoted to the rank of general; but now, in connection with the establishment of a republic army there, he could be put out of work. Pakhomov was a division commander in Ukraine, and as a result of the nationalization of the Armed Forces there, he too could find himself in the ranks of unemployed generals.

As Papakin told me about his comrades in the formerly unbroken military ranks, I got the feeling that mentally he was thanking the Almighty for the fact that Russia, where he now serves, has not yet followed the example of administering oaths to the officer corps. But you never know what could happen: If it does, where will he, a native of Kharkov Oblast, go?

But the question is sooner a rhetorical one. Colonel Papakin is going to serve Russia as a division chief of staff. And Koshevoy would faithfully serve Azerbaijan, had not someone in the powers that be there decided that he is "unreliable." And Ukraine would have gotten a faithful soldier in the person of Pakhomov, were he not forced to go against his conviction that a soldier takes only one oath in his lifetime.

Their current situation is a kind of cross-section of the situation of the entire officer corps. One has yet to be drawn into the political struggle over the establishment of national armies. A second didn't want to get drawn into it, but that didn't help. And the third group had a firm conviction on this score and, as they say, himself slammed the door on the politicians who are causing discord among military personnel. Not without some benefit for those politicians, let us analyze just what the aforementioned three categories of servicemen constitute.

Judging from information published in the press, there are not that many generals and officers who have "slammed the door" in Ukraine. In any event, the names

of only the troop commanders of three military districts have been cited. And a "telling figure" has been made public: 350,000 servicemen have taken an oath to Ukraine. But for some reason, another figure has been left out of the picture: There are a total of more than 450,000 servicemen there. What about this "remainder" of 100,000—will they too, like Pakhomov, be quietly gotten rid of? And will it be possible to do this quietly at a time when a clamor is already being raised? And who can say how it will all end? One thing is certain: No one has an interest in this kind of unpredictable situation.

Many of those who have "slammed the door" on their own initiative are already looking for a new place to serve—in Russia and Kazakhstan. Because in those states, the garrisons have a far more tranquil life in a psychological sense: They are not being dragged off by force to serve in national armies. And the "refugees" are going there because they are people who have a truly keen sense of officer pride. And without that quality, strictly speaking, what professionalism, what reliability, can there be to speak of? It seems that in them, Ukraine is losing in the best that the army has to offer.

True, it is gaining something. Officers in Russian garrisons are also requesting transfers to Ukraine. For example, in the Far East Military District there have been nearly 2,000 such requests. So are we talking about a mass phenomenon? I wouldn't say so. One has to know the size of that district. One has to do some simple calculations that show that in any unit, nearly one-third of the officers are Petrenkos, Mirgorodskiys, Rudenkos, and Ivanyuks. Finally, bear in mind that most of the garrisons in the Far East, Transbaykal, Siberian, and Volga-Urals districts are without question remote and desolate places where, on account of climate, supplies, and the shortage of housing, military service is very hard to endure, and the prospect of staying there after completely one's service is all the more unappealing. In Ukraine, there are only a handful of such "holes in the wall." And this is not hearsay: I was born and raised there, and I served there for almost 10 years.

As a participant in the All-Army Officer Conference, I met with many officers I had served with from the Kiev, Odessa, and Carpathian districts. Including some who have taken the Ukrainian oath. And none of them said their reason for taking the oath was a commitment to "separatist" ideas! It's all much more prosaic: They didn't want to find themselves out of a job and lose their apartments; some already have private garden plots, and their wives are employed. I suppose that some readers will perceive in these words of mine an attempt to discredit the image of these officers and claim that I am portraying them as all but traitors to the common interest for the sake of personal well-being. But they needn't get on their high horse. After all, these officers are hardly to blame for what is going on, they're not the ones who organized our life in such a way that that apartment costs several million and the political squabbling over the army is surpassing all bounds of decency. The politicians have deceived the officer corps so many

times that they have taught the officers quite a lot about this. This time it looks as if the officers have tried to outsmart the politicians. You demand we take an oath? We'd be glad to!

And I don't think that the Ukrainian leaders themselves are seriously counting on unswerving obedience from people who have taken the oath on pain of being discharged and losing a roof over their heads.

I foresee another objection: The fact is that there are also staunch proponents of national armies! Of course there are. And I respect that conviction, just as I respect any conviction. But I cannot help but share a few observations on this score.

It is said that the Azerbaijani authorities were told some things about General V. Koshevoy by one of his own subordinates, a person of the same nationality: that Azerbaijani interests mean nothing to him. And so they came up with a "loyalty card"—what would we do without all our cards these days? Needless to say, for temporary loyalty, because if we are talking about the prospect of "total nationalization" of the Baku school, there won't be a place there for any Koshevoys or in general.

I doubt that a place will be found there even for Major V. Mudrak, the well-known reader of our newspaper who, supposedly submitting to the "call of his maternal blood," conspired with its fellow countrymen—Azerbaijani militants—and helped them seize weapons and combat hardware from a unit. He may be their hero for now, but down the road, he could with equal success become a newly unreliable servicemen—should he suddenly hear the "call of his paternal blood."

Am I exaggerating? Am I getting ahead of events? Am I making excessively dire predictions?

The fact is that the very logic of this sort of "privatization-nationalization" of armies is inexorable. It comes as no surprise that people in Kiev are now asking more questions: Why is the Ukrainian officers council headed by an Armenian? Why is the Defense Minister a Russian—at any rate, a man with a Russian surname?

If the parliament of that state is using legislative acts to encourage Ukrainian officers to return to their homeland from other states, but, at the same time, can only put them on a long waiting list for posts, it is really impossible that this could be followed no longer by legislative acts but acts based purely on force—the eviction of a Sidorov who is serving in the Carpathian district, even though he has taken the Ukrainian oath, in favor of a Sidorenko who has come from the Far East?

And maybe the latter will go to Khabarovsk or Blagoveshchensk, as a group of officers from the Samaro-Ulyanovsk Iron Division is prepared to do. But if Sidorov tells them where to go, he will have his reasons: His wife's maiden name is Shevchenko, and there'll be no one to look after his elderly father-in-law in Yavorov.

And finally, what if Sidorov sees the insidious intrigues of not so much Sidorenko, but of those who are behind this whole sordid business?

Good or bad, the legacy of mixed marriages from the former single USSR is enormous, and it can't be cancelled out by any decrees issued by all the current presidents put together. As in officers' families, mixed marriages surely account for at least half the total: An officer serves where he is sent, and as a rule he gets married where he is serving. Have the powers that be given any thought as to what it means to have an army of like-blooded officers (assuming that such an army could be created) but who have "second halves" of another nationality? Or do they expect to administer more oaths—to officers' wives, and then to their children and grandchildren?

My thoughts keep returning to the All-Army Officers Conference. It had everything—a certain spirit of rebellion, anguish over the army's plight, and extreme left and right radicalism in equal proportions. But there was undoubtedly one most important thing that united the envoys from all the officers' collectives in the Armed Forces: The conviction that they cannot permit the unthinking breakup of the army and navy along national lines. All clearly understand that rash, arbitrary actions can only bring disaster: a situation in which the political confrontation between the newly independent states could develop into a confrontation between former army comrades.

No other view was expressed at the conference. And it would be a terrible thing for anyone to forget this—above all those who on February 14 in Minsk will discuss these extremely serious problems that have a bearing on the fate of one-sixth of our mother earth. Let them heed that view!

Pay Problems Among Internal Troops

92UM0625A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Feb 92 First Edition p 2

[Reader replies: "It Appears That Not All Are Friendly in the MVD as Well"]

[Text] The article "The AFB [Federal Security Agency] and the MVD Are Friends But Is the Army a Foe?" (7 February, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA) on the unjust pay for the servicemen in the Armed Forces in comparison with the servicemen of the Russian Ministry of Security, as it turned out, evoked many telephone calls and telegrams. And quite unexpected were the calls from the Main Administration of the Commander of the Internal Troops [GUKVV] of the Russian MVD.

Col N. Prokopenko, chief of the Department for Social and Legal Work and Military Discipline in the GUKVV of the Russian Federation MVD.

"The Decree of the Russian government of 20 January 1992, No 38, which is described in the article, alas, does not extend to our troops.

"We would like to ask the officials at the Russian Ministry of Economics and Finances who drew up the decree whether they know anything at all about the existence of the Internal Troops in the structure of the MVD and what role they are to play?

"And certainly for how long have our soldiers and officers already been fighting in 'hot spots' where their lives are constantly threatened with mortal danger."

Col V. Burakov, acting chief of the Financial Department at the GUKVV of the Russian Federation MVD.

"Decree No 38 "On the Pay for Personnel in the Russian Federation MVD and the Russian Federation AFB" introduces a clearly unjust aspect in the relations of the Internal Troops servicemen. In particular, inequality has been increased in the wages of the servicemen and workers in the corrective labor colonies [ITK] and they essentially perform the same job. For a comparison: the chief of a lumber ITK which guards some 2,000 convicts receives a salary of 3,215 rubles while the commander of the regiment a subunit of which guards several such facilities receives just 1,330. The pay according to military ranks would be respectively 360 and 342 rubles.

"In addition; the workers of the ITK receive a significant amount of bonuses but under the current legislation the servicemen are deprived of these. And such bonuses from production operations may reach up to 12,000 rubles. The amounts of the bonuses depend upon plan fulfillment. The plan should also depend upon guarding. In the drive for profits, the ITK administration "stretches out" the production shifts. The convicts are sent to work even on holidays. The personnel of the subunits guards the convicts. Without gaining anything from this!

"We have also received valid complaints from the servicemen over the Order of the USSR President of 28 November 1991, No RP-2892, according to which the value of in-kind rations for the employees of the bodies is included in the total earnings for figuring pensions. Alas, this benefit is not extended to servicemen."

Incidentally, when this material was being prepared for the press, it was learned that the Commander of the Internal Troops, Col Gen V. Savvin forwarded to the Russian Minister of Internal Affairs, Lt Gen of the Police B. Yerin a report which set out these facts. The commander requested assistance in establishing social justice in the maximum short time on the questions of pay for the servicemen of the Internal Troops of the Russian MVD.

CIS: POLICY

Dubynin Scores Polish Stance on Economic Issues

92UM0557A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
10 Feb 92 p 4

[Interview with Colonel General V. Dubynin, commander of the Northern Group of Forces, by PRAVDA correspondent Anatoliy Starukhin; in Legnica, Poland, date not given: "How Much Is the 'Zero Option' Worth: Negotiations Concerning Terms for the Withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces From Poland Are at an Impasse"]

[Text] *I remember how we bade farewell to the first military train of a guard missile brigade heading home from the northwestern corner of Poland on a rainy day in April of last year. This was the beginning of the regular withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces, which has been stationed in the territory of the neighboring country for 45 years. About 23,000 soldiers, warrant officers, and officers have gone home; 35,000 continue to serve far from home. However, a great many problems in the agreements concerning the redeployment of our troops still have not been resolved. Colonel General V. Dubynin, commissioner of the government of Russia and commander of the Northern Group of Forces, discusses these problems in a conversation with a PRAVDA correspondent.*

[Starukhin] Apparently, by now the main aspects of the return of our troops from the territory of Poland have been clarified.

[Dubynin] Unfortunately, the 14 rounds of negotiations already held between our side and the Polish side have brought about the coordination and initialing, in November, of just one document on a schedule for the withdrawal of army units. According to this document, we must redeploy all combat units until 15 November of this year. By the beginning of 1993 we will have up to 6,000 personnel there, and by the end of the year virtually all units of the Northern Group of Forces will have crossed the border and the group will have been liquidated.

However, it is possible that in 1994 a small contingent of servicemen will remain, whose strength has not yet been specified, to support the transit of the Western Group from Germany through Poland, if there is such transit. For now, there is none. As is known, our colleagues to the west are effecting withdrawal by sea. I would like to establish right away that we are not interested in extending the duration of our service on the land of a foreign state. There are at minimum two aspects involved in this. The first aspect is political. There is no longer any need for our troops to be based abroad. The second aspect is economic. Ours are "hard-currency" troops, and their maintenance here costs the people dearly.

This particular problem is the most difficult because it calls for resolving financial, ownership, and legal problems on a bilateral basis. Sad as it is, not a single item has been agreed upon to date.

During almost half a century in Poland we have erected residential buildings, barracks, technical and other facilities totalling about 3 billion rubles [R]. Naturally, we do not have the right to be negligent and abandon all of this. However, so far we have not been in a position to sell real estate and movable assets. Neither party wishes to compromise. The Poles recognize only one "concession"—the "zero option." What is this? Our hosts continuously play the trump card by demanding compensation for ecological damage done by our troops.

Initially, they evaluated this at R3 billion. The thrust was clear: You should leave all your assets to us free of charge in payment for damaging the land and polluting the water and air. Quite recently, our negotiating partners quoted a quite different number—\$4.5 billion! Which one is true? The number is clearly unacceptable to us. Damage was evaluated unilaterally, and the interests of only one side were taken into account. I even doubt that the above "hard" billions originated from precise calculations or some kind of methodology. Most probably they were pulled out of a hat, as the saying goes.

[Starukhin] What is our side undertaking? For example, notes such as the following one have surfaced in the Polish press: "A garrison of the Northern Group of Forces stationed in Stargard Szczecinski transferred 28 apartments to the local authorities. The premises have been transferred free of charge." In Swinoujscie, a naval garrison transferred 34 apartments to the city. Major repairs were done in all apartments; the garrison refunded the costs, and the apartments were transferred free of charge. Viktor Petrovich, is this a payment of sorts for the damages inflicted or simply a gift?

[Dubynin] As I see it, this is wishful thinking. First, we leased these apartments. Indeed, we did major repairs in them. We asked the Polish authorities to refund the outlays to us, but we did not get anything. Then, in turn, we refused to pay for repair of a dock carried out by the Poles. As you can see, conflicts are still underway. Both participants in the negotiations and the Polish mass media took offense at me after I blurted out at the last press conference: "We did not count money when we helped the fraternal people of Poland after the war with foodstuffs, clothing, and footwear, and built houses and plants free of charge..." I recall 600,000 Soviet soldiers who died on Polish soil. In response, they mention the Polish officers who were shot at Katyn and produce an invoice. I am not against submitting bills, but they should be calculated and coordinated throughout.

[Starukhin] What stands in the way of us making such calculations?

[Dubynin] Confusion at the top, the low rank of the participants in the negotiations, and the absence of specialists... The head of the delegation is not endowed

with any powers. The former Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not argue for our positions during negotiations. Its representative was merely in attendance and considered his task to be the signing of a final document as soon as possible, regardless of its content. I met with deputies of the Russian parliament and officially requested that the jurisdiction of Russia be extended to our group of forces. Finally, this was done in mid-January. I keep hoping that greater progress is now possible. The level of the negotiations should be increased immediately. Representatives of the supreme authorities, the government, should head the negotiations. After all, what kind of a situation are we in at present? The group of forces is in arrears on payments for electricity, foodstuffs, and leasing of premises to Poland. I hope that we will pay the money soon. They have already begun to use sanctions against us. On 25 January electricity was turned off in five settlements, and in residential buildings, schools, and kindergartens into the bargain. Subsequently the lights in another 10 settlements went out. We are helpless in counteracting such measures. I believe that this calls for the firm will of the leadership of Russia. Incidentally, Poland purchases substantial amounts of electricity to the east of the Bug. They turn around and charge us, the military, a dollar per 10 kilowatts, or three times more. Also, let us look at ecology. I have asked many times that a group of experts, authoritative specialists with instruments and equipment and in possession of relevant normative acts, be assigned from our side. Together with Polish specialists, they should work out a different method for defining, counting, and evaluating losses inflicted on the environment. In this case, we would not go through the motions at the next session of our meetings but would proceed from specific conclusions. How can we do without this when several billion dollars are at stake?

[Starukhin] We may conclude from what you have said that our side was not quite ready to prepare agreements.

[Dubynin] I believe it was so. For example, it was set forth in the 1956 treaty that "we must transfer houses in good repair." However, what is good repair? Is it after cosmetic repairs or after major repairs, which may ruin anybody? The agreements are hopelessly obsolete; they have not been revised for decades; they were signed under absolutely different political and economic conditions. Here is another issue: At present, we do not have an opportunity to trade in our assets. This should also be resolved at the level of governments. Our group of forces may sell to the Polish Army spare parts, some combat materiel, and ammunition. All of this costs a pretty penny. Otherwise, things will happen which are already happening: The amounts of payments for damage done to nature will be artificially adjusted to equal the extent of value of assets and military materiel. The notorious "zero option" will be implemented, or still harsher terms will be offered.

[Starukhin] Finally, my last question: One might conclude that the servicemen of the Northern Group of Forces are in a less advantageous situation than their

colleagues from the Western Group of Forces, for whom Germany is building residential settlements.

[Dubynin] Of course, they are in a worse situation. We are leaving with a burden of unsolved problems, and uncertainty lies ahead yet again. We proposed that housing be built simultaneously for the cadre personnel of the Northern Group of Forces and the Northwestern Group of Forces based in the Baltic states. Perhaps they will heed our call...

Officers Polled on Politics, Politicians

92UM0579A Moscow SYN OTECHSTVA in Russian
No 5, 31 Jan 92 p 2

[V. Strugovets report: "Of Sympathies, Antipathies, and So Forth"]

[Text] As has already been reported, the Moscow section of the All-Russian Center for Research on Public Opinion, together with the Association of Military Sociologists, has conducted a poll among those attending the All-Army Officers Assembly.

The main task of the poll was to study the opinion of officers on the most topical Army problems, and attitudes toward the complex and contradictory processes that have been taking place since the collapse of the USSR. About 1,500 senior and top officers were polled. The questionnaire was made up of almost two dozen questions.

One of the most complicated was a question about sympathies and antipathies toward present political figures. Here, the number of those who found the question difficult to answer made up almost seven percent of those polled.

N. Nazarbayev enjoyed the greatest support among those polled. From 33 percent to 46 percent of respondents expressed a negative attitude toward V. Zhirinovskiy, M. Gorbachev, and L. Kravchuk.

In answer to a question of whether the Army should act as an independent political force, 19 percent of those polled answered that the Army should wait for decisions reached by the politicians. However, 79 percent of those polled are convinced that the final word in determining the further fate of the Armed Forces should be left to the military.

Here is the opinion on the future of the Armed Forces. Some 67 percent would prefer unified armed forces, and 27 percent combined armed forces along the line of the Warsaw Pact. Only two percent preferred independent armed forces for each of the states of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

More than half of those polled are concerned about the possibility of military conflicts between Russia and the other states of the Commonwealth, and only one-fourth believe that nothing like this will occur.

In answer to a question of whether the internal function of the Armed Forces should be preserved in the years immediately ahead, more than 50 percent responded in the affirmative.

On the subject of attitudes toward the military in the region where they are serving, 60 percent of officers defined them as good, 36 percent as bad. Among the latter were included first and foremost the territories of the Transcarpathian and Transcaucasus Military Districts and the Northwest Group of Forces. Here, officers noted growing tension in the mutual relations between the commands of military units and the local authorities. Incidentally, those polled also named Moscow among the unfavorable regions.

On the subject of the prestige of the military profession, 55 percent of those polled believe that in the coming years its prestige will decline (most of the pessimists are officers who have served for more than 15 years), 10.9 percent believe that prestige will remain at its earlier level, and 24.1 percent hope that it will be enhanced.

Moscow Officers Assembly Accused of 'Nostalgia' for the Empire

92UM0507A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
22 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel V. Lazorkin, deputy of Lvov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies: "It Is Dangerous To Project Personal Ambitions in the Army Environment"]

[Text] The battles of the All-Army Officers Assembly are behind us. We can summarize the results now. I would rather not offer a simplistic appraisal of this forum, since in addition to preplanned political exhortations in favor of preserving a single army, the officers on the podium spoke sincerely and honestly about their pain, the hardships they now have to face.

I sincerely sympathize and respect these courageous and honest people in military uniform. At the same time, I feel dislike and contempt towards those who for such a long time had been looking with such indifference at the officers problems and the hopelessness of their situation in one of the largest militaries in the world.

Who is responsible for this dramatic situation? Many of those who spoke up tried to answer this question. I have no doubt that the culprits, most of whom were not present in the audience, were eagerly following the words of every speaker, breaking out in a cold sweat from fear that the deprived officers will again say their names in front of the entire world.

They are the ones who had been shamelessly wasting the military budget and exploiting gratis military labor while fattening their bank accounts, building luxurious dachas, and finding their offspring comfortable generals' jobs. Their time is gone now and will not return, but justice will be served on these greedy consumers.

Unfortunately, one could hear in the speeches of many officers an aggressiveness and a touch of ignorance, which showed that they simply do not understand the processes that are taking place on the territory of the former USSR. One can understand these officers from the human point of view. One can also understand Marshal of the Air Force Yevgeniy Ivanovich Shaposhnikov's reaction to the demand of one of the speakers' for his resignation. But it is hard to understand why Commander in Chief Shaposhnikov turned a deaf ear to the numerous entreaties of the Ukraine delegation during the four-month negotiations in Moscow on military matters, which is evidenced by stenographic transcripts of these negotiations.

For Yevgeniy Ivanovich, the Ukrainian position and the practical steps in regard to the creation of its own Armed Forces was not a secret. We had regularly informed him and the chief of General Staff, and had held consultations with them. As a main argument against reciprocal coordinated actions, the commander in chief had been referring to the fact that above him was President Gorbachev who was not in support of the Ukraine desire for independence. Now there is no President Gorbachev; still, Yevgeniy Ivanovich sees other arguments against Ukraine creating its own Armed Forces, and looks for support among the delegates of the All-Army Conference of Officer Assemblies' Representatives, where common sense did not always prevail. Some officers were getting nearly hysterical in their nostalgia for the disintegrated empire.

Colonel Alksnis' speech was permeated by vulgar egotism. Having made mourning over the lost motherland the focal point of his reflections, the officer does not even want to think about tens of millions of people who have finally regained the motherland taken from them by force—from some in 1918, from some later. For some reason, Col. Alksnis does not bring up the memory of the net of concentration camps that had enmeshed one-sixth of the Earth. Yes, he can proclaim loudly, for the whole world to hear, the loss of his motherland; millions of those who died martyr deaths during the collectivization and artificial famine, repressions, and genocide no longer have this opportunity. The colonel does not share the joy of the people of Ukraine who have regained their motherland and are creating an independent state and their own Armed Forces.

It somehow slips everyone's attention in the conference hall that Leonid Kravchuk is not the commander in chief's gopher, but a president of a state with a 52-million population, recognized by many foreign countries. Such position of responsibility requires a respectful attitude not only on the part of presidents of states, but also of the All-Army Officers' Assembly.

Neither did the speakers note that starting 1 January, Ukraine took upon itself the financing of the entire group of Armed Forces stationed on its territory; and

that starting 3 January, all job appointment and promotions in rank are done by the Ukraine minister of defense.

And, of course, it was totally beyond anybody's understanding that by bashing the Ukraine the speakers were interfering in internal affairs of a sovereign state. What is it—a political nearsightedness of depoliticized officers or a meticulous fulfillment of orders from a superior? Let it be on the conscience of every one who stooped to this hypocrisy. I only want to remind them once again that the events of the August putsch had clearly showed: In the hands of politicians, the army has been, is, and will be a tool of the struggle for power, a means of suppressing freedom and democracy.

On 1 December the people of Ukraine said at the referendum: "Enough!" "We Are for Independence!" "Yes to the President!" and "Yes to Our Own Armed Forces!"

By introducing the notion of dual citizenship, the Supreme Soviet has opened the doors wide for honest and decent officers of the former Soviet Army to join the Ukraine Armed Forces. Our state will gratefully reward, in accordance with laws on social and legal protection of servicemen and members of their families and on military pensions, all those who will honestly and loyally serve its people.

The Ukraine Ministry of Defense will take care of those servicemen who have expressed a wish to be discharged and leave Ukraine. We will see them off with proper material provisions and honors.

This is a normal civilized approach to the problems of officers, and respect showed by the people Ukraine for their difficult martial work.

And what is completely puzzling is the officers' unwillingness to take into account the political realities of our time.

Col. Alksnis craftily misled everyone by saying that the servicemen have lost their motherland. Nobody lost a motherland. We should not equate the notions of "motherland" and "state." Each person has, had, and will have a motherland. It can only be taken away by force, as had already happened in the state called the USSR. So Col. Alksnis is simply trying to pass wishful thinking for reality.

And the reality is this: The USSR has ceased to exist as a state as a subject of international law. The laws of this state are no longer in effect; also gone is the budget that used to finance the USSR Armed Forces. On the territory of the former Union there are now new states—subjects of international law; one of them is Ukraine.

The state of Ukraine is forming its own Armed Forces on a firm legal ground. The Ukraine Supreme Soviet has adopted a package of laws on defense matters, and approved the defense budget.

In accordance with international practice, upon joining the Armed Forces of a state, each citizen takes an oath of allegiance. This is necessary for the consummation of a legal contract between the citizen and the state, in order to establish the mutual legal responsibility for observing the existing military legislation. Such is the norm of a law-based society. Ukraine is unswervingly following this road, and nobody has the right to interfere with it.

There are, however, forces that would like very much to use for their own gain the already difficult situation of the officers. No matter what clothes they put on, however, their nakedness and lack of principles still come through. Among those who fully revealed a disapproving attitude towards the Ukraine leadership's concern for the officers needs was the representative of the so-called independent Officers Association. Such a two-faced position of a public organization splits the collectives, which is absolutely impermissible. Especially considering that the Ukraine defense minister has explained in detail policy of the Ukraine Government, aimed at bringing all officers together, strengthening healthy relations in the collectives, and removing tensions surrounding the army in the society.

I understand that our difficult time is the time for breaking mental stereotypes, but one should not project personal ambitions and lack of understanding of the situation into the army environment. This is very dangerous. It is also a thankless undertaking. The people of Ukraine voted for their own Armed Forces. There will be Ukraine Armed Forces!

Officers' Conference: Divisions Between General, Field Grade Officers

92UM0622B Moscow DEN in Russian
No 4, 26 Jan-1 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Vasilii Bubnov and Aleksandr Anisimov: "The Display Board"]

[Text] A great deal still will be written and said about the All-Service Officers Meeting, but even now it is clear that this event became very significant.

First of all, prior to 17 January neither patriotic nor democratic forces realized the enormous changes which had occurred in the Army of the former USSR in recent months, nor did they expect such a swift awakening of the military. By admission of experts of quite different orientations, the Army became an independent political subject capable of speaking with parliamentarians and governments on equal terms in a tough and at the same time quite civilized manner (and without the traditional rifle).

Secondly, the Army also showed itself to be an independent subject of a civil society and far from indifferent as to the state to which to swear allegiance and which people to serve.

Thirdly, a clear split in the Army occurred at the meeting between its oligarchic "nomenklatura" leadership agreeable to everything and officers from colonel on down who "have nothing to lose except the Motherland." This is attested, for example, by the new style of behavior of majors and colonels in the presence of marshals and generals. And the makeup of the Coordination Council indicates the very same thing: there are only a few generals on it.

Fourthly, the meeting did not become the usual "letting off of steam," but served as the beginning of an intensive process of politicization of the Army, above all at a regional level. No one will stand in the position of attention any longer. In the near term it is possible to forecast the advancement of new informal leaders in the Army environment.

Processes going on in parallel with Army processes will develop the entire chain of conflicts around partition of the Soviet Army even more. Above all, the confrontation of Russia and Ukraine will deepen. Its basis will be demands of the Russian Federation Supreme Council to repeal the 1954 decisions transferring the Crimea to Ukraine. This will split Army ranks even more both political as well as nationally, but at the same time will allow the process of Russian Army establishment to be activated.

The wave of a "new" anticommunist "revolution" in Central Asia hardly will permit military subunits to remain aloof and not intervene in bloody events, especially if they affect families of the military and the Slavic population.

The Army's disintegration even now makes coordinated economic market reforms in the former USSR impossible: there is an absence of potential for ensuring security, and the political situation is diverting efforts of executive and legislative authority from economic stabilization and prevention of open military conflicts, this time with the threat of Soviet Army subunits becoming involved in them.

Any individual republic (except Russia) of the so-called Commonwealth of Independent States which is assuming the burden of establishing its own modern Armed Forces will cope neither with political nor economic tasks, nor with problems of military organizational development under the present starting conditions. The fact is that together with the defense industry, financial expenditures for establishing and maintaining a modern army under our conditions can "devour" up to 30 percent of the budget. Practically the entire amount of currency existing in the republics will go for these same purposes. It was only as a result of joint efforts by all subjects of the former USSR that it was possible to create the strongest Army in the world in the recent past.

The present situation insistently demands that a mobilization draft be advanced to the foreground in a reform

package, a draft providing for direct state intervention to bring order in the national economy and in all spheres of vital activity.

First Reading of Draft Law on Conversion

92UM0630B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Feb 92 p 2

[INTERFAX: "Draft Law on Conversion"]

[Text] The Council of the Republic of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet has accepted the draft law on conversion in its first reading. It regulates the organization, planning, financing and management of conversion in the conditions of a market economy. In the section on foreign economic activity of VPK [military-industrial complex] enterprises the draft law provides them with the right to export the resources, materials and equipment which have been freed up and to import equipment, technology, completed sub-assemblies for the output of new production. They can also create joint enterprises with foreign firms for the output of new civilian production, seek foreign credits using their own property as security, etc.

Nine Deputies, Ten District Commanders Said Involved in Coup

92UM0622A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Feb 92 p 1

[Report by parliamentary analyst Robert Minasov under rubric "In the Russian Federation Supreme Council": "The Army Found Itself Between a Rock and a Hard Place"]

[Text] Parliamentary analyst Robert Minasov reports from the White House.

The Small Room in the Russian House of Soviets, where a parliamentary hearing was held on 18 February on the involvement of Armed Forces leaders in the 19-21 August coup d'état, surprisingly held all who wished to come. The parliamentarians themselves showed no particular interest in the hearings, and the military who were invited probably occupied the bulk of the armchairs and seats.

Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov announced that a commission established on 5 September of last year to analyze activities of Armed Forces leaders in the coup d'état completed work on 5 November. The marshal dwelled on details of the conference which former Minister of Defense Yazov convened at 0600 hours on 19 August, at which he ordered troops placed in a state of increased combat readiness. The count of further actions by troops and military leaders began from that minute.

Shaposhnikov noted that bringing troops into Moscow and other cities as well as expenditures for fuels, lubricants and other purposes cost the state R13.5 [Translator's note: the second digit is only partially legible and

may not be "3"] billion. The marshal announced that nine deputy ministers of defense and ten district commanders who supported activities of the State Committee for the State of Emergency were relieved of their positions based on results of the commission's work. Air Force leaders were especially active.

Based on results of the analysis, a number of measures were worked out precluding Armed Forces involvement in criminal adventures. In particular, Shaposhnikov noted that all troop movements must be carried out only by sanction of the Supreme Council, president and commander in chief (minister of defense). It is his conviction that the Army should not take part in inter-ethnic conflicts and that it is better to think about strengthening the MVD. The Armed Forces must perform the sole mission of protecting the homeland against external aggression.

An episode occurred at the hearings that left an impression. People's Deputy Gleb Yakunin asked the marshal how it happened that Major Yevdokimov, a hero of the barricades, still had not been promoted. Even worse, he had been transferred to work in a rayon military commissariat. Shaposhnikov announced that Major Yevdokimov received the rank of colonel by an order of 9 February. There is no doubt that he will not be left without work. He congratulated the hero, who was in the room.

General of the Army Konstantin Kobets, who directed defense of the White House in August of last year, focused his attention on the role of the CPSU Central Committee and former government in involving the Army in criminal plans of the putschists. He said that the Armed Forces essentially ended up between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, as we know, orders are not discussed, but executed. On the other hand, these orders came from such structures as the CPSU Central Committee which stand above the laws and above the Army. Therefore we have an extreme need for laws on the Armed Forces, on security and on social protection of servicemen.

Temporary Duties of Personnel Officers

92UM0611C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Feb 92 First Edition p 3

[Document, approved by CIS United Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov on February 17, 1992, place not given: "Temporary Duties of Personnel Officers"]

[Text] The temporary duties of personnel officials have been developed in accordance with the Temporary Statute on Personnel Organs (Attachment No. 2 to this order).

Duties of the Deputy Regimental Commander (Ship 1st Rank) for Personnel

The deputy regimental commander (ship 1st rank) for personnel is responsible, in peacetime and in wartime, for the moral-psychological state of personnel, military discipline, and the effectiveness of work for the socio-legal protection of servicemen, their family members, and workers and employees of the CIS Armed Forces in the regiment (on the ship). He is subordinate to the regimental commander and is the immediate commander of all regimental (ship) personnel, with the exception of personnel who are directly subordinate to the regimental commander.

The deputy regimental commander (ship 1st rank) for personnel is obliged to:

- participate in the development and support the execution of combat and mobilization readiness plans and regimental (ship) combat training;
- organize and conduct educational work with personnel while considering specific ethnic and psychological characteristics, educational level and attitudes toward religion of each servicemen, form loyalty to the Homeland, to military duty and to the military oath, and the high combat and moral-psychological qualities of a soldier-citizen among them;
- conduct specific measures to strengthen military discipline and law and order, prevent violations of the law among personnel, and promote the cohesiveness of military collectives; insure safe conditions of military service;
- know the professional, moral, and psychological qualities of each officer, warrant officer, and master sergeant of regimental (ship) subunits;
- participate in the work to educate military cadres and increase their military- professional skills;
- study the moods, public opinion, and psychological state of servicemen, compile the general socio-psychological characteristics of regimental (ship) personnel and realize the measures to maintain a healthy moral climate in military collectives;
- organize and conduct work on insuring social justice with regard to servicemen, their family members, and workers and employees of the CIS Armed Forces, know their needs and requirements, take steps for the timely resolution of well-founded complaints and statements, and also restore rights that have been violated, manifest concern about the expansion of glasnost and democratization of official military relations;
- conduct effective political and legal information of regimental (ship) officers and warrant officers, and workers and employees, organize socio-humanitarian training of personnel, teach subunit commanders to

- conduct educational work, and summarize and introduce their leading experience;
- organize socio-psychological support of the educational process, combat alert (service), and guard and internal services;
- render methodological assistance to public councils and commissions and to other democratic organs that operate in the regiment (on the ship);
- maintain contact with local organs of state power and administration and with public associations of citizens and solve social problems, educate regimental (ship) personnel, and organize the military-professional orientation of young people and propaganda of military service;
- create conditions for the spiritual and cultural development of servicemen and organize the leisure of personnel;
- monitor the accuracy of the use of educational work technical systems and cultural-leisure equipment and the timeliness of delivery and issuance of periodicals and mail to personnel; and,
- report to the regimental (ship) commander in a timely manner on the moral- psychological state of personnel.

Duties of the Regimental (Ship) Psychologist

The regimental (ship) psychologist is directly subordinate to the assistant regimental (ship) commander for personnel and is responsible for the socio- psychological support of the regiment's (ship's) combat (combat training) activities.

The regimental (ship) psychologist is obliged to:

- study the socio-psychological processes in military collectives, the psychological characteristics of various categories of servicemen during the course of combat and moral-psychological training, while performing combat alert duty, guard or internal service, and take steps to prevent negative phenomena;
- develop recommendations in a timely manner for work with compulsory service personnel who have the signs of difficult adaptation and deviant conduct, and personally participate in preventive work, while closely cooperating with medical institutions;
- take part in the placement of servicemen to subunits and military specialties and prepare well-grounded recommendations for assigning sergeants and master sergeants to positions;
- develop recommendations for manning subunits that perform combat alert duty, selecting teams (groups) for carrying out missions while separated from the military unit, and eliminating psychological tension;

- participate in the planning and organization of professional officer training on issues of military pedagogy and psychology;
- participate in the psychological training of personnel for the conduct of modern war, the fulfillment of combat training and other tasks, and implement measures for the maintenance of their psychological stability; and,
- report in a timely manner to the assistant regimental (ship) commander for personnel on the psychological state of servicemen.

Duties of the Regimental (Ship) Leisure Organization Officer

The regimental (ship) leisure organization officer is directly subordinate to the assistant regimental (ship) commander for personnel and is responsible for organizing cultural-leisure work in the regiment (on the ship).

The leisure organization officer is obliged to:

- organize and conduct cultural-leisure work in the regiment (on the ship), conduct jointly with the club, library, and public organizations that operate in military collectives, specific measures for servicemen and their family members, especially on days off and holidays;
- provide conditions for the spiritual improvement of servicemen, satisfaction of their cultural and religious needs, development of independent creativity and independent amateur associations;
- participate in the conduct of mass sports and health work and tourist trips for servicemen, their family members, and workers and employees of the CIS Armed Forces;
- organize cooperation with the organs of state power and administration, with public associations of citizens, creative unions, cultural centers and charitable foundations to organize the full-fledged leisure of personnel;
- participate in providing subunits with cultural and educational equipment, organize its operation and repair, and carry out monitoring of the state and preservation of cultural and leisure facilities;
- report in a timely manner to the assistant regimental (ship) commander for personnel on the state of cultural-leisure work; and,
- organize subscriptions to periodicals at the military unit.

Duties of the Assistant Battalion (Ship 3rd Rank) Commander for Personnel

The assistant battalion (ship 3rd rank) commander for personnel is responsible, in peacetime and in wartime for the moral-psychological state and military discipline of

personnel. He is subordinate to the battalion commander and is the immediate commander of all personnel, with the exception of individuals who are directly subordinate to the battalion commander.

The assistant battalion (ship 3rd rank) commander for personnel is obliged to:

- participate in insuring the fulfillment of battalion (ship) combat and mobilization readiness and combat training plans;
- organize and conduct educational work with subunit personnel while considering specific ethnic and psychological characteristics, educational level and attitudes toward religion of each servicemen, form loyalty to the Homeland, to military duty and to the military oath, and the high combat and moral-psychological qualities of a soldier-citizen among them;
- organize and conduct measures to strengthen military discipline and prevent violations of the law among personnel, promote the cohesiveness of military collectives and insure safe conditions of military service;
- know the professional, moral, and psychological qualities of each officer, warrant officer, and master sergeant of battalion (ship) subunits, public opinion, and moods of personnel and take practical steps to establish interpersonal relations and to prevent negative phenomena in subunits;
- organize objective and efficient information of personnel and classes with servicemen on socio-humanitarian training plans;
- organize and conduct socio-psychological support of the training process, combat alert duty (service), and guard and internal services, and manage the battalion commander's work on information and leisure;
- render methodological assistance in the work of public organizations of servicemen and their family members;
- insure compliance with the principles of social justice with regard to servicemen, know the needs and requirements of servicemen, their family members, workers and employees of the CIS Armed Forces and take steps to resolve their complaints and statements;
- be concerned about the satisfaction of the spiritual needs of personnel, organize their cultural leisure, take steps to provide personnel with periodicals and mail, and organize the proper use and care of educational work technical systems and equipment; and,
- report to the battalion (ship) commander in a timely manner on the moral- psychological state of personnel.

Duties of the Deputy Company Commander for Personnel

The deputy company commander for personnel is responsible, in peacetime and wartime, for the moral-psychological state and military discipline of personnel. He is subordinate to the company commander and is the immediate commander of all personnel, with the exception of individuals who are directly subordinate to the company commander.

The deputy company commander for personnel is obliged to:

- participate in the composition of the schedule of classes and to plan and conduct educational work with subunit personnel while considering ethnic and psychological characteristics, educational level and attitudes toward religion of each servicemen, form loyalty to the Homeland, to military duty and to the military oath, and the high combat and moral-psychological qualities of a soldier-citizen among them;
- conduct measures to strengthen military discipline and to prevent violations of the law among personnel and insure safe conditions of military service;
- know the individual specific features of each serviceman, their professional, moral and psychological qualities, conduct individual work with them, and take steps to promote the cohesiveness of the military collective;
- carry out objective and efficient information of personnel and organize and personally conduct classes with servicemen on socio-humanitarian training plans;
- conduct socio-psychological support of the training process, combat alert duty (service), and guard and internal services;
- know the needs and desires of personnel, take steps to resolve their complaints and statements, and maintain contact with their relatives and loved ones;
- be concerned about the satisfaction of the spiritual needs of personnel, organize their leisure and the company's amateur artistic activities; take steps to provide personnel with periodicals and mail; and, organize the battalion commander's work on information and leisure, and properly use and care for educational work technical systems and equipment; and,
- report to the company commander in a timely manner on the moral-psychological state of personnel.

The CIS United Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov approved the published documents on February 17, 1992.

Temporary Statute on Personnel Agencies

92UM0611B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Feb 92 First Edition p 3

[Document, approved by CIS United Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov on February 17, 1992, place not given: "Temporary Statute on Personnel Organs"]

[Text] 1. Personnel organs are being created in accordance with the approved organizational structure of the troops (forces) and with the nature of the missions being carried out by them and are an integral part of the organs of military administration.

2. Personnel organs are subordinate to the appropriate commanders (chiefs) and are responsible for the moral-psychological state of personnel, military discipline, and also socio-legal protection of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces servicemen, their family members, and workers and employees.

3. In their activities, personnel organs are guided by the laws and military regulations that are in force and by orders and directives of the CIS Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief and appropriate commanders (chiefs), organizational-methodological instructions of the chairman of the Committee for Work with Personnel, and also by the Temporary Statute.

4. Personnel organs carry out socio-legal, informational, and socio-psychological support of combat (combat training) activities of the troops (forces), and conduct educational and cultural-leisure work with personnel and servicemen's family members.

5. The rights and obligations of personnel organs are defined by military regulations, this Temporary Statute, and the procedures of their activities that are prescribed by documents that regulate the work of the appropriate military administrative organs of which they are a part.

6. Personnel organ officials are assigned in the manner prescribed.

7. Assistants to commanders (chiefs) for personnel, who are direct commanders for all personnel with the exception of officials who are directly subordinate to the commander (chief), head personnel organs.

They insure the realization of combat and mobilization readiness measures, training of troops (forces), participate in their inspections, render methodological assistance on issues of socio-legal protection and cultural support of personnel, represent the interests of servicemen and their family members in the organs of state power and military administration, and also in public associations, issue instructions to subordinate personnel organs on socio-legal, informational, and socio-psychological support of the combat (combat training) activities, and educational and cultural-leisure work of the troops (forces).

Assistant commanders for personnel of the services of the Armed Forces, military districts, groups of forces, fleets, armies and flotillas, and commanders (chiefs) of branches of troops can be part of the appropriate military councils.

8. The following duties are assigned to the personnel organs:

- carry out measures to effectively influence the moral-psychological state of personnel, the quality of fulfillment of combat and mobilization readiness tasks, and combat (combat training) activities and training of troops (forces);
- support the fulfillment in the troops and in the fleets of social programs and measures for socio-legal protection of servicemen, their family members, and workers and employees of the CIS Armed Forces;
- develop and realize measures to prevent violations of the law among personnel, support strict military discipline and law and order in the troops (forces), and the cohesiveness of military collectives;
- conduct educational work with personnel and form the qualities of a citizen-patriot and loyalty to military duty and to the military oath among servicemen;
- provide informational support of military administrative organs and organize objective and effective information of personnel and their socio-humanitarian training;
- study and analyze the social processes in military collectives, public opinion, and moods of servicemen and members of their families, and develop recommendations to military administrative organs based on this;
- organize socio-legal support of the activities of the troops (forces) and resolve complaints and statements of personnel in a timely manner;
- study the needs and requirements of servicemen and their family members, workers and employees of the CIS Armed Forces, develop and implement steps to comply with the principles of social justice, and submit proposals to the appropriate commanders (chiefs) on insuring the rights of subordinates;
- render methodological assistance to public councils and commissions and to other democratic organs that operate in military collectives and garrisons;
- maintain contacts with public citizens associations, creative unions, and charitable and regional organizations which operate in accordance with the law on issues of socio-legal protection and spiritual development of personnel;
- implement socio-psychological support of personnel and render them psychological assistance;

- provide cultural servicing and organize the leisure of personnel at military units, on ships, and in garrisons;
- organize cooperation between the military mass media and state and other mass media and organize periodical subscriptions;
- summarize and implement the leading experience of education of personnel and the activities of personnel organs;
- participate in the development of measures on cadre policy in the troops (forces), measures to strengthen one-man command on a legal basis and democratization of official military relations and train military cadres in practical educational work;
- organize military-professional orientation of pre-conscription and pre-prescription age young people and the advertising of military service;
- study, select, train, and educate officials of personnel organs and of military units, institutions, enterprises and organizations subordinate to them; and,
- manage subordinate troop (fleet) television and radio transmission systems, military cultural institutions, and general education schools and printing enterprises.

9. Personnel organs supply the troops (forces) with technical systems for educational work, educational manuals, and cultural-leisure and other equipment and materials.

They provide financing and monitoring of the expenditure of funds allocated for the conduct of educational work and also of subdepartmental institutions, enterprises and organizations, manage their financial-management activities, and participate in the creation of funds, associations and other public organizations that are involved with issues of the development of culture in the troops (forces) and social protection of personnel.

Temporary Statute on Personnel Committee

92UM0611A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Feb 92 First Edition p 3

[Document, approved by CIS United Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov on February 17, 1992, place not given: "Temporary Statute on the CIS Armed Forces Personnel Committee"]

[Text] 1. The procedures for activities of the CIS Armed Forces Personnel Committee (hereinafter, the Committee) are determined by the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces and also by this Temporary Statute.

2. The Committee is subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces and is responsible for the moral-psychological state and military discipline of

personnel, and also for socio-legal protection of servicemen, their family members, workers and employees of the CIS Armed Forces, and also individuals discharged from active military service.

3. In its activities, the Committee is guided by the laws and military regulations that are in force, and by the orders and directives of the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces, as well as by this Temporary Statute.

4. The Committee organizes the socio-legal, informational and socio-psychological support of the troops (forces) combat readiness, the conduct of educational and cultural-leisure work with personnel and servicemen's family members, and implements personnel organ training program management.

5. For the purpose of insuring committee management when preparing decisions on the most important questions of personnel education, military discipline and socio-legal protection for servicemen, their family members and workers and employees, and improving the activities of personnel organs, a non-staff Coordinating Council, whose personnel are approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces, is being formed under the Committee.

6. The Committee is headed by the Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces's for Personnel who is the chairman of the CIS Armed Forces Personnel Committee. He has the right to:

- participate in the development of combat and mobilization readiness measures and in the structural development and training of troops (forces);
- sign orders for the Committee and to issue organizational-methodological orders to personnel organs;
- approve manuals, guidance, instructions and reference books on the problems of education and cultural-leisure work, and the socio-legal, informational and socio-psychological support of the troops (forces) and also other questions within the Committee's competence;
- on issues within the Committee's competence, to represent the interests of servicemen and their family members at organs of state power and the military directorate of the states participating in the Commonwealth of Independent States and also in public associations that function in accordance with the law; and,
- participate in the selection and placement of personnel organ officials from among officers in accordance with the prescribed manning document [nomenklatura].

7. The Committee is tasked to:

- develop social programs and measures for the protection of the personal rights and freedoms of servicemen and their family members, workers and employees, and veterans of the Armed Forces and also those

- individuals who have been discharged from active military service, and to guarantee that they are carried out in the troops and fleets;
- conduct measures to maintain the high moral-psychological state of personnel, support the fulfillment of combat and mobilization readiness missions and the combat (combat training) activities of the troops (forces), and participate in troop (force) inspections;
 - develop and implement measures to prevent violations of the law among personnel, maintain strict military discipline and ensure law and order in the troops (forces), and the cohesiveness of military collectives;
 - develop proposals on the primary directions, forms and methods of educational work, program-methodological support of socio-humanitarian training of CIS Armed Forces personnel, and organize objective and efficient information of personnel;
 - study, analyze and predict social processes in the troops (forces), public opinion and the moods of servicemen, and, based on this, develop recommendations for military administrative organs;
 - manage the socio-psychological service;
 - organize scientific accompaniment of educational work, develop the military problems of the social sciences, teach socio-humanitarian disciplines at military educational institutions, and conduct military-sociological, psychological and socio-legal research in the troops (forces);
 - organize business-like cooperation of the military mass media with press, radio and television organs;
 - cooperate with the state organs of power and administration of the states which are participating in the Commonwealth on issues of social policy and cultural support of the troops (forces), and military-professional orientation of youth;
 - support the development of culture and artistic creativity, and organize cultural-leisure work in the troops (forces);
 - organize, along with the organs of justice, legal assistance on issues of the socio-legal protection of personnel;
 - maintain ties with public organizations of citizens, artistic unions, and charitable and religious organizations on questions of socio-legal protection and the creation of conditions for work to preserve cultural values, military historical monuments, develop military-museum matters, advertisements for military service, and participate in the making of movies of all genres and television-radio programs for the troops (forces);
 - cooperate with and render methodological assistance to social councils, commissions and other associations of servicemen, their family members, and workers and employees;
 - organize the publication of socio-political, socio-legal, educational and artistic literature, educational-methodological manuals and posters on the problems of humanitarian training and education of personnel;
 - plan, coordinate and implement measures for cooperation with the cultural, military-legal, religious and other institutions of foreign armies that are involved with work among servicemen;
 - participate in the development of measures on cadre policy in the troops (forces) and measures to strengthen one-man command on a legal basis and democratization of official military relations, and train military cadres in practical educational work;
 - provide organizational-methodological support of training and retraining cadres for work in the personnel organs;
 - participate in the selection, training, placement and education of personnel organ officers in accordance with prescribed manning document assignments; and,
 - manage subordinate military educational institutions, scientific research organizations, general education schools, printing enterprises, cultural institutions and other military units, enterprises and organizations in the troops (forces).
8. The Committee organizes the supply of the troops (forces) with educational work technical systems. It is the general customer as well as the fund maintainer of mobile educational work equipment and facilities, cultural-leisure equipment, television, radio, video, movie and photographic equipment, television transmission and reception equipment, printing equipment, and other equipment and materials.
- The Committee is tasked with concluding contracts for the production and delivery of the equipment and materials listed above, organizing their operation, repair and inventory, and also managing the establishment and operation of television-radio broadcasts in the troops (forces).
9. The Committee participates in the economic analysis, substantiation and implementation of social programs in the troops (forces), carries out financing and monitoring of expenditures earmarked for conducting educational work, support of cultural ties with the armies of foreign states, maintenance of general education schools in the troops (forces) and also subordinate institutions, enterprises and organizations, management of their financial-economic activities, conducts advertising and cultural-commercial work, has the right to participate in the organization of foundations, associations and other public organizations that are involved with the issues of

the development of military culture and social protection of servicemen and their family members, workers and employees, and individuals discharged from military service.

CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Accidental Rocket Launch Kills Soldier in Estonia
92UM0495B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Feb 92
Morning Edition p 1

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent Leonid Levitskiy: "Rocket Launch in Estonia"]

[Text] At one of the Estonian missile bases there was a spontaneous firing of a missile.

The missile, as they say, did not go far and fell into the sea. But the accident was a tragic one. One of the soldiers serving the facility was brought to the hospital where he died of his wounds. A second soldier had a leg amputated and a third suffered from severe burns.

Story of Transfer of Missiles, Warheads to Urals
92UM0626A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 8 Feb 92 p 2

[O. Andryashkin: "Where are They Taking the Nuclear Weapons?"]

[Excerpts] ...separating cement walls and moving hills do not constitute an interest for the ...[illegible word] children playing "I'm Rambo". The combat work of the officers and the ceaseless expectations of their patient wives are the daily fare of the N'sk—in Perm Oblast.

The daily life of the military garrison was unexpectedly and somehow all at once shattered. Huge vehicles, loaded with heavy containers, began to move along the district road on an early snowy morning. Moreover, [they did] not [move] covertly and guardedly—but simply with caution... [words illegible] various types of missile personnel. But when the officers themselves without the participation of soldiers unloaded the frosted steel containers onto a special pad, the local elder commanders began to cross themselves from surprise. A good half of those arriving consisted of people in civilian clothes "armed" with small dosimeters... And after hours a helicopter delivered an additional group, among whom were not only generals, but also representatives of an unknown "Moscow Institute".

The freight arrived daily. The signs "Danger Radioactivity" and the red "trefoil"—a symbol sadly and well known—literally glowed on the green sides.

All of this was told to me by a man serving in that so-called Mobile Missile Technical Base, where nuclear warheads are stored. After separation he returned to his home, N'sk, where a week ago he was witness to the events described above. He himself (I am not using his

last name for completely obvious reasons) worked with nuclear devices, and in his opinion, could not be mistaken.

"The Officers" delivering the "special freight" to the Urals traveled either from Ukraine or from Belarus—believes another witness to the events. ...

Belarus 'Has Right to 5 Nuclear Submarines'
92UM0623C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Zelentsov and Vitaliy Potapov, under the rubric: "Commentary": "Posting of the Guard"]

[Text] As we all know, Urmas Ott is always extremely frank in everything. Leonid Kravchuk was also frank in his latest television interview, while stating: "I can mentally grasp when they say that all the fleets should be Commonwealth fleets, but I cannot mentally grasp it when they say that the fleets should be Russian."

Meanwhile, the Belarussian People's Deputy quite officially noted that his republic has the right to five nuclear and 11 non-nuclear submarines and seven capital ships (naturally, including aircraft carriers). While attending the February 14 Minsk meeting as a Georgian Ministry of Defense observer, Lieutenant-General Sharashenidze stressed that to a certain extent his republic lays claim to a part of the Black Sea Fleet.

In a word, "goodbye, rocky mountains...."

You can figure out that all of this has some sort of relation to the Russian President's recent excessively emotional statement on the original ownership of the Black Sea Fleet—he says it was, is and shall be Russia's. Or to wit, that it is Russia, during the first quarter of this year, that will have to lay out half a billion for the maintenance of the Armed Forces. All of them. In general. But then again, could everything be much easier? And has it not become really necessary to create the Russian Armed Forces? All the more so because on the eve of the Minsk meeting such authorities as State Committee on Defense Issues Chairman Pavel Grachev, State Defense Advisor Konstantin Kobets, and Armed Forces Committee on Defense and Security Issues Member Dmitriy Volkogonov advanced this idea. Yes, and moreover the problems of ratifying the Paris Accords on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the START Treaty still exist. Really, how will Russia, which does not have its own army, ratify it?

Having once again accused Russia of being a great power, some are hastily creating their own armies and, according to some expert assessments, attempts by Kazakhstan and Ukraine to assert claims to the right of ownership of nuclear weapons in the near future have not been excluded. But for now, as a result of the latest negotiations in Minsk, it seems like the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] has split into two groups:

Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Azerbaijan—on one side and, all of the remaining countries—on the other side. The remaining countries have formed a working group to hammer out an agreement on a unified command authority over the conventional armed forces.

The latest round of talks on military questions in Minsk has ended with the emergence of new problems. Moreover, all previous problems have still not been resolved. A unified military space has not developed. As for the West and America, they can do little more than wince: as before, the fate of the strategic nuclear forces is unpredictable.

Still, Russia needs its own army. Just like Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Belarus... This is really necessary so that someone will be able defend us in the event of trouble.

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Critical Discussion of Weapons R&D Process

92UM0561A Moscow VESTNIK

PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian

No 12, Dec 91 pp 18-21

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences Lieutenant Colonel V. Vdovenko under the rubric "The Exploitation of Hardware and Armaments": "We Are Behind, and That is a Fact...—The Opinion of an Analyst on Military Scientific and Technical Policy"]

[Text] Our propaganda was talking about the supremacy of Soviet armaments and military hardware (VVT) and our military scientific and technical parity with the NATO integrated forces for many long years. Then official acknowledgment started coming that we were behind here and there, of course, but we were at that level overall. And finally, first in the draft military reforms and then in the article by Doctor of Military Sciences General Army V.N. Lobov entitled "Ways of Realizing the Concept of Sufficiency for Defense" that was published in the military-theory journal VOYEN-NAYA MYSL (No. 2, 1991), the principal areas of our serious lag in the level of VVT behind the analogous weaponry and hardware of the Western countries were officially acknowledged out loud. The scale of the USSR as a state, its super-centralization and detachment from micro-economic ties and a human psychology altered by years of suppression of any different thinking or shows of initiative had done their work.

Military scientific and technical policy occupies a subordinate position in relation to the military policy of the state. The effects of national strategy on it occur in mediated fashion—through the formation of prospective requirements for the armed forces, concepts for the creation of new armaments and tactical performance requirements for them. The danger of developing means of armed struggle that are of little effectiveness and technically obsolete even before they are accepted for

service is very real, owing to the fact that the process of creating new armaments is exceedingly long, lasting 10-15 years (and sometimes 20 years or more for major and technically complex VVT systems). The areas of creating automation systems (KSA) and putting them into service, especially at the operational and operational-strategic levels, along with radio navigation systems for ground troops and high-speed military computer networks, have proved to be in a similar position. What are the reasons for this lag?

First, seemingly lying right on the surface, is the lack of an overlap between the positions and views of inert military scientific and technical policy and the realities of succession (forward movement) in the creation of complex technical systems. All of the ground troops, including the formations and units of the air defense for the ground troops, quite recently more closely resembled rapid-deployment troops. All of their VVT was conceived only on a mobile basis (wheeled or tracked). The automation of command and control started right off in a "mobile" version as a result, something the likely adversary did not do. They started with automated stationary command posts and command-and-control stations. They did not shy away from strict requirements for the amount of computer and other equipment or the transportability or operating conditions of the KSA under extreme conditions. All of the technical and program decisions were carefully worked out. And they were able to select, out of that aggregate, whatever could be adopted successfully and quickly for a transportable version in modular-unit form as the result of minimization.

Analogous problems are also solved in the United States by reforming the system of administration for military scientific research and experimental design and by borrowing experience, techniques and mechanisms, i.e. free-enterprise management. Much independence is given to planning military research and development that is not connected with dedicated programs for the creation of VVT. Regional bodies for the administration and monitoring of military deliveries, supplementing the administrative bodies of military financial monitoring and auditing of contracts, have been created in the interests of effective supervision of military contracts.

A second cause of our lag in the realm of developing ASUV [automated troop command and control systems] is directly dependent on the fragmented nature of the national economy of our country. The United States has been able to ensure strict monitoring and fundamental restriction of the access of the Soviet Union to the advanced scientific and technical achievements of the West since the 1950s—not only in the realm of purely military-oriented technologies, but even those developments that could have been employed in principle in the creation of VVT and been adapted to expanding capabilities to oppose the growth of the military potential of the United States. This is demonstrated especially starkly by the rapid growth in the gap between the West and us in the sphere of information technologies.

Supremacy in that sphere, coupled with other spheres for the utilization of fundamentally new and scientifically sophisticated technologies of a military thrust, could easily be transformed into complete military superiority over any potential adversary in the near future.

A third reason is an overcomplexity and backwardness of thinking along with waiting for guidance on any score—significant or insignificant—both by officers and civilians affiliated with the development of VVT and its operation among the troops.

How can we preserve the country against a further decline in defensive potential at the threshold of the third millennium? First and foremost by improving the organizational system for managing military research and development, and incorporating principles of modern management and administrative technique in it on the basis of computer networks.

The chief aim herein is the creation and maintenance of high functional efficiency for a system of management that would not be inferior to the analogous system of a potential enemy, either in its ability to make use of all the latest achievements of science and technology in the creation of armaments or in the pace of adoption of innovations in advanced VTT systems. And here we are approaching the essence of the essential transformations in the VPK [military-industrial complex]. What, in our opinion, must be done, in the short and long term, to save military scientific and technical potential?

Relying on the experience of China in this sphere of management, all of the supervisory personnel at scientific-research institutions (NIU), starting with those holding the rank of colonel and up, who do not have academic degrees or have not received that degree while in their given position and who have reached 45-50 years of age could be offered the positions of scientific consultant while preserving their salaries and right to use transport, if they had it, and other privileges. Only thus can dilettantism in its extreme forms and uniform thinking based on the fear of responsibility be eliminated quickly, and the "selection and placement conveyor" of like people from the strictly scientific sphere be halted.

The universal creation of small scientific enterprises, either in conjunction with industry or independently, should be permitted for the rapid accomplishment of the task of creating high-precision weaponry that is in effectiveness analogous to—or surpasses—that which was used by the armed forces of the United States, Great Britain and France in the AirLand operations to liberate Kuwait. Existing unclaimed scientific work in progress at the NIUs and higher educational institutions of the MO [Ministry of Defense] should be the foundation for creating this type of enterprise. (It should be noted for the sake of truth that the first, very tentative steps on this qualitatively new path have already been taken at certain military academies.)

The creation of small production enterprises, including joint ventures, on the basis of the MO NIUs would be

expedient, and they should provide the troops with, say, automated control equipment in the fastest possible time. I have already had occasion to talk about the fact (see VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBO-RONY, No. 3, 1991) that it would be possible, for example, to satisfy the requirements of the troops for software over a year and a half, and to satisfy the requirements for stationary ASUVs based on personal computers and local and regional computer networks—including real-time networks for the transmission of, say, radar information—over one to three years with the level of real spending on automation that exists today.

The creation of small scientific and production enterprises realizes the principle of the selective demonopolization of the VPK. There are not and cannot be, in any case, any bans on similar activity in the "guiding directives" of the USSR MO as recorded in documentary form. But there is a conservative reluctance to accept the idea. The enterprises in the defense sectors of industry will nonetheless cease to be "dying for freedom" from the VPK under the new conditions of business management, and will switch over to a tough, competitive struggle with the newly active collectives of business people; this should ultimately lead to a sharp rise in the quality of the VVT being developed and supplied to the troops and a substantial reduction in the prices for it. I would propose to those who doubt the potential capabilities of such enterprises that they address the operating experience of at least the Scientific-Research Institute of Radar and Communications Equipment of the Ministry of Defense of Great Britain, which is making a substantial contribution, through concrete developments, to the American SDI program.

The time has come not only to declare, but to realize the right of scientists to their own opinions regarding the views of military officials of all ranks, especially those from the central ordering administrations and agencies and including the General Staff. A certain degree of autonomy of the scientific-research and higher-educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense and the defense sectors of industry is needed for this. The leaders of the NIUs and higher educational institutions of the ministry should not be designated without the consent and knowledge of the councils of scientists (and namely scientists, not a scientific and technical council) of the given institution.

I have already had occasion to express the proposal to remove the NIUs from the direct subordination of the MO to the leadership of the branches of the armed forces and the arms of the troops (adding here the apparatus of the deputy minister of defense for armaments, the ordering chief directorates and the General Staff) and unifying them into a self-managing association. Relative independence should be preserved within the framework of the association of NIUs. A number of the central NIUs, self-contained, working by and large for themselves and spending the lion's share of the financing for scientific research and experimental design, should carry

out a demonopolization of research structures (a fundamental organizational restructuring!), either by cutting back substantially on personnel or dividing them up into a number of mobile NIUs with fewer people. It is not a matter of eliminating an environment favorable to the realization of the well-known Parkinson's Laws alone. The main thing is the realization of the principle of equality of all MO NIUs among themselves and before the customers for the scientific products. The right to dedicated financing and acceptance with the evaluation of the work being performed at the NIUs should be reserved for the higher directorates and staffs of the Ministry of Defense.

The automation of military science would make it possible to raise the dynamism of the interchange between customers and executors and formulate a nourishing environment for alternative opinions and plans. If such an association existed, a concept of military reform that is already obsolete a month after publication in the journal VOYENNAYA MYSL would not see the light of day.

The fundamental changes in industrial relations within the MO NIUs would gradually lead, on the one hand, to the adoption of a contract system in mutual relations and the professionalization of scientific collectives and, on the other hand, to the creation of conditions under which a reduction in the numbers of scientific-research institutions against a background of a sharp rise in the quality of their work would become possible as the result of self-regulation, rather than directive decisions from higher leadership.

VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY (No. 9, 1990) has come out for the adoption of real economic accountability in the lower levels of military science, which have up to now been rigidly structured, hierarchical subsystems of the scientific collectives. All internal economic accountability at MO NIUs today consists of the distribution of the bonus fund by the chiefs from the "common pot" and is used, by and large, for the internecine struggles of the leadership with the councils of the labor collectives of scientific-research institutions. This struggle has become a sad spectacle in which various means are employed—including attempts to use party bodies and the officers' courts of honor—for punitive purposes.

The introduction of internal economic accountability at MO NIUs requires a flexibility of thinking from the leadership and elasticity from the structure of the scientific collectives itself and the individual members of the horizontal mutual relations. The temporary creative collective formed for specific scientific research and experimental design should be the center of attention as the principal scientific-production and economic entity. This is a kind of permissible and essential partial privatization, by the scientific staff personnel, of at least their own intellect and the results of their labor. And despite possible incidents at the start of the road—since the needed economic conditions will immediately require

freeing the collectives of "scientific ballast," which will lead to conflicts—a true, rather than "paper," economic accountability will ultimately improve the clarity of mutual relations among the scientific personnel and raise the remunerable contribution of each to the research.

A sharp intensification of the work at MO NIUs, as in the self-regulating system of temporary creative collectives, will require a new approach to reserve and retired officers who are working at NIUs as civilian workers. First of all, as harsh as it may seem at first glance, we should approach evaluating the business and scientific qualities, including the ability to work, of each of them more strictly in their declining years. Second, there is a persistent need to form a unified group of consultants possessing experience but not having sufficient powers and energies to perform independent scientific research and experimental design, directly subordinate to the chief of the NIU. Economic accountability—both on the scale of the whole NIU and on the scale of an individual collective—is incompatible with charity, since an excessive increase in it is a heavy burden on the shoulders of the "active" or "principal" scientific personnel, a large portion of whom are huddled together with their families in private apartments and are by and large hoping for the resolution of their own basic issue through the housing cooperatives. Especially if the expanded selection of "reservists" entails attempts to preserve certain administrative structures from cutback. The fewer these structures, the better for science!

A transition to a regional principle for managing the VPK is also essential, in my opinion. I have in mind here the necessity of an "intellectualization" of the network of customer representatives via the qualitative transformation of them into a network of scientific-research centers (NITs) of the USSR MO, closely linked with the concerns (NPOs [scientific-production associations], POs [production associations] and the like), the VPK and regional information-marketing centers of a "VPK—civilian sectors of science and industry" intermediary network. Each regional MO NITs should represent the armed forces, and not a certain branch or arm of the troops, and act within the framework of the system of the deputy minister of defense for armaments and interact with the administrative bodies of the region and the boards of republic, oblast and city industrial associations. An MO NITs could: carry out research either independently or in conjunction with other centers for military-systems research (including problems of conversion or reconversion) in accordance with the principles of defensive sufficiency; and, form specialized military-industrial firms or small enterprises (temporary creative collectives) on a contract basis within the framework of the concerns for the time to develop concrete projects, as well as to staff them with highly qualified research officers from the USSR MO. An MO NITs could also shoulder the functions of the new regional bodies for the management and monitoring of military deliveries. This is now, in the aggregate, quite a powerful military-economic system for the selection and development of

weapons, formulation of military programs, analysis of their effectiveness and management of contracts!

The spirit of the times has not, as some leaders hoped, skirted the armed forces either—the insurmountable desire of the rank-and-file scientific worker to cease being a “day laborer,” to obtain a greater degree of freedom in his creative work to obtain a more substantial end result and be in the overall channel of the struggle of the Soviet person for worldwide standards.

Highly effective labor by scientists would allow the command of the armed forces to organize a highly effective strategy for the defense of the country.

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Stealth Threat to Air Defenses

92UM0560A Moscow VESTNIK
PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian
No 12, Dec 91 pp 22-24

[Article by Lt-Gen V. Malanichenko based on foreign press materials: “Invisibles’ Against Air Defenses”]

[Text] Surmounting modern air defenses has become one of the difficult problems for offensive aviation. This resulted in the adoption of a new program by the military leadership of the USA to improve aerodynamic offensive weapons, directed at creating so-called “invisible” airplanes based on “Stealth” technology (stealth—an English word meaning cunning, subterfuge).

A decrease in the radar cross section (RCS) is achieved in modern “Stealth” airplanes by means of a shape that minimizes reflection of energy from air defense radar; strong, heat resistant radiation-absorbing coatings and composition materials are employed.

Reducing the RCS of airplanes even more by absorption of energy from emitting radar by means of a layer of ionized air generated by special sources has been proposed.

In the opinion of foreign specialists “Stealth” technology makes it possible to reduce the RCS of aircraft by more than an order of magnitude in comparison with airplanes of traditional design, which means reducing the range of detection by four to five times.

RCS also depends significantly on the polarization of the electromagnetic wave irradiating the target and the waveband of the DLS [not further identified]. In this respect “Stealth” technology creates the most difficult conditions for centimeter-band radar, while reconnaissance radar operating in the decimeter and meter wavebands experiences less of a loss in detection range.

To neutralize air defense systems employing infrared guidance, “Stealth” technology employs a complex of countermeasures, shielding of engine exhausts and the jet of hot air, diversion of hot gases to an area over the

upper part of the fuselage, introduction of impurities into the jet stream, and employment of heat insulation and special fuel recipes. These measures reduce by 70-80 percent the thermal emissions of an airplane caused by aerodynamic heating and by propulsion units, thus providing for a significant increase in concealment not only from missiles that home in on thermal emissions but also from reconnaissance resources.

Despite the decrease in radar and thermal contrast, “Stealth” airplanes possess identification characteristics similar to those of traditional aircraft, which can be picked up by radar, television, laser, acoustic and optical reconnaissance resources. The particular design features of “Stealth” airplanes limit the load they can carry, their fuel reserve and their speed. Nonetheless, use of “Stealth” technology is presently believed to be rather effective and justified. All new and future offensive air weapons are being developed with its mandatory use, and some weapons that have already been adopted are being modernized. B-1B bombers and F-16C and F-16D tactical fighters have already been updated with “Stealth” technology, reducing their RCS by 40-50 percent. The rated RCS of F-17A, ATF and A-12 airplanes making full use of “Stealth” technology is 0.2-0.5 m², 0.3-0.7 m² and 0.5-1 m² for the centimeter, decimeter and meter wavebands respectively at an aspect angle of 0-45°.

The first experience in combat use of American F-117A “invisible” airplanes in Panama and in the Persian Gulf vicinity confirmed their rather high specific qualities in surmounting air defense systems; however, it also dispelled the myth of their supposedly total invulnerability to modern radar equipment. In particular, French-made “Shakhinya” [transliteration] radar deployed in Saudi Arabia detected F-117A tactical fighters on several occasions at a range of 20 km or more when such airplanes flew in an altitude range of 2-3 km at a speed of 900-1,000 km/hr.

Foreign information sources refer to three basic types of combat missions for the F-117A. First, covert penetration of the enemy’s air defense system to seek and destroy early-warning radar detection and control (AWACS) airplanes, reconnaissance and relay airplanes of integrated reconnaissance and strike systems (PLSS) and airborne command posts (E-4B). Second, attacks on large control and communication centers, missile bases, airfields, field ordnance depots and infrastructural elements. Third, reconnaissance in the theater of military operations, detection of weaknesses in the enemy’s air defense system, and support of combat operations of strike groups of offensive airborne weapon systems by suppressing air defenses by means of air-to-ground guided weapons and jamming. In this case an F-117A jams electronic resources when it is in direct proximity to them, within the zone of operation of air defense resources, and only in cases of activation of surface-to-air missile launch warning equipment.

According to the Western press, the principal methods of combat use of "Stealth" airplanes will consist both of raids by individual aircraft and of joint operations with air groups carrying out different tactical missions, sometimes referred to as "force packages." The tactics of covert raids by individual aircraft make it possible to reach attack objectives through areas of complex terrain and in avoidance of air defense force groupings, to allow maneuver, and to reduce losses.

During combat operations in the Persian Gulf, raids by individual aircraft were carried out both by small groups comprised of pairs of airplanes or flights, and by individual airplane crews. Joint operations within echelons of attack aviation were used in group, concentrated or massed airstrikes or airstrikes disposed in depth, as well as in aerial combat and air battles.

American military experts planning combat use of new "Stealth" offensive air weapons jointly with tactical, carrier and strategic aircraft have developed diverse tactics. As an example one tactic used by F-117A airplanes in joint operations was leading. The attack group flew at low altitude with an F-117A leader forward of it to ensure its precise attainment of designated objectives. Moreover special groups were created out of F-117A's consisting of one reconnaissance and three or four attack aircraft. Such groups were intended to seek and destroy surface-to-air missile positions, the launch positions of operational-tactical missiles, elements of land-based integrated reconnaissance and strike systems, and other point targets. The flight routes of F-117A's and the times of their approach and passage over zones of operation of active air defense resources were coordinated with the actions of the main strike groups. Creation of escort groups out of F-117A tactical fighters to provide cover to strike groups from the enemy's air defense fighters was also foreseen. In another tactic that was developed, a pair or flight of F-117A's flew to the area of strike objectives in advance of the strike groups in order to block the possible approach of air defense fighters.

Foreign military specialists note that the effectiveness of surmounting air defense systems, conducting reconnaissance and making strikes, and the probability of survival of F-117A airplanes are determined in many ways by the range of altitudes of their combat use.

In particular, the effect of the RCS and flying altitude on survival of an "invisible" airplane was quantitatively evaluated on the basis of simulation results. It was revealed in this case that "radar invisibility" was almost nonexistent when flying at low altitude at near-sonic speed, because the airplane was within the range of fire of anti-aircraft weapons using optical sights. Anti-aircraft artillery batteries were hard to detect by electronic warfare support measures, screen jamming and imitative jamming were totally ineffective against them, and it was impossible to launch antiradar missiles employing passive guidance. No effective protection from intensive fire by anti-aircraft artillery guns was found. At the same time, survival was increased by four times when flying

with an RCS reduced by 10 times at moderate and high altitudes within range of enemy radar. The probability of airplane survival approached unity with the use of intensive jamming. Consequently low altitudes are the most dangerous to "Stealth" targets, while moderate and high altitudes are optimal. Moreover "radio silence" is precluded at low altitudes. This means that electronic warfare support measures could detect an airplane on the basis of its onboard radar. Consequently F-117A tactical fighters can operate at low altitude only for a short time.

Modern "invisible" airplanes are capable of carrying out combat missions at any time of the day and in any weather; however, they are used at night in order to conceal their configuration. Inasmuch as the range of detection may be increased by using radar probing signals matched to the shape of the target, the command of the U.S. Air Force parks airplanes at airfields only in shelters; deployment locations are selected outside the range of possible photography by various reconnaissance resources; training flights are limited to daylight hours, and trainers are used extensively. In addition "Stealth" airplanes are outfitted with devices that increase and distort the RCS during training flights. It may be possible that they were also used by F-117A airplanes as a tactic during combat operations in the Near East.

In order to conceal their true RCS, "Stealth" airplanes may be covered by interference both from special jamming aircraft flying in air patrol zones and directly from the combat formations of the attacking aviation.

(To be concluded)

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Comment on Strategic Value of Air Defenses

92UM0560B Moscow VESTNIK
PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian
No 12, Dec 91 p 24

[Article by Col A. Panchenko: "Hands Off of Air Defenses"]

[Text] Today what we referred to until recently as our probable enemy is taking steps to reduce the threat of any strikes against his facilities. At the same time he is creating systems making it possible to monitor the entire territory of our country, and he is sparing no money in producing highly effective offensive air weapons. In the meantime the forced withdrawal of Soviet units from Eastern Europe deprives us of our first echelon of air defenses in the Western theater of military operations, and reduces the time available to make the decision to raise forces to higher states of readiness.

This is why the Combined Aerospace Reconnaissance Forces being created by the enemy must be opposed by an integrated aerospace defense system. And this means

that the Air Defense Forces must be qualitatively saturated with the most up-to-date equipment, given the certain decrease in their numerical strength.

It is no secret that the Air Defense Forces protect not only the air borders but also army groupings, airfields, missile positions, nuclear power engineering enterprises, hydraulic engineering structures and so on. A comparison of the economic expenditures on providing direct cover to these facilities with the possible economic and ecological losses from their destruction or damage clearly reveals the suitability of maintaining air defenses. In this connection all nonprofessional statements in the press suggesting that air defenses are unnecessary are extremely harmful. They only promote an unhealthy, prejudicial attitude toward the armed forces and raise tensions in military collectives.

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Obituary: Maj-Gen Avn Oskanov

92UM0589A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Feb 92 First Edition p 4

[Obituary for Major General of Aviation S.S. Oskanov: "S.S. Oskanov"]

[Text] Major General of Aviation Sulambek Susarkulovich Oskanov, chief of an Air Force flight training center, was killed in the course of duty in a tragic airplane crash on February 7, 1992.

S.S. Oskanov was born into a large Ingushetian family on January 8, 1943, in the village of Pliyev, Nazranovsky Rayon, Chechen-Ingush ASSR. On graduating from secondary school he worked as a mechanic and installer at the Grozny Oil Refinery. In 1962 he enrolled in the Kachinsk Higher Military Aviation Pilot School. After graduating from the school, he continued to serve at it as a flight instructor. He went on to hold command posts in a squadron, regiment, and aviation division. He served as a senior pilot-inspector in the flight safety service and as deputy chief and later chief of an Air Force flight training center. He graduated from the Military-Political Academy in 1974 and from the General Staff Military Academy in 1991. He was a top-flight military pilot, an meritorious Armed Forces specialist, and a candidate of military sciences, and he was a master of the sport of advanced aerobatic maneuvers.

In all his posts S.S. Oskanov displayed superior organizational abilities, responsibility, industriousness, a creative approach to accomplishing missions, and a love of flying. He was always noted for his modesty, respectful attitude toward people, and concern for their needs.

S.S. Oskanov engaged in extensive public-political work and was a Deputy to the Lipetsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies. For his services to the fatherland S.S. Oskanov was awarded many state decorations.

Warm memories of Major-General Sulambek Susarkulovich Oskanov will always remain in our hearts.

[Signed] Ye. Shaposhnikov, P. Deynekin, N. Stolyarov, A. Malyunov, Ye. Zarudnev, A. Goryainov, S. Ivanov, A. Alyupov, I. Kalugin, B. Yefanov, G. Matveyev, V. Kaydyn, N. Antoshkin, V. Ovcharov, R. Aushev, E. Nechayev, G. Laptev, N. Slezkin.

SU-24 Crews Explain Motives for Flight from Ukraine

92UM0628A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 18 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by V. Makarov: "Flight with the Red Banner: Pilots and Navigators of Six Bombers Remained Loyal to One Oath"]

[Text] Something like this was bound to happen. Letters to the editor in recent months suggested this idea. The atmosphere of the All-Army Officer Assembly was filled with such moods. And here six SU-24m tactical bombers, having launched from the military airfield at Starokonstantinovo, which is in Khmel'nitskiy Oblast, landed at one of the Moscow-area Air Force airfields. The regiment's combat red banner was aboard one of the aircraft.

The act is unprecedented, for the time being. For development of the situation around the armed forces of the former USSR, unfortunately, is suggesting that these are the first signs. Just what incited the airmen to such a desperate act?

Major Vadim Staritsyn, squadron navigator:

"On the morning of 13 February, there was a report over television that the leaders of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova did not plan to participate in the Minsk meeting on military issues. This would mean the final collapse of the army, its redistribution, to which we all categorically object. Moreover, real officers pledge their allegiance only once, and not to politicians but to the people. That is why we decided to take this step."

Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Maryasov, division senior navigator:

"There has long been talk among unit flying personnel about the possibility of such a flight as an extreme form of protest. Officers have grown tired of the instability of their position and of empty promises. For example, we were assured from the speaker's rostrum of the All-Army Assembly that no one would be taking the oath again. But 23 officers in the regiment (that is one-fourth of the flying personnel) have pledged allegiance to Ukraine for one reason or another. I do not blame them. The ones to blame are the politicians, who are causing the split in the officer corps and presenting us with an unnatural choice."

Colonel Viktor Chernyy, deputy division commander:

"The decision matured immediately before the flight. Neither fellow workers nor family members knew about it. The usual scheduled flights were taking place. We took off and set off on the heading agreed upon in advance. I want to emphasize that we anticipated everything pertaining to flight safety. The aircraft carried no munitions."

Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Krishtop, regimental chief of staff:

"I am Ukrainian, a native of Luga Oblast. Nevertheless, I also decided on making the flight and do not regret it. The armed forces must be unified. As far as the combat banner is concerned... First of all, by my position, I am responsible for its safety. In Ukraine, voices are being heard more and more loudly and at the highest level that the national army should not have any banners; they say that the banners should be replaced by the traditional standards for Ukrainian forces. Did I have the right to leave the banner? We did only what duty and conscience prompted."

Loud words? Well, lately they are being heard less and less frequently, and these very concepts—duty and conscience—it seems are disappearing from people's minds and hearts, giving way to selfish consideration and advantages. The pilots spoke of officer's honor, and from their manly calm confidence in their rightness they somehow feel better in their hearts.

Their families remained in Ukraine. Many of the pilots have well-equipped apartments and a normal daily life. In general, the officers admit, they live better there than in Russia. Nevertheless, they ignored this and are willing to continue serving under any conditions and in any positions. But with one stipulation: that they not be drawn into politics.

How should we react to this flight? It has already been called both a risky venture and a provocation... It is clear that it will not improve relations between the two Slavic states. But in the situation that had taken shape, the pilots were presented with a choice.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Kasatonov on Fleet, Special Status for Sevastopol
92UM0614C Kiev VECHERNIY KIEV in Russian
29 Jan 92 p 1

[Interview with Adm I.V. Kasatonov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, by Anatoliy Smetanin under the rubric "Military Affairs": "The Fleet Is Indivisible"]

[Text] A brief interview with Adm I.V. Kasatonov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet:

[Smetanin] Igor Vladimirovich, in your opinion, is the Ukraine's military doctrine substantive and legal?

[Kasatonov] I do not intend to criticize it, but I believe that from the scientific and technological standpoint, it has elements of subjectivism. On the other hand, however, it is probably correct, systemic and substantive, like that of any other independent state.

[Smetanin] Do you feel that if we split up the fleet, it will be unable to perform the missions it presently performs?

[Kasatonov] The fleet as such cannot be split up. To single out individual forces, assets and units which Ukraine would subsequently build up is another matter. As Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk has stated, and this was the original position of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the fleet should patrol, combat smuggling and perform local, operational missions along Ukraine's coast. The assets allocated for this would be adequate.

[Smetanin] Why are you so opposed to turning the Black Sea Fleet over to Ukraine?

[Kasatonov] Whether or not to turn over the fleet is a matter for the politicians to decide. The fleet is a single entity located in over five republics. How can it be turned over to Ukraine? And what jurisdiction would Ukraine have over our bases in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova, at Nororossiysk? The fleet can therefore not belong to a single state. It must belong to the commonwealth, just as it belonged to the Soviet Union, but absolutely based on the realities of today, and I do not believe that anyone dismisses the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. If the fleet belongs to a single state, it will disintegrate. And not just from the standpoint of its scientific, combat and operational use, but from the standpoint of the people as well. This is the second, difficult aspect of the matter, which is presently moving to the fore

If the politicians make a one-sided decision, the fleet will cease to exist. There will be some iron hulls, some submarines, but there will be no fleet!

[Smetanin] How do the fleet's personnel and its leadership feel in this situation?

[Kasatonov] This is not a natural situation for us, of course. Neither I nor anyone else has ever been in it before. And I feel that the young man, the sailor, who has arrived with a sense of the romantic and a desire to serve in the fleet cannot understand it at all. I cannot understand it, because the matter should be resolved primarily at the political level. Unfortunately, however, the realities are such that the situation in which the armed forces find themselves lags behind that which the politicians are building up. And while we recognize these realities, we ask that the fleet and its personnel be handled with respect.

[Smetanin] What will be the status of Sevastopol?

[Kasatonov] I want to say that the public opinion of the residents of Sevastopol and of those forces and movements which exist in the city, as well as the 65,000 trade union members, are a very significant force. And the

most recent city meeting unanimously passed a resolution that Sevastopol must be the main base of the Black Sea Fleet as part of the strategic forces of the CIS.

[Smetanin] And just where will the Ukrainian fleet be based in this case?

[Kasatonov] In the area of Odessa and Ochakov, possibly Ismail. The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has the documents for this. They are specific, realistic and capable of being understood by the people who have them. And we obviously need to go for this, to reach agreement at last.

Nikolayev Deputy Director: 'Varyag Subject to Moth-Balling'

92UM0586A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 12 Feb 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Varyag at Anchor"]

[Text] The largest shipyard in Ukraine—the Black Sea Shipyards association—has found itself in a difficult situation after the breakup of the Union. Its collective has been left face to face with the unfinished aircraft-carrying cruiser Varyag and other defense orders. The problem is complicated by conversion and the fact that the building slip on which commercial vessels could be built is occupied.

"Due to the lack of financing on the part of the governments of Russia and Ukraine, we have stopped filling defense orders for an undetermined period of time," a Ukrainian Information Bureau correspondent was told by Ivan Vinnik, deputy general director of the association. "The ships are subject to moth-balling, but this requires considerable funds, which not a single sovereign state so far plans to give. A commission at the Ukrainian government level has been created to examine the state of affairs at the association. Above all, it must solve the problem of material and technical support. Major enterprises such as ours are state enterprise overseas, too, and are provided resources."

In turn, the administration is trying not to lose personnel and to assign a full load of work to the production capacities. A contract has been signed with a foreign firm for construction of three food tankers. As before, construction of large refrigerated fish-processing trawlers continues. Experts believe that the next 2-3 months will be the most difficult for the shipbuilders of Nikolayev.

Cadres Chief V-Adm Yermakov Interviewed

92UM0562A Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK*
in Russian No 12, Dec 91 pp 3-5

[Interview with Yevgeniy Ivanovich Yermakov by a *MORSKOY SBORNIK* correspondent under the rubric "Time and the Fleet": "Concerned About the Fate of Every Officer"]

[Text] The memorable slogan of the first five-year plans, "The cadres decide everything," was not so long ago sarcastically transformed into "Everything is decided in the cadres." Many officers really feel even now that the cadre organs are all-powerful. Is that in fact true? Today, during a time of mass discharges of admirals and officers into the reserves and on the eve of impending personnel cutbacks, many readers of *MORSKOY SBORNIK* are interested in that question. They want to know what the program of activity of the personnel organs of the Navy is like under contemporary conditions. A correspondent of the journal asked the chief of the Personnel Directorate of the Navy, Vice Admiral Ye. Yermakov, to answer a number of questions.

[Correspondent] Yevgeniy Ivanovich! Directive D-53 of the Minister of Defense points out the necessity of employing fundamentally new approaches in work with military cadres, based on the strict observance of legality and the constitutional rights and obligations of each serviceman. What is the concrete manifestation of these new approaches?

[Yermakov] The fact is that a turning point has come in work with the officer cadres. The situation is forcing us to be guided more strictly by the law on the performance of service in relation to those who have served out the stipulated terms or have crossed the age limit defined by law. We are moreover not yet ready or accustomed to that. After all, one used to be able to go in confidence to one's superiors, prove one's irreplaceability and serve an "extra" year or two, if not more. And people thought, that's how it will continue into the future as well. That psychology must be changed today.

I want to note that, in my opinion, it is necessary to eliminate from the Statute on Performance of Military Service by the Officer Personnel the article on the possibility of extending the term of service. Say the maximum age for a captain 1st rank is 50 years old. But... in some cases it is possible, by decision of the minister, to extend service until age 55 or more. And those cases turned into the rule, which could not help but give rise to certain abuses or conflicts. You can still explain to two lieutenants why one of them is more deserving of promotion than the other. But explain to two captains 1st rank the reasons that one remains in the service while the other is discharged, even though both of them have good records. So very many dragged out the deadlines for discharge into the reserves.

[Correspondent] Can you cite a concrete figure?

[Yermakov] Look, I have in my hand a list of just the admirals that must be discharged in 1991. It is four pages long, as you see. The discussion does not concern cutbacks either, but rather planned discharges on legal grounds. I have to talk with many of them who have been submitted for discharge. Believe me, it is not an easy job. But we have turned the corner anyway. Today we all must get accustomed to the idea that the discharge of officers, generals and admirals who have reached the age

limits for being on active military service and who have the right to a pension should become the natural and fully realized ending to conscientious service.

[Correspondent] You have cited large figures. Behind them are living people with their problems, concerns and plans...

[Yermakov] The officials of the personnel directorates and departments perhaps feel that more acutely than anyone. Increased attention toward the fate of each person, the strict monitoring of the granting of all of the rights, benefits and privileges stipulated by legislation to those being discharged into the reserves and the elimination of any bias whatsoever in relation to whomever it may be have become the fundamental criteria for us in approaching the matter in this transitional period. Intensive work has been underway over the last three months. The Personnel Directorate has essentially become a team to protect the rights of servicemen. Many professionals who have completed good schooling in the navy and have experience in working with people are working with us. I trust my subordinates, they rarely err. And they are fulfilling their duties honestly and conscientiously in today's difficult situation.

[Correspondent] Does that signify that the personnel organs, as it were, were "fighting to fulfill the plan" for the discharge of officers and have fulfilled it?

[Yermakov] Under no circumstances. We are concerned first and foremost about the strength levels and combat readiness of the Navy.

We have eliminated the plan and the gross. Rather the opposite; we have tried to put ourselves in the place of each serviceman being discharged into the reserves. We were interested in his family situation, whether he had an apartment, what size pension he would be getting... As you see, no one was cutting on the spot, no one was rushing thoughtlessly to fulfill and report. The Minister of Defense called upon us, demanding that we grant those being discharged all the rights, benefits and privileges stipulated by law, not permitting any prejudice toward servicemen who were subject to discharge and ensuring the systematic rotation of the officer corps.

I cited a figure of more than four thousand. These are those officers who by age and years of service should have been discharged. But not all were discharged. Reasons other than of a personal nature arose. Composing an extensive diagram of the positions freed up and analyzing it, we came to the conclusion that we will have no one to fill roughly a fifth of the vacant spots right away. The replacements, in any case, will be far from equivalent. Some sections will end up denuded altogether. If a commander, his deputies, the chief of staff and the chiefs of the principal services of a large unit, formation or educational institution all go at once, for example. What kind of systematic rotation or continuity in leadership can we then be talking about? And if the people are connected with the operation of nuclear power installations, missile weaponry or scientific

research? We had to reckon with all of that. The commander-in-chief of the Navy, relying on work performed by the Personnel Directorate, reported his considerations and proposals on this issue to the Minister of Defense. They were met with understanding. We were permitted to shift the discharge of more than 20 percent of the officers to next year.

[Correspondent] Some want to serve but are not permitted to, others do not want—in the expression of some—to keep "rowing at their oar," but they are forced to. Doesn't that contradiction seem paradoxical to you?

[Yermakov] Unfortunately, it does. And not only to me. That simply should not be. No one, after all, is forcing young people to study at the service schools. They come there themselves, they take the entrance exams, they go through competitive selection. And then some, you see, 'don't want to...'

[Correspondent] But isn't it natural that a person changes his ideas about life and his place in it with age?

[Yermakov] Of course it is natural. But the life and activity of the Navy should depend least of all on changes in those ideas. The draft and discharge are like the ebb and flow of the tides, like the turn of a formation of ships "together." A lack of coordination is impermissible here. How can we best take into account personal interests and the tasks of naval service? There is one way out—we need an all-encompassing law. A draft of one has already been created. It indicates that an officer will have the right to discharge into the reserves ten years after graduation. A bit of juggling is being permitted in that case, in my opinion. I think that over five years a person is able to understand whether he has made the correct choice in life. If there is a law, there would not be such letters as this one. A lieutenant appeals to the commander-in-chief with the request to discharge him. He is moreover not shy in his statements and assessments of the fighting ability of the fleet. Imagine the situation he has put us in. On the one hand, there is no clearly defined legal basis for a justified refusal. On the other hand, if we part so easily with every young officer, we do not know where it will go. And if there were a law in force, then the lieutenant would obviously know in advance that there were no grounds for such a request, the more so in such a crude form. Why, as they say, get into trouble if you can wait a few years and make use of your right? So I repeat that a wise law taking all aspects of officer service into account is essential for successful personnel work, the more so for the process of reform.

[Correspondent] But the reforms are proceeding. A large amount of crucial work has been completed to disband the military-political organs and create organs for combat training and structures for working with personnel in the Navy. How has the fate of the former political officers shaped up?

[Yermakov] As is well known, a commission of the USSR Ministry of Defense headed by Colonel-General D. Volkogonov has been engaged in disbanding the old

structures and creating new ones. Our role was an auxiliary one, as it were. We nonetheless had an attitude of all seriousness toward the task before us. Our approach in principle was that the system, not the people, was faulty. All of the former military-political and party officers have gone through certification. The commissions moreover demonstrated maximum benevolence and objectivity and took into account all of the officer's capabilities, especially his theoretical training and experience in serving with units and on ships. The further service functions of each of them were determined according to the results of the work; positions were selected and directions for retraining were proposed.

[Correspondent] But weren't there any misunderstandings during that difficult period?

[Yermakov] Unfortunately there were. They rushed to drop the former military-political officers from the rosters in the Northern Fleet... But steps were taken immediately. We are fundamentally against any oppression whatsoever against these people. The same benefits extend to them in discharge from the armed forces as to other officers discharged under personnel cutbacks. Any illegal actions here in the spirit of neo-Bolshevism will be cut off, and cut off in the most decisive manner.

[Correspondent] And what is the essence of the changes themselves? Was it worth, as they say, making all the fuss?

[Yermakov] In order to understand that one must recall what we had recently. There were formally separate political and party structures that in fact had not wanted to be split. They expressed the ideology and policies of one party. And they essentially conducted the forced indoctrination of the personnel in the spirit of the communist ideology. What did, for example, religious believers experience therein? They were seemingly not prohibited from believing, but they demanded that they answer "with a communist slant" in political training. It is not difficult to guess where the formation of the "new man" led according to such blueprints.

The political officers are gone today. Their places are occupied by specialists in psychological support for the combat behavior of the personnel. Sitting with textbooks for political training is being replaced by simulations in trainers for psychological training, special studies and checks on peoples' adaptation to various conditions, on compatibility, all sorts of testing.

The new specialists, as opposed to the military-political and party officers, will not have separate cadre structures. There will also not be a new department in our directorate, even though some officers from the personnel organ of the former military-political directorate have been brought into it. They have joined our workers.

[Correspondent] But what are the service prospects for future officers—today's cadets? Some of them are believing the rumors that a portion of the graduates of

the service schools, in connection with the impending cutbacks in the fleet, will just be handed a diploma and sent off to the disposal of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet...

[Yermakov] I can reassure all the cadets that those are only rumors. We have not received, and have not issued any directives, on the score of curtailing recruitment for the schools or graduation from them.

[Correspondent] A final question, Yevgeniy Ivanovich. What are your personal plans?

[Yermakov] I crossed the maximum age limit this year myself, and I am ready for discharge into the reserves. But matters, each more complex than the last, have not allowed the leadership of the Navy to release me, as they used to say, to my well-deserved rest. After all, you don't change horses in midstream. I will try to carry my burden to the opposite shore as well.

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Potential Impact of Transfer of Baltic Fleet

92UM0586B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
12 Feb 92 p 6

[Article by Col Viktor Baranets, special PRAVDA correspondent: "The Ships Are also Tenants"]

[Text] I have visited the Baltic Fleet several times in recent years. But never before has a meeting with the Baltic Fleet left such an uneasy and distressing impression as today. The slogger-fleet has become confused and irritated. In many respects, it is barely making ends meet, and it often carries out combat missions at the limit of technical and human capabilities. I spent only 10-15 minutes in the office of the first deputy chief of staff of the fleet, Rear Admiral V. Bobrovskiy. And even during that time Valeriy Aleksandrovich had occasion to receive a great number of alarm signals over the phone. Somewhere combat equipment was laid up due to a shortage of fuel. Somewhere seamen were not paid on time due to some mix-ups with the finance agencies of one of the Baltic states.

The steep storm waves of all our crises are mercilessly beating the sides of our ships and human souls. And it is painful to realize that it is not only the legendary fleet that is declining in health. The nearly 300 years of naval glory of Russia, born on the waves and shores of the Baltic, is also withering along with it.

Of course, I understand: When you, the reader, have an empty refrigerator or you are fiftieth in line for oil, when it is drilled into your head every day that the our overall poverty is from the voraciousness of the army, will you grieve over the fate of some Baltic Fleet? You see, the hungrier the country is, the more fiercely it makes the average person count the submariners and tanks in tons of sausage and cheese. There are many people whose depth of patriotic feelings depends on the amount of

meat in the freezer. Why do I say this? I say it because more than once I have heard: "No one is threatening us in the Baltic. So why keep the fleet there?" And other young politicians sometimes also state: "International relations and humanitarian aid is more dear to us now than your ships." It is quite likely that our naval policy soon will depend completely on the number of cans of stew being delivered from beyond the "knoll"... However, the armada of the NATO allied naval forces in the Baltic does not exist for pleasure trips. It has very serious missions, which it practices in the most stringent manner.

After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, when ships of the former GDR and Poland "divorced" us, the burden on our forces increased considerably. At the same time, a multitude of material-technical, social and everyday, financial and economic, personnel, and many other problems, resulting from the breakup of the USSR and formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], rained down on the fleet. I have been told that commanders collect butter from other ships for ships heading out on alert duty. As before, the fleet has a very critical housing problem. A fairly large number of officers and warrant officers continue to leave for civilian life. The manning level of crews and shore-based subunits is decreasing.

"Despite all this," says Vice-Admiral V. Grishanov, chief of staff of the fleet, "the fleet continues to stand its difficult watch, although often only we know how it is able to do it today..."

But perhaps nothing is causing so much alarm in today's life of the Baltic Fleet as the issue of its future fate in connection with the persistent demands of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia for the immediate withdrawal of land and sea forces of the former Soviet Union from their territories. Until recently, the positions of the sides boiled down to the fact that one side has been stubbornly saying over and over again "Go," and the other has been asking "Where?" After all, relocating many dozens of ships, vessels, other equipment, headquarters, depots, and tens of thousands of people requires, first of all, pre-prepared installations to accept them. For the time being, the Baltic Fleet is not ready for this.

It is difficult to say whether or not the Baltic Fleet will be based in the Baltic region in the future. Negotiations should provide an answer to this question. Many political and military experts believe that the fleet will still have to leave. Namely, leave but not flee. The bitter experience of flight should teach us much. It would also be good to consider the experience of other countries. Captain 1st Rank A. Nedilko, a staff officer, remarked in this regard:

"The withdrawal of quite small, compared to our forces in the Baltic region, contingent of forces of the United States, Belgium, and Canada from Western Europe has been fixed for periods from five or more years. And these

are highly developed countries that have well-organized economic support of the withdrawal of the contingents."

For us, even a five year period of a planned, civilized withdrawal and relocation of Baltic Fleet personnel to new regions seems quite problematical. In this regard, I was provided the following information at the fleet headquarters. According to experts' estimates, theoretical possible expenditures for the withdrawal of all facilities and forces of the fleet from the territory of the Baltic states, provided accommodations can be found on the territory of Kaliningrad and Leningrad oblasts, could amount to more than 10 billion rubles [R]. Where are we supposed to get them? The fleet's commercial activities are just beginning.

Having broken down the system of basing, management, and support of the Baltic Fleet, stretching from the Zemland Peninsula to St Petersburg, and not having created anything in place of it for the time being, we will place the fleet in a situation in which it will not be able to carry out its missions.

The seamen are very concerned and alarmed by the fact that in the event of hasty political decisions, we may be deprived of what took centuries for our forefathers to create. It is a pity, of course, that often we recall our naval genealogy only on name days and at funerals.

Basing the Baltic Fleet in the Baltic region began back during the times of Peter the Great. Then, at his direction, a system of defense of Russia's borders was developed and a list of fortresses compiled, including Revel (Tallinn), Narva, Rogervik (Paldiski), as category 3 fortresses. The annexation in 1975 of Liepaya with Courland [Kurlandiya] to Russia started the construction of the canal and the ice-free port of Liepaya. The Baltic Fleet and its basing system were built and developed through the efforts of many generations of people of various nationalities who, I am sure, did not think the time would come when we would begin dividing up that which was once created in concert for common security. During the prolonged period in the Baltic region, a great number of fleet installations were built and equipped over an area of 29,091 hectares and valued at more than R40 billion. About half of the fleet forces and all submarines of the Baltic Fleet, a third of its aviation, and more than 50 percent of its living quarters and depots are located at the basing facilities. There are dozens of beacons and hundreds of navigation markers. And this is far, far from everything the fleet has in the Baltic region. It is very difficult to take and relocate all this outside of the Baltic region, and it is altogether impossible for some facilities.

But certain leaders of the Baltic countries do not want to consider this. B. Landsbergis, they say, stated it in his own way: "If you were able to come in in two days in 1940, then you can leave the same way too." Well, all right: We Russians, it seems, are beginning to get used to the casual and imperious tone of voice here in the Baltic region. The fleet understands that today it has fallen its

lot to clear up a very bitter social and political mess created long ago and in quite recent years. And this condition can be called the condition of a humiliated fleet, whose patience at times pushed to the limit...

Today it is clear even to a "green" lieutenant that having abandoned its age-old harbors in the Baltic region, the fleet is virtually being broken in two and will take a long, very long time to recover. This means that Russia's traditionally strong positions in the Baltic are being weakened.

These processes did not begin today. New thinking and winds of change are having their effect. Just let no one reproach me for being a military-political reactionary. The ancient, wise, hard-working Baltic states have gained their long-awaited political and economic independence. This is their most sacred right, for them to live in their own home as they want. But it seems to me, we must not keep quiet about or scatter our difficulties and legitimate interests to please some momentary political situation. But no matter how distressing it is to admit this, the upcoming relocation of a large part of the fleet forces will sweep over many human destinies like powerful tidal waves. Military seamen and their families are living in anxious anticipation today. What bases and garrisons will they have to abandon? Where will they have to redeploy? Where will they live? The uncertainty is torturing people. Having already felt the helplessness of the large number of decrees, instructions, laws, orders, and resolutions that do not work, they are preparing for life in the new conditions with a feeling of alarm and even hopelessness. The cruising speed of the political decisions affecting the fate of the army and fleet has already shattered many destinies and resulted in a lot of human tragedies.

The life of the Baltic Fleet today is troubled, dynamic, and hectic. There have been many trials in its nearly three-century biography. Today yet another one has befallen it...

Fire Aboard Cruiser Admiral Zakharov

92UM0626B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Feb 92 First Edition p 6

[Article by Captain 1st Rank V. Shirokov: "Incident: Fire on Board the BPK [Large Anti-submarine Cruiser] 'Admiral Zakharov'"]

[Text] On 17 February in the Ussuriy Bay during a transit from a basing point to the port of Vladivostok a fire broke out in an aft machinery compartment on the large anti-submarine ship, The Admiral Zakharov. As the Pacific Fleet's Press Center Chief Captain 1st Rank V. Ryzhkov reported, as a result of the fire—Petty Officer 2nd Rank B. Andruk—was killed, five [others] were hospitalized with various degrees of burns and toxic smoke inhalation. The ship has now been moved to a mooring. A commission has been appointed to investigate the causes of the tragedy.

Navy-Azerbaijani Talks on Caspian Fleet

92UM0623B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Feb 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by TASS Azinform Correspondent A. Kardili: "CIS Navy Commander Admiral V. Chernavin Conducts Negotiations in Baku on the Fate of the Caspian Flotilla"]

[Text] CIS Navy Commander Admiral Vladimir Chernavin called his visit to the capital of Azerbaijan with the leadership of the Republic the beginning of the negotiating process on the future of the Caspian Flotilla. In an interview with an Azinform correspondent, he stated that he faces the task of working out a mechanism for the navy's future existence in the Caspian.

The admiral expressed agreement with Azerbaijan's intention to create a naval structure based on the Caspian Flotilla in their armed forces. "We are ready to participate and to assist the republic in this difficult task. But, there are a multitude of hidden obstacles which must be avoided, while finding this line for the solution of the problems so that we do not ruin or destroy that which has been created over many years and, on the contrary, to increase it, while considering the new conditions that correspond to the present situation," the commander stressed.

In Vladimir Chernavin's words, an agreement to create special commissions representing the interests of the CIS Navy and Azerbaijan was reached at a meeting which took place late in the evening of February 18 with Azeri President Ayaz Mutalibov and the leadership of the republic Ministry of Defense and the KKF [Caspian Red Banner Flotilla] command authorities. Their task includes preparation of concrete proposals that define the status of the Caspian Flotilla.

Submarine Collision 14 miles Off Shore

92UM0623A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Feb 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Captain 3rd Rank V. Maryukha: "American Submarines off Russia's Northern Coasts"]

[Text] Nuclear attack submarine Commander Captain 2nd Rank I. Loktya's assumption that he collided with a foreign submarine in our territorial waters (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, February 19, 1992) has been officially confirmed by the American side. The U.S. Navy's Los Angeles-Class Submarine Baton Rouge is proceeding under its own power to American shores, having sustained insignificant damage. For the first time, American Naval representatives have openly acknowledged that the submarine was carrying out reconnaissance missions off the Russian coast near the main Northern Fleet bases.

The collision, which took place 14 miles from Cape Rybachiy (less than 26 kilometers off our shore) was

made possible by the fact that neither submarine "heard" the other due to the specific hydrology of the sea these days. After a prolonged thaw there was a severe freeze and a so-called layer of sharp density gradient, a layer of water sharply different in temperature from the rest of the sea, was formed at the depth at which both submarines were located. Under such maritime conditions, it is as if sonar runs into an impenetrable wall and it is as if a submarine is "blind."

While acknowledging the fact of the collision itself, the Americans nevertheless categorically do not accept accusations that they violated our territorial waters. The fact is that we are guided by international agreements while marking off our boundaries, in accordance with which in places where the shore line is very irregular, base lines, connected to the shoreline orientation points farthest out in the water, are accepted as the boundary marking. The Americans do not recognize this marking and they "measure off" only 12 miles from our shore.

Deputy Chief Naval Navigator Captain 1st Rank Tsimbal told me in an interview that the warming in our relations with the Americans has not changed their desire to monitor the entrance and exit to Kola and Motov bays, where our nuclear submarine routes lie. They should acknowledge our right to establish the boundaries of our territorial waters in this region, just as they have done with regard to other northern shorelines; they are depriving us of that possibility. This accounts for the fact that having gone 4.7 miles (about 8.5 kilometers) into our territorial waters, they calculated they were located in neutral waters.

As This Issue Was Going to Press

U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, while on a trip to the countries of Central America, said in an interview with journalists that he was not surprised by the incident in the Barents Sea and sees no reason to change the nature of U.S. Naval operations there. "We have several submarines operating there," he noted. "This is an important element of our security and I have no reason to think that any kind of fundamental problem exists here which requires us to change our policies."

According to Data from Jane's [All the World's Fighting Ships]:

The Sierra-class (NATO designation) nuclear attack submarine has been in service in the Northern Fleet since 1987.

Displacement when fully loaded is 8,100 tons; dimensions are 107x12x8.8 meters; speed is 34 knots; the crew is approximately 100 men. It is armed with anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles, torpedoes and mines, including with nuclear warheads.

The Baton Rouge, a nuclear attack submarine of the 1975-design Los Angeles-class, has been in service in the U.S. Navy since 1987.

Its fully loaded displacement is 6,927 tons; dimensions are 109.7x10.1x9.9 meters; speed is more than 30 knots; the crew is 133 men. It is armed with anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles, depth charges and mines, including with nuclear warheads.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Former DOSAAF Chief Heads Russian Aviation Association

92UM0615A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 51-52, Jan 92 p 8

[Interview with Lt-Gen Avn Sergey Nikolayevich Maslov, chief of the Aviation Training and Aviation Sports Directorate, by L. Baynazarovaya; place and date not given: "Recovery from the Dive?"]

[Text] *The National Aviation Association of Russia [NAAR] was born on 30 September 1991 in Kaluga at the constituent conference. Lieutenant-General of Aviation S. Maslov, now the former deputy chairman of the Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF and chief of the Aviation Training and Aviation Sports Directorate, was elected its president. The association's charter has been registered at the RSFSR Ministry of Justice (certificate of registration No 397, dated 14 November 1991).*

The new public association was met with different views in DOSAAF circles. During the struggle between NAAR supporters and opponents, Maslov's name was constantly mentioned. Some accused him of divisiveness, egoistic ambitions, irresponsibility, and aspirations of occupying a leadership seat in the structures of the Russian OSTO [Defense Sports and Technical Organization]. Others considered him a reformer, a fighter, and tied their hopes for the future of Russia's sports and amateur aviation only to him.

Several articles have appeared in SOVETSKIY PATRIOT concerning this. However, many perceived them critically and accused the authors of bias, a one-sided view of the conflict, and striving to link the problem that has arisen only with Maslov's personality.

Readers ask: Where is the pluralism of opinions? Why, unlike other publications, television and radio, does not SOVETSKIY PATRIOT give the leaders of the association the opportunity to speak? Will the incident with Solzhenitsyn be repeated: Everyone cursed the novel "Gulag Archipelago" without looking him in the eye, but they read it and shouted "Oh, this is a masterpiece!"

Accepting valid criticism of the readers, we would note that back in the summer, the newspaper offered the authors a chance to speak out on the most critical, burning issues of aviation life of the Defense Society. Considering the special interest in the problem that has been raised, we are publishing an interview with the president of the

National Aviation Association of Russia, S. Maslov, by our correspondent L. Baynazarovaya.

[Baynazarovaya] Sergey Nikolayevich [Maslov], what is the reason for creating the new, independent National Aviation Association of Russia?

[Maslov] The idea of creating the association did not occur spontaneously, as some believe, but in the process of an in-depth analysis of the whole series of tasks facing training and sports aviation of the Defense Society.

Unfortunately, it has been developing extremely poorly during the last 40 years. Both from the standpoint of quantity, since the number of flying clubs and aviation sports clubs have decreased, and from the standpoint of quality, the social aspect of the issue. It concerns the paltry existence of our staff workers, whose salaries were ridiculously low for a long time. And there has been no progress in providing them with apartments. For all practical purposes, no one has monitored the expenditure of monetary assets allocated for share participation in building housing.

Without a doubt, aviation of the Defense Society is a very dear pleasure for the state. Nevertheless, despite the difficult times in the country, it must not be lost, for it is a matter of the honor of our aviation, preservation of its traditions, high proficiency-rated specialists for the army and the national economy, and patriotic education.

But already now, some leaders are adding a pair of destructions to our overall trouble—they are disbanding aviation centers and proposing to plow up airfields...

All this is due to the fact that aviation in the Defense Society is often managed by people who are far removed from it and do not understand its essence and problems. In 1971, by decision of the Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF, aviation organizations were subordinated to oblast, kray, and republic committees of DOSAAF. That is when DOSAAF aviation also acquired its uniquely cumbersome and unqualified management structure, unlike in any country of the world.

All attempts to find and introduce a more flexible and effective form of management were met with extreme hostility. More than 2 years ago we came up with the idea of creating regional aviation centers. But...

Aviation is the only organization in DOSAAF which was financed only from the state budget. Every year the state allocated funds, considerable funds too, on the order of 250 million rubles [R], for development of our aviation. And there are indisputable facts that not all of these funds reached the aviators, but accumulated in the apparatus of the DOSAAF Central Committee and in a number of oblast and kray committees of the society. This is why it was necessary to create an independent aviation association.

[Baynazarovaya] What specific goals and tasks face the national association?

[Maslov] Our organization is outgrowing the framework of the Defense Society, although all the previous tasks that faced DOSAAF aviation remain in force. The NAAR assumes responsibility for fulfilling obligations under agreements concluded with the Ministry of Defense: training specialists for the armed forces; working with students at special residence schools being opened; and it will also assist in creating new aircraft and in vocational orientation of youths on flying duty in structures of the defense specialty and law enforcement agencies.

A second direction of the NAAR's activities is the development and popularization of aviation types of sports. Aviation sports has also been financed from the state budget all these years. Recently, Russian bodies of state power reaffirmed their agreement to continue subsidizing it. In what proportion? Of course, not 100 percent. For comparison, I will say that aviation sports in all countries is financed from the state budget, but in different percentages: for example, 30 percent in the United States, 80 percent in France, and 50 percent in Germany.

Our state has too few millionaires to count on patronage, and the people are too poor. An attempt to develop a mass character at the expense of the empty purses of the parents of the teenagers and young men would be disastrous to aviation and, along with it, the international prestige we have. You know that 200 world records have been recorded in the International Federation of Aviation Sports, and two-thirds of them belong to Soviet sportsmen.

Needless to say, in the new economic conditions, the NAAR will be engaged in cost-accounting and commercial activities within the country and abroad. This is especially so since some international firms have already expressed a desire to cooperate with us after learning about creation of the NAAR.

The final direction of the NAAR's activities—something totally new!—is the development of general-purpose aircraft: amateur, private, business, and independent aircraft. So, in the near future, besides civil and military aviation, small aircraft will appear in our country, like in all civilized countries. All design bureaus have actively supported this idea.

The times of naked enthusiasm have long passed. People understand: only after becoming independent and having thrown from their shoulders the whole staff of unneeded chiefs and parasites can they achieve some changes. That is why the very idea of the association was born not from above but from below. In the final analysis, this is the most important thing. Today, 47 of the 97 aviation subunits have become members of the NAAR.

[Baynazarovaya] The NAAR and ROSTO have practically the same areas of common interest. Why can't the NAAR's tasks be accomplished within the framework of the ROSTO?

[Maslov] Each aviation organization should itself—and only this way can we live!—dispose of all of its budget and cost-accounting funds, plan how many people it needs to accomplish current and future tasks, and how much it should pay to whom for work.

The leadership of the society favors priority development of aviation in words only. But in practice... The fact that not a single aviation subunit as a member of DOSAAF, as a primary organization participated in the process of electing delegates to the constituent conference of the Russian Defense Sports and Technical Organization [ROSTO] speaks for itself. The large detachment of aviation sportsmen and sportsmen of other technical and applied military types of sports has also been sidestepped.

Delegates were "elected" from a list released in advance from above; that is why no one but those committee chairmen in whom they had confidence attended the conference. They would support and elect to the leadership posts of the ROSTO those whom they must. Representatives of aviation organizations (about 100 people) who arrived at the conference independently without prior permission were not admitted to the conference.

In principle, I was sure that we could not expect any kind of democracy from the organizing committee elected more than 2 years ago by the strong-willed decision and at its own discretion by the former leadership of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee. That is why I addressed the leaders of the committees and workers of DOSAAF organizations on the territory of the RSFSR and expressed a lack of trust in the organizing committee.

Incidentally, I informed Comrade Kotlovtshev about this in advance. How could I do otherwise? I am opposed to being hit without warning. Later on, I had no other way out. Even as a member of the bureau, the DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium, and deputy chairman of the society, I was virtually blockaded from all issues associated with the creation of the Russian Defense Organization. Apparently, all because my name was listed among the candidates for the post of leader of the ROSTO.

Take the ROSTO charter and try to find the word "aviation." I doubt whether you will. It was heard once, probably by chance, in the text on technical types of sports. That is how it was constantly; they forgot about us, ignored us. That is why the creation of the NAAR—an absolutely independent organization—is a vitally important issue.

[Baynazarovaya] Is your organization planning to operate on the training and material-technical base of the former DOSAAF?

[Maslov] This issue of ownership is the essence of the conflict between the NAAR and the ROSTO. The Defense Society of the RSFSR has declared itself the legal successor to DOSAAF and its property with all

technical, material, financial, and other resources. We, the NAAR members, make claim only to the aviation property.

Let us examine this. What is a state institution? It is that which is maintained totally by the state budget. So, the DOSAAF flying club is the only institution in the structure of the society that had no subsidy other than state subsidy. Consequently, the flying clubs are state institutions, although they function in the system of a public organization. And the ROSTO has no right to lay claim to this property. Or to the equipment which we received from the Ministry of Defense. In the society it is listed merely on the record of current operations. The Ministry of Defense and the Air Force commander in chief of aviation equipment gave their consent to transfer the equipment to the ownership of the aviation organizations. I will emphasize—to the ownership of each aviation organization, and not the NAAR. And this, I believe, is a big step forward.

Airfields, buildings, structures on them, land—everything that is on the books of the clubs should also be privatized by the flying clubs, not by higher organizations. Although illegal orders of the ROSTO leadership are now hastily coming out on the immediate transfer of all property from the books of the flying clubs to the books of the committees. This is a violation of the most elementary legal rules. There is a law on privatization, and disputed issues should be resolved on the basis of this law, and if necessary, through arbitration. There is no other way.

[Baynazarovaya] From all appearances, the NAAR is not planning any contacts with the Defense Society in the future?

[Maslov] On the contrary, we are planning the closest cooperation. We would like to join the country's OSTO as a collective member with rights of an independent organization of a sovereign republic.

[Baynazarovaya] Sergey Nikolayevich, they say you apologized publicly at a recent plenum of the DOSAAF Central Committee. For what did you apologize?

[Maslov] I apologized for the fact that in a moment of anger I wrongly offended a person. In the address I already mentioned, I condemned the inaction of the leadership of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee during the days of the August coup and named specific names, including Lieutenant-General Kanastratov, deputy chairman of the Defense Society. But as it turned out, I was wrong, and I apologized to him for this publicly.

[Baynazarovaya] Sergey Nikolayevich, much is being said about you now; some support you, others criticize you...

[Maslov] I did not figure that everything would be simple and easy. I knew what I was going into. The only thing that makes the conflict more complicated is that my

comrades in arms and I cannot permit ourselves to use those techniques and methods which the opponents are using.

I am sorry for those who just recently approved of our ideas, thoughts, and plans in words, but when the time came to support the initiative in public, they stepped aside and were silent. But I can understand them. They can lose their job for disobedience. Not everyone is able to change. But all this is a trifle compared to those prospects which are opening up before our brainchild—the NAAR.

When this material was already set in type, we were informed that the regular meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Council of the Union of the OSTO considered the statement by the president of the NAAR on this public organization joining the Union of the OSTO. The Bureau did not decide favorably.

Having noted that the activities of the aviation association could be of considerable benefit to carrying out the tasks of defense and sports societies of Russia, members of the Bureau recommended to Comrade S.N. Maslov to coordinate his positions with the Russian OSTO and return again for consideration of this issue after legal resolution of disputed problems concerning ownership.

Americans, Joint-Stock Company To Build Housing for Navy

92UM0532A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
10 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Captain Second Rank V. Pasyakin: "Will There Be No One in the Navy Without Apartments? Or About the Development of a Housing Construction Program by American Businessmen for Soviet Officers"]

[Text] A group of American entrepreneurs visited the Black Sea Fleet for the purpose of signing a contract on the construction of housing for naval officers. Also visiting the fleet with the Americans were representatives of the Novikon joint-stock company (AO), which was set up in accordance with a decision of the commander in chief of the Navy.

"As a matter of fact, we are talking about two firms," Captain Second Rank Sergey Ulayev, vice president of Novikon tells me. "These are Kontilinkgrupp Ltd. (Nicholas Rezini, president, and Charles Hak, director) and the producer and designing firm Technogrit Ltd. (Jack Kulka, president, and Angelo Korva, chief architect)."

Getting acquainted with the American entrepreneurs and the presentation of the project took place on the hospital ship Yenisey.

Beautifully manufactured models, graphs, diagrams, and colorful booklets of two projects of three-story apartment houses were laid out before those in attendance.

"These buildings are very popular in the United States," explained Jack Kulka, manager of the construction corporation. "An enormous building program, based on the buildings in this project, began to be implemented after World War II. So, in the course of three years, starting in 1950, 35,000 houses were built".

D. Kulka showed a colored photograph of a whole small town built for families of sailors of the U.S. Navy on the basis of the proposed project. A splendid housing complex was merged beautifully into the infrastructure of New York with its multi-million population.

"But, in general, this is an historic project, spread throughout the entire United States," Kulka continues. "Depending on the geographic and climatic conditions, it is changed somewhat, but it is a kind of basic project that is shown here. Incidentally, we plan to survey your land that is earmarked for construction, so that we can then site the houses in the local landscape. We are also ready to consider any of your desires and to make changes to the proposed project..."

I will note that the two projects selected by the American specialists are not at all accidental, inasmuch as they answer three conditions put forth by our side: speed of construction, low prices for the houses and conveniences, comfort, and modern trimmings. The Americans believe that the proposed project meets the aggregate of these requirements ideally. Incidentally, there was a competition among firms to fill the Navy's order, and the firm with experience in the construction of homes for American sailors won.

Briefly about dates. Within 90 days after the conclusion of the contract, all of the necessary units and parts for the houses will be delivered from the United States to the building site, and in another 45 days the houses will be ready for occupancy. Their layout and internal trimmings, judging from the photographs, inspires respect for the builders of such apartments. The houses are not only fashionable, but also practical and comfortable to live in. Despite the fact that a significant part is of wooden construction, a house, nonetheless, is fireproof, owing to special materials. For example, the vinyl siding is four millimeters thick. Thus, in the event of a fire, an internal fire will be resisted for over an hour, and external walls and stairwells will withstand fire for a period of two hours. The Americans are prepared to use local building materials without restrictions, which will facilitate and lower the price of the housing construction. They showed a great interest in Inkerman stone, and they expressed a willingness to take any amount of building material samples with them to the United States so that, there, with the help of physical-chemical research and subsequent computer runs, they could determine where and how specifically to use local raw materials. The Americans, as is well-known, are great pragmatists, and they do nothing that is not necessary (we must learn this from them), and if they do something, then they first plan it and calculate it carefully. It is the same in the construction of the aforementioned houses for the military. The

strength of support structures, the thickness of heat insulation, and many other things are calculated by means of a computer, into which data has been fed on the seismic features of an area, temperature variations, the amount and nature of settlement, wind pressure, etc.; that is, not by eye, but in strict conformity to technical requirements and geographic and climatic conditions. In a word, nothing is superfluous, and there is total optimization of all structures and technological processes.

The project of 18-apartment houses envisions the installation in each apartment of a set of kitchen furniture, a refrigerator, a gas stove, a washing machine, a microwave oven, a dryer, and television sets (according to the number of rooms). A three-room apartment will have an area of 76 square meters, and a two-room apartment will have 61.5 square meters.

It is remarkable that the Americans can erect such houses anywhere, even on an uninhabited island where there is no infrastructure, and there are no engineering and power networks. At the same time, houses will be equipped with absolutely everything that is necessary for people to live: electric power, water, sewer, and garbage disposal systems. Of course, this will require additional facilities, and this means expenditures also, but the fact itself speaks of the enormous capabilities of the firm. It can "hook up" houses to any power and engineering networks that pass through an area of construction, or do without them entirely.

This is a great plus for the project, for the military very often (especially sailors, border troops, and Air Defense troops) are very frequently settled in areas that are remote from cities and even rural systems.

In a word, the more I became acquainted with the project, the more respect I gained for its creators. However, it could not have been otherwise; after all, we are talking about professionals of a high class. Thus, Angelo Korva is not simply a recognized architect with 25 years of service specializing in the creation of facilities that have social significance. He is a designer who is capable of siting a house, two houses, or an entire little town in any landscape, as was done in New York.

"I myself was born in Italy," relates Korva, "my father was a professional stone cutter in that country. And, believe me, I know about stones and building materials not from hearsay."

"We see our task as not only building houses for naval officers of your country in a minimally short period and at a low price," says D. Kulka, "but also to turn over our technologists to you to assist in setting up a production line for the production of assembly equipment, to train specialists..."

The aims and tasks are generous. We need everything that is proposed like the air we breathe. But it is also time to talk about what is most important: Who will finance these fine programs?

"Half of the resources will be made available by the commercial center under the Ministry of Defense, and the second half, by the Novikon joint-stock company," says Captain Second Rank S. Ulayev, Novikon vice president.

"Initially, it is planned to build 6,000 apartments in two years," Admiral I. Makhonin, chief of Rear Services of the Navy, told me, "this is \$269 million. But, taking into account the use of Navy transport to move local building materials, the sum will be significantly less. Well, and besides this, the Navy is itself now learning how to make money. I am talking, in particular, about the lease of tankers, including to foreigners, for hard currency, transportation of passengers and various cargoes, use for commercial purposes of naval liquid fuel bases, various kinds of auxiliary ships, Navy aviation transport, the sale of old surface ships and vessels..."

In time, the Navy, with the help of Novikon, will earn both rubles and hard currency, but the money for construction is needed today, now, so that, at best, the first houses for officers, petty officers, and workers and employees of the Navy will appear in four and a half months.

Report on Biological Warfare Research Facility

924P0080A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Feb 92 p 6

[Article by Vitaliy Kaysyn: "Visiting a Caged Beast"]

[Text] Biomedical means of protection against some kinds of weapons of mass destruction are being developed in many countries of the world in the framework permitted by the international convention of 1972, this being an integral part of state defense programs. The establishment of a reliable protective potential against the spread of infectious diseases of man is a priority matter. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the coordinated actions here remind one of the well-known riddle: How can you catch a black cat in a dark room?

I understood from the first minutes of the conversation with N. Urakov, the general director of the scientific research institute, that it was not without reason that approval was given for the visit: the situation in the country could not help but reflect on the fate of the scientific complex with which he had been entrusted. But necessity is the mother of invention, as the saying goes. They permitted me to visit the laboratory building, a nine-story glass building where they develop effective therapeutic and prophylactic medicines against different pathogens of infectious diseases. The list of diseases includes tularemia, legionnaire's disease, pestilence, and anthrax.

We approached the main building with deputy director A. Stepanov. The building is surrounded by a concrete fence with an electronic warning system. The checkpoint requires a permit with a number. On the floor, a woman attendant notes the time of arrival, takes the permit, and checks to see whether you went through the morning

medical examination and whether you have a certificate for the appropriate inoculation.

And then there is the disinfection center. Here the scientist removes all of his clothing, passes into the "clean" cloakroom, and there he receives a work "uniform." Through the "dirty" room, which is closer to the working zones of the laboratory, you reach the so-called air lock. After closing a massive metal door behind you, you find yourself in the "safe." A similar door is in front of you.

I was uncomfortable at first. But my guide casually opened the door and pointed out the overhead air vent. "On the way to work," he explained, "you are accompanied by a flow of clean air. On the way back, you go against it."

"But if...."

"Everything is provided for," Aleksey Vyacheslavovich said, dismissing my fears. "In the event of the slightest disturbance of the air exchange, these vents are hermetically sealed, not allowing air to escape from the work zone. We have hermetic doors."

We crossed the threshold and went out into a second corridor, which, just as the first one of glass, encircles the perimeter of the building. The entrance to the laboratories is from there.

What was I able to see in the "holy of holiest"? I saw a sealed refrigerator and a work table located in a hermetic box with a glass window and protruding rubber mittens.

"You see," the deputy general director pointed to a special receptacle attached to the side of the table. Cultures of microbes, contaminated organs of animals and their blood samples, and other infectious specimens under investigation are delivered here in a sealed metal box. The scientist inserts his hands into the mittens with oversleeves, takes the box from the interior side, and sets it on the table. He works under a directed flow of clean air.

"And where do the organs of contaminated animals come from?"

"Work with especially dangerous infections is done only on three floors. Each one of them has its own vivarium. Cells are kept in metal cabinets—also under a flow of air. Here is where the animals are kept that have first been infected with pathogens of the diseases under investigation to check the effectiveness of therapeutic medicines and vaccines. All of the solid waste material goes through an autoclave to the institute crematorium and the liquid wastes pass through special pipes to thermal treatment. As you see, it is not only the air that goes out processed. This is why we were not able to photograph the vivarium. We were saving the photographic equipment, for it would also have to go out through the autoclave."

The observance of the appropriate conditions in the performance of the work with infectious materials makes

it possible to guarantee the complete safety of the research and also to protect the environment against the accidental discharge of contagion and simply filth.

"From the vivarium," concludes A. Stepanov, "the experimenter obtains samples of organs and tissue of infected animals perishing as a result of diseases."

That which evokes associations with death in my imagination is for some here only a specimen—working stock, so to speak. Although I understand very well that the work of the experimenter primarily benefits my health, my fellow citizens, and all of us. This research can become an iron curtain between us and our diseases. Nevertheless, I am concerned about the fact that a force for good as well as evil is concentrated in this building—in the form of pathogens of diseases. In my imagination, they are associated with an apocalyptic beast that according to the legend is still confined. In addition, the country is in a mess now. Fundamental programs have ceased to be a priority of the state. Will they not attract the attention of more interested circles? For the institute is getting less and less financing and accordingly its scientific output is declining. Where can one find an application for the unique intellectual potential, knowledge, and experience gained by the scientists of Obolensk near Moscow and similar science towns? Possibly where this is appreciated more—in other countries?

If we really do not need vaccines or therapeutic or prophylactic medicines against infectious diseases, then would it not be better to close the institute, which cost the state 150 million rubles? And on its basis to open a profitable reinforced concrete or cement and mortar plant?

Obolensk has existed for two decades in a picturesque location between Serpukhov and the city of physicists Protvino. Here they have long had an excellent school with an observatory and a swimming pool, a polyclinic and everyday services, a store, and a youth center. The housing problem has been resolved almost completely. The institute has an up-to-date complex in which they can perform unique research that even includes the use of bacterial aerosols. It was built taking into account the international standards for work with highly dangerous biological materials. It is dangerous to forget this and it is not the best thing that the state is capable of doing with its government.

Although he understands the need for concrete and mortar for the economy, Doctor of Medicine N. Urakov, general director of the research institute and winner of the State Prize, sees the activities of the science complex somewhat differently.

"The history of the fight against infectious diseases," he says, "has had victories and defeats, ups and downs. We eradicated smallpox and then Aids appeared. There is still a danger of cholera, pestilence, and other previously unknown infections, whereby the most frightening thing is their manifestation in new variants. It is precisely for this reason that we must have diagnostic, therapeutic,

and prophylactic medicines capable of preventing misfortune. It is sad to realize that a unified system in the country for the prevention of infectious diseases, which for years was one of our major achievements, has practically collapsed."

"It is also well known that in a time of war and natural disasters," Nikolay Inokentovich goes on to relate, "most loss of human life occurred from the massive spread of infectious diseases. Thus, at the time of the Ashkhabad earthquake in 1948, many died because of the lack of effective medicines. Children died of infectious and intestinal diseases, for they are most vulnerable. I do not think that there is anything in the world that can outweigh a human life, especially that of a child."

Later on in our lengthy conversation, a completely unexpected subject of a different nature arose.

"Many kinds of bacteriological weapons are known," N. Urakov said as I was leaving, "that are based on pathogens of particularly dangerous infections. There are countries where they secretly perform research in this area. Unfortunately, the events of recent years have shown that these countries are not averse to demonstrating their armor. But this does not mean that our country, in violation of the Geneva Convention, must develop weapons of mass destruction. But we are obligated to have effective biological medicines and vaccines against them. Until quite recently, our country and our institute in particular could be proud of the results of their research. Today, however, we are hopelessly behind the developed countries. This is doubly vexing, inasmuch as the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons and on their destruction provides for the necessity of carrying out national scientific programs to combat infections."

The United States allocated \$95 million for a similar program in 1990. Here they think that we should find our own way out of our troubles. For this reason, to avoid unemployment and destitution at a time of raging inflation, the scientists in Obolensk established 10 small enterprises for the production of medicines that are in very short supply. But even they did not provide more assurance about tomorrow. Just as in a mirror, the business of science is reflected in the same food store where there is a line even for bread. There I heard uneasy voices: Will they close the institute? For once it is deprived of the support of the research institute, the settlement will immediately find itself in trouble.

Many towns, just like Obolensk, decided to unite in an alliance of science cities to survive. It includes Zhukovskiy, Kaliningrad, Pushchino, Protvino, and many others. On 23 December, the alliance decided to take the youngest member—Obolensk—under its wing. Perhaps together it will be easier to overcome the economic disorder? After all, it is precisely the close ties between an enterprise and its social infrastructure that make it

possible to establish optimum conditions for the full uncovering of human talent and intellectual capacities.

When this material was prepared, a scientist from Obolensk called me and reported two bits of news: work is successfully proceeding on a fundamentally new compound—"the tumor necrosis factor." Its effectiveness is being tested on laboratory animals infected with cancerous tumors. The results are impressive.

The second news is that scientists from the town of Zhukovskiy decided to establish a shoe factory to save their cause. The first news brought joy but the second was bitter. For if our domestic scientists start to sew boots and the rulers do not take note of this, then I fear that within a few years the scientists and the shoe factory and the rulers themselves will all disappear.

It would be better for the shoemaker to make shoes, the doctor to concern himself with our health, and the politicians to be involved in politics—real politics.

Ukrainian Impact On Military Education

92UM0528A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 5 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by A. Grigoryev: "The Distribution of Schools"]

[Text] The country's civilian institutions of higher learning prepare specialists in approximately 300 professions, and military institutions in 476. This is explained by the fact that the modern army is a mechanism more complex than all of our national economy combined. By the way, the same is true in the camp of our former "probable enemy."

Eighteen military academies, 160 higher military institutions and secondary schools, and the 10 Suvorov and Nakhimov military institutions have duly provided the Armed Forces with qualified staff personnel. The level of their training in certain categories has been regarded as the highest in the world, and primarily that of strategic missile operators, pilots, and motorized-rifle officers.

The Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov military methodological schools are well known throughout the world. As a whole, in the USSR a single, efficient system for training officers has taken shape. However, according to the head of "The Main Directorate for Military Educational Institutions" (GUV) within the Ministry of Defense of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Colonel-General N. Madudov, this system is now on the verge of collapse.

This is primarily explained by the position of the Ukraine, which has taken into its own jurisdiction not only troops, but higher military institutions located within the Republic. There are 33 of them now in the Ukraine. The loss of the majority of the latter has not caused hardship for the Combined Armed Forces of the

Commonwealth of Independent States, as specialists within this category can receive schooling at other academies and schools.

However, difficulties will be encountered with military staffing in the Commonwealth of Independent States if the Ukraine keeps for its own use the Kiev and Kharkov PVO Academies, the Kharkov (Strategic) Missile Troops Command School and the two naval schools in Sevastopol, which train officers for service on nuclear submarines and large strategic ships.

The Ukraine itself does not need so many specialists in these military professions. For the most part, it is in need of others. Within the republic cadets and students are trained in 51 specialties, and rare ones we would note, but where will the Ukraine get "profs" in the other 425?

Meanwhile the Republic has created its own Main Directorate for Military Educational Institutions, which, it is said, is preparing new academic programs. The latter will even include those receiving training to serve in the strategic forces. How can two "drivers" trained differently direct the same "cart," specifically a strategic missile or a nuclear submarine?

Meanwhile, cadets in Ukraine take an oath of loyalty to the independent republic. The Kiev Ministry of Defense has made assurances that those who do not take the oath

will be given the opportunity to finish their schooling. Some people, however, do not believe this.

Chief of the Main Directorate of Cadres of the CIS Ministry of Defense, Colonel-General Yu. Rodionov, made assurances that a position would be found in Russia for all cadets. Helping warrant officers make the move is more difficult. If cadets of the closed political institutions in Tallinn and Riga were disseminated down to the last man, the professors in epaulets would have been sitting until now on their suitcases in expectation of how their fates would be decided.

Aside from Russia and to some extent the Ukraine, not one republic within the Commonwealth of Independent States is equipped to school staff personnel for their armed forces. In Uzbekistan there are three institutions of higher learning in all, in Azerbaijan, two, in Kazakhstan, one, and in the others there is not one. It is true, some of them have wanted to provide schooling for their officers. Armenia directed a request for help in organizing a tank school to the Ministry of Defense. No response to this proposal ensued.

The question regarding admission into higher military institutions in 1992 is, in the words of Colonel-General N. Madudov, still a "dark forest." If only the way is not lost...

UKRAINE

Morozov Appeal to Black Sea Sailors

92UM00608B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
1 Feb 92 p 1

[Address by Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel General K. Morozov: "Respect Human Rights and Personal Dignity: Ukrainian Minister of Defense Address to Black Sea Fleet Navymen"]

[Text] Dear comrades, citizens of independent Ukraine!

In a complicated time of our young state's establishment we have directly begun organizational development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which must be a reliable guarantor of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Our concept of defense and military organizational development is being implemented in strict conformity with national legislation and agreements signed by heads of state of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

But despite this, a purposeful campaign to whip up the situation over the problem of the Black Sea Fleet and servicemen taking the oath of allegiance to people of Ukraine has been unfolded by certain circles both on the territory of Ukraine as well as outside it. All possible means have been used, which are at cross-purposes with laws of the independent state. Objective information coming from Kiev over television, radio and press channels is not reaching the personnel of fleet units and formations, and the state's laws, Cabinet of Ministers decrees and Ukrainian Ministry of Defense documents are being ignored.

We always have stood and do firmly stand for the fact that every serviceman must make his own independent choice, and not just determine his citizenship, but also make an independent, unpressured decision in which armed forces he will serve. There should be no discrimination or pressure in this matter. In the truly rule-of-law, democratic state which we are striving to build, every person is free to determine his own fate and no one has the right to impose any kind of viewpoint on servicemen by methods of force, but, to my great regret, this is happening.

The Ministry of Defense and public of Ukraine are following events in the Black Sea Fleet with great attention and anxiety. The position of Black Sea Fleet navymen in their attitude toward processes of the creation of Ukrainian statehood and the Ukrainian Armed Forces is far from a matter of indifference to all of us. Despite a continuous flow of disinformation, we sense your support and express sincere gratitude for your civic position.

The military oath of allegiance to people of Ukraine taken by personnel of a number of Fleet units and formations eloquently attests to the high level of self-awareness of seamen, petty officers and officers. It attests to the courage which personnel are displaying

under conditions of a total absence of objective information and of constant pressure on the part of the Black Sea Fleet command.

Today it is no secret to anyone that officers and warrant officers who command formations, units and subunits are being persecuted for the fact that they and their subordinates are being pressured [sic] despite laws of the state on whose territory they perform service. They are persecuted for the fact that they made their choice in favor of Ukraine and determined their citizenship once and for all independently of national affiliation.

Addressing you today who have sworn an oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine and those of you who in their hearts already have perceived this need but still are wavering because of uncertainty in the face of illegal actions of some commanders and officers in charge, I wish to assure you that you, like all citizens of Ukraine, are under the protection of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine. Fleet officers and warrant officers relieved of positions today because of their patriotic motives or discharged to the reserve for this reason will be registered for service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and restored in positions with retention of all civil rights and privileges. To ensure fairness and legality I ask that you send your requests to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense or transmit them through representatives of the republic's military department.

There is no place in our Armed Forces for threats and intimidations. Respect for human rights and personal dignity is the chief principle of mutual relationships.

Respectfully,
Colonel General K. Morozov.

Morozov Speaks on Military Service Draft Law

92UM0616A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
4 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent Lt Col N. Gorenko: "Ukraine Builds Armed Forces: Sacred Duty of Every Citizen"]

[Text] The words in the headline belong to Colonel General Konstantin Petrovich Morozov, minister of defense of the Ukraine. He spoke them this past Friday in Parliament in a speech delivered to representatives of the people of the Ukraine.

Defense of the Ukraine is the sacred duty of every citizen of the Ukraine.

How splendid, how wonderful, that we have progressed in our self-development to the point where we hear resounding from the tribune of state authority words which signify in reality that we are a country, that we are independent, that we have a right to an army and already have the rudiments of an Army of a state which makes no claims to world mastery! That we are a state that has no intention of attacking anyone.

I am firmly convinced that historians will in time pass fair judgement and tell millions of people the truth about the present events. This will be an amazing story, one that is simple and true, of a new birth. Let us say that the Ukraine is acquiring its statehood.

The Ukraine, the same as a bride, is donning her inimitable, distinctive, national attire.

Thanks be to God! This is what millions of people want.

The bill, Universal Military Obligation and Military Service, was passed by the Ukraine Supreme Council on the first reading. This means that the law that will guide you and me—the people wearing the uniform—will be approved in short order. This means that conditions will become easier and simpler. For coming into play will be certainty.

The Ukraine minister of defense, in his reading of the future law, the draft of which was twice published in NARODNAYA ARMIYA, reported the following.

He stressed that the drafters of the proposed legislation have been mindful of the provisions of world military legislation. At the same time, the legislation incorporates a traditional and national approach to the construction of the Ukraine Armed Forces, which are building on a basis of historic development of statehood for the people of the Ukraine.

The general provisions lay out the principal functions of the state relative to its defense. Leading in significance here is the phrase: **"Defense of the Ukraine is the sacred duty of every citizen of the Ukraine."**

The future law provides that military service in the Ukraine will consist of regular service for conscripts and of alternative service.

Regular military service will have a duration of 18 months, while alternative service will last twice as long: 36 months. The institution of the latter service constitutes a positive solution of one of the most pressing problems, the rights of man. It pertains to people whose religious convictions do not permit them to bear arms.

The future legislation makes provision for contract service. This affords the possibility of transferring to the professional Army. It definitely is a positive point. I believe that only this treatment of the problem will make it possible to effect future improvement in combat readiness and responsibility on the part of military cadre. This will generally enhance the authority of military service.

The future legislation will effect material changes in the service of enlisted, noncommissioned, and warrant officer personnel. Rating categories will be introduced, as based on professional qualifications. The categories will be associated with a pay scale. The introduction of contract service will do away with the concept of "extended-service military personnel." Provision is

made for first year cadets to sign an agreement (contract) for service in commissioned status after they graduate from their VUZ.

The future legislation resolves the problem of student draft. Students will be inducted into service only on a volunteer basis. In this connection, the time students invest in military studies in civilian VUZ's will count toward time in military service. Youths who do not complete this military training or term military service will be inducted into the service for a tour of up to one year in duration.

About draft deferments. The law introduces expansion of civil rights in this regard. For example, it is proposed to grant a deferment to citizens with children three years of age and older. A three-year deferment will be granted to youths, if a family has two or more sons, with one of them in compulsory military service. Youths resettled from a disaster area will be granted a deferment of up to two years. Youths starting an individual farm will not be drafted for three years, starting with the day they take possession of the farm.

The future legislation provides for social protection of officers who upon graduating from military schools are not given an Army assignment.

Finally, we have arrived at the point (progressed in our development) where we recognize the right to total social protection of an officer and warrant officer (occupying a position of officer for at least five years) to be granted a discharge upon request of the applicant. Officers and warrant officers will be so entitled by the new law.

The Ukraine minister of defense pointed out in his speech to Parliament that the proposed legislation incorporates numerous suggestions. For example, clarification of Article 5 of the future law. The article previously discussed categories of military ranks. The rank of colonel is henceforth to be considered as a higher rank.

There will be a definite change in draft age. This is associated with the changes introduced into the education system in the Ukraine. The length of study in tekhnikums, lyceums, and vocational and technical schools has been extended to 19 years of student age.

There is an increase in liability for avoiding the draft (Article 43). It is proposed to increase the term of service by the length of time a youth avoids the draft. The minister of defense stated that **"We are of the opinion that all citizens of a law-governed state must comply with the laws of the state, and that persons who fail to do so should be held criminally liable."**

About officers and warrant officers who have not taken the oath of allegiance to the people of the Ukraine. The minister of defense stressed that this kind of question must be resolved in a civilized and legal manner, on a basis of agreed-on solutions, ones that are responsive to the interests of servicemen and the state.

The Ukraine deserves an army. The Ukraine is expecting to possess an army. The Ukraine, we can be confident, has a law dealing with the Army and Army service.

What Kind of Pensions?

The legislative package passed by Parliament on the first reading includes in addition to the bill, the essence of which is presented above, another bill of equal significance, that being the Pension Entitlement of Servicemen and Internal Affairs Members.

A report on the legislation was read to the Ukraine Supreme Council by the chairman of the Committee on Questions of Social Protection for Servicemen at the Cabinet of Ministers, Colonel V. Martirosyan.

I believe that the speaker was justified and objective in his stressing the idea that **"The conditions of military service differ substantially from those of the usual labor activity of citizens."** With that as a basis, both pay and retirement benefits for servicemen should be such as to encourage their discharge of state functions and duties.

The drafters of the legislation had the above in mind. The bill is generally based on the general principles of Ukraine pension legislation.

What does the bill contain?

First and foremost, there is a definite change in eligibility for retirement. Imagine how important this is for the future, for generations of boys who would like to enter the service? For example, it is intended to initiate pension for an officer of age 40 to 50, for **"Military service entails considerable sacrifices and difficulties, strict compliance with the military oath, regulations, and orders, often requiring 24-hour tours of duty, with attendant mortal risk to the men."**

Based on Colonel V. Martirosyan's report and in light of the new legislation, the committee intends to work on pension amounts that would be **"more flexible and adequate compared to the present legislation."**

The committee chairman feels that **"this will certainly improve the pension situation of the various categories of retirees, especially veterans and the disabled of war and other military actions and family members of men killed in action and otherwise deceased."**

A 50-percent increase in disability pension payment is to be provided veterans of war and of other military actions. Also raised is the pension based on number of years of service for disabled war veterans. In the case of disability group I and group II, this amounts to three minimum age-related pension amounts. For group III, it is one and one-half times the minimum age-related payment. In comparison with the law of the former Union, the amounts were 150 rubles and 75 percent of the minimum age-related pension, respectively.

Disability pensions for command and enlisted personnel are as follows: First group, 70 percent; group II, 60

percent; group III, 40 percent of base pay. The present rates are: groups I and II, 55 percent; group III, 30 percent.

Now for service-connected disability. The future law sets payments at 100 percent of base pay for group I, 80 percent for group II, and 60 percent for group III.

It is intended to increase from 25 percent to 50 percent the payment made to dependent children who are complete orphans.

It is planned to increase from the 100 percent to 150 percent the payment to the family of a breadwinner who loses his life in line of duty.

The future law allows for greater flexibility in responding to changes in cost of living in the Ukraine, in that it is proposed to calculate minimum pension payments and various supplementary amounts on the basis of minimum age-related pensions.

Protection has been extended to reserve servicemen. The future law includes changes in this regard.

Of changes in the legislation as presented for examination by Parliament, the following are of principal importance. **First**, there is to be no years of service limitation relative to total labor entitlement of 50 years. Officers attaining this age as a rule have at least 20 years of creditable service. However, it often happens that officers called up from the reserves and discharged into the reserves at age 45 do not possess this amount of service. **Second**, it is proposed to pay a pension to officers discharged into the reserves in connection with a reduction in Armed Forces of the Ukraine and credited with 15 years and longer of service, regardless of age as of the day of discharge. Age-related pension is to be paid, for 15 to 20 years of service, in the amount of 35 percent for 15 years, with one percent of base pay for each additional year up to 20 years of service. **Third**, persons who were involved in cleanup operations at Chernobyl and are category I and category II equivalent are to have their age-related pension increased by 10 percent, while persons of categories III and IV equivalent are to be granted an increase of 5 percent. **Fourth**, payments supplementary to base salary (base pay and allowances) are to be reviewed in the transitory period of pension recalculation.

There can be no doubt that the legislation now before Parliament is some of the most significant in the life of servicemen. The version that will be passed will determine the establishment of the Armed Forces of the Ukraine and the authority and prestige of service in the Army of the independent state.

Ukraine Border Troop Commander Interviewed

92UM0614B Kiev *POGRANICHNIK UKRAINY*
in Russian 4 Jan 92 p 1

[Interview with Lt Gen V.A. Gubenko, commander of the Border Troops of Ukraine, by correspondent V. Sergeyev: "Today We Are Writing History"]

[Text]

[Sergeyev] First of all, permit me in the name of all our readers to congratulate you on your appointment to the position of chairman of the State Committee for Protection of the State Border of the Ukraine.

[Gubenko] Thank you. The establishment of the border troops of sovereign Ukraine is an event of historic importance. Now we have to establish the legal basis not only for the functioning of the troops but also for the state border of Ukraine itself. A lot of work lies ahead.

[Sergeyev] I would like for you to describe the procedure for taking the military oath and the prescribed ceremony.

[Gubenko] I do not believe there is any point in commenting on the temporary statute on the procedure for taking the military oath or the model scenario of the ceremony itself. The former document has been published in the press and is available in all the units and subunits of border troops.

Furthermore, model arrangements of the formal ceremony have been sent to all the troop collectives. A group of veteran officers is going from Kiev to help the commanders. They can provide on-the-spot assistance.

At the same time we are in no case trying to stifle intelligent local initiative aimed at enriching the oath-taking ceremony. The more colorful, ceremonial and elaborate it is, the better.

In short, we are fairly well prepared and do not anticipate any sort of significant attacks.

[Sergeyev] The appearance of representatives of various religions, the blessing of banners, and so forth, have recently become a common thing. Church representatives will most likely want to visit the border troops also on oath-taking day. Will they be allowed to do so?

[Gubenko] Of course. The doors of our units and subunits are closed to no one, including the clergy.

I am profoundly convinced that decisions on religious matters must be up to the believers themselves, and we are required only to give them the opportunity to exercise their right to freedom of religion and perform cultural ceremonies.

[Sergeyev] Representatives of many states of the former unified Union serve today in the armed forces of Ukraine. What are they to do when they have to take the oath of loyalty to a single power, Ukraine?

[Gubenko] This is truly an important question, one of interest to all categories of servicemen. I would not dramatize the situation, however.

What we have is that a youth from Russia, let us say, drafted to serve in the Ukraine acquires legal status equal to that of the republic's citizens. And it is perfectly natural that he also have the right and even be required to swear allegiance to this state. This in no way deprives him of the opportunity to return to his native republic and serve it after completing his service term. This applies also to officers who, after taking the oath, decide for whatever reasons to be transferred to another republic.

It is a different matter that we have still not worked out in the Ukraine the legal mechanism for permitting a citizen of one state to be transferred to another without losing his length of service, his right to advancement, his pensions and benefits, and so forth. I am confident, however, that in the near future the republic's parliament and Cabinet of Ministers will work out the legislation and the state decrees making it possible to resolve this problem.

We have to proceed not from the ideal today but from the realities of life today, after all.

Those who still do not want to take the oath and continue serving Ukraine will be given the opportunity to transfer to their native republics. This is their right, and we shall not prevent such transfers.

[Sergeyev] One last question, which has no direct relation to the oath-taking act itself. I refer to the future of those officers who will be taking the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine and the Ukrainian government a few days from now. More precisely, to the statute governing the procedure for performing military service.

The draft of this extremely important document calls for increasing the service age limits for officers by 5-10 years. Along with eliminating the possibility of transferring to serve in other republics, this can result in "stagnation," if I may put it that way, in the service advancement of young officers.

Will such circumstances not result in a deterioration of the Ukraine's border troops?

[Gubenko] I do not believe that it is valid to put the matter like that, since this statute has not yet been passed and is in the development stage. And our Committee for Protection of the State Border of the Ukraine has submitted its own proposals, unlike the aforementioned ones, to the Cabinet of Ministers for consideration.

In my opinion it will not be a great tragedy even if they are not passed, however. The fact is that along with negative aspects, increasing the age limits for serving as an officer also has its positive side. It is all a matter of the people's attitude.

Let us take the traditional procedure for serving in professional armies, for example. Every soldier who signs a contract commits himself to serve 20-25 years as a private or an NCO. The situation is approximately the same for officers. As long as an officer is capable of performing all of his duties, no one is going to discharge him just on the grounds that he has turned 45.

We too are starting to establish professional forces. And what is bad about the fact that the officer will serve a year or two longer at each level of his advancement in the service than he now would? I believe that this will benefit not just the officer himself but the border troops as a whole.

This is only one side of the coin, however. The other is that serving in the border troops of Ukraine does close the door for officers and warrant officers to transfer to other republics. So the pessimism of certain officers and warrant officers is totally unjustified.

The last thing I would like to say on the eve of an event of importance to all of us, the taking of the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine, is that we are writing history with our own hands today. And not from zero, as some people are inclined to believe. We have good traditions, and they need to be continued.

NARODNAYA ARMIYA Editor on Circulation

92UM0423A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
15 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Bilan, editor-in-chief of the newspaper *NARODNAYA ARMIYA*: "One Solution—Subscribe to *NARODNAYA ARMIYA*"]

[Text] The subscription price of the newspaper is 36 rubles for one year, 18 rubles for six months, 9 rubles for three months, and 3 rubles for one month. The index of the publication is 60975.

The telephones at the editorial office are ringing off the wall these days. People are calling from Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, Odessa, and Sevastopol. The questions are the same: Where can we get your newspaper? In what issues are the laws on organizational development of the Army of Ukraine printed?...

We gladly answer all these questions and, at the same time, are perplexed along with those who are not yet our readers: Why is the Main Administration for the Distribution of Publications [Soyuzpechat] sharply reducing the number of copies of *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* being distributed via the news stands, while interest in the newspaper and reader demand for it are increasing. While other publications do not come out for weeks due to a paper shortage, we are doing everything we can to get into the readers' hands on a daily basis. But for now an insurmountable barrier stands in our way: the position of the main distributor—Soyuzpechat.

It is most difficult to deliver the newspaper to regions of Ukraine where the Carpathian and Odessa military districts and the Black Sea Fleet are located. It is quite obvious that commanders did not conduct any explanatory work concerning this during the subscription campaign. So the people themselves, even at the general level, are forced to consult the editorial office with a request to obtain one or another issue of *NARODNAYA ARMIYA*. But we are unable to satisfy a large number of requests in such a manner.

The most acceptable solution is to subscribe to the newspaper. We advertised the newspaper quite a bit during the subscription campaign. But by no means were we able to visit all regions due to a shortage of time and money for travel. And those who could have helped us significantly did not do so. Therefore, we are forced to begin a repeat subscription or, more accurately, a second phase of it. All the necessary information on it has been set in type using a larger print and will be repeated for a specific period of time. We are adding to it that a person can subscribe to *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* at any post office or, better yet, with subscription organizers in the units by sending a completed order form to the publishing house subscription department of *NARODNAYA ARMIYA*. All the necessary information regarding this can be obtained in Kiev at telephone number 216-65-34.

At the same time, we are consulting the chairman of the State Committee of Ukraine for Communications, Vladimir Ivanovich Delikatnyy, with a request to clear up the situation at Soyuzpechat, which is subordinate to him, to remove restrictions on the number of copies of *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* for retail distribution, which were made by someone unknown, and also to lift the ban established many years ago by the Ministry of Communications for some unknown reason on post offices accepting subscriptions for periodicals directly to military units.

We are informing our readers—both our permanent readers and those who will join their ranks these days—that henceforth the newspaper will comprehensively and effectively cover the progress of organizational development of Ukraine's own armed forces and publish laws and decrees being passed by the Supreme Soviet and the president of Ukraine on this matter of national importance.

Kiev MD Council Addresses Servicemen's Issues

92UM0608A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
1 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel M. Vertushkov, chief of Kiev Military District press center: "In the Kiev Military District Military Council"]

[Text] A session of the Kiev Military District Military Council was held on 31 January of this year. The following questions were placed on the agenda: results of work by military councils, commanders and staffs for

strengthening military doctrine and tasks of preventing incidents, crimes and people's deaths in the 1992 training year; status and measures for improving training facilities in district forces; fulfillment of a joint agreement by the command element and the district workers and employees trade union territorial committee; and measures for improving work in the current year.

The briefers and the commanders, chiefs of staff and representatives of joint trade union committees who spoke from their seats emphasized that "the aggravation of socioeconomic problems of servicemen and their families and the sharp drop in the standard of living has had a negative effect on the status of military and labor discipline and the moral and ethical atmosphere in military and labor collectives."

But even in this situation 52 percent of the regiments, 64 percent of the line and artillery battalions, and 78 percent of the companies and batteries in district forces completed the 1991 training year without incidents or crimes. There was a 42 percent reduction in the number of incidents and the number of deaths dropped by one-third.

Kiev Military District Commander Lieutenant General V. D. Boriskin chaired the session and gave a briefing on the first question.

Defense Committee Answers Questions on Army, Servicemen's Rights

92UM0607A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
1 Feb 92 pp 2, 3

[Unattributed article: "Will Concern be Shown for Every Serviceman?"]

[Text] Creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is evoking the natural interest of our readers, and not just servicemen but also many other categories of the population. Today we answer the most typical questions. The answers to them were prepared by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security Affairs and by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

Why were combat units and large units of armed forces stationed on Ukrainian territory so quick to take the military oath, at a time when other states (Belarus for example) foresee a certain order, and a period of transition in creation of national armies?

Taking the military oath is the most important stage in forming our own armed forces. As of this date Ukraine already has an entire package of laws pertaining to defense and military development, and it is on their basis that it embarked upon implementing the conception of developing the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Not one other state of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] possesses a legal base of the sort created in the Ukraine. It was established at a conference of leaders of the Commonwealth states that the Ukraine would begin exercising its right to create its own armed forces as of 3

January 1992. Since that moment, forces stationed on Ukrainian territory have been subordinated to the President of the Ukraine and the Ukrainian Defense Minister. And as in any army of an independent state, its personnel naturally need to take an oath of allegiance to the people of the country in which they are located.

How is it that taking of the oath by the set deadline precedes resolution of matters regarding the structure, composition and numerical strength of the republic's armed forces?

The Ukrainian Parliament adopted the necessary legislative acts, including the laws "On Defense of the Ukraine" and "On the Armed Forces of the Ukraine," which provide a possibility for embarking upon practical creation of our own armed forces. The Ukrainian president published the ukase "On the Armed Forces of the Ukraine," which spells out the specific objectives in regard to this issue. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet will examine a second package of bills on problems of military development in its next regular session. The plan is to discuss problems of the structure, composition and numerical strength of the state's armed forces as well. But taking of the oath should not be linked to these problems. Composition and strength will be refined at each stage of the transitional period on the basis of the principle of reasonable sufficiency. These magnitudes will be variable, and they will change in the direction of lower values.

Why is the decision on taking the military oath of allegiance to the people of the Ukraine being implemented without a written legislative act and a mechanism by which to release servicemen from the oath they took previously?

We should make a clarification here. At one time, servicemen took an oath to the USSR, which no longer exists, as was confirmed in Minsk at the meeting of leaders of the independent states. The laws of the former USSR are null and void; nor is there an agency that could release servicemen from the oath they took. In this case when servicemen take the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people, they are simultaneously released from the former oath. It makes no sense to swear allegiance to the CIS because the Commonwealth is not a state.

Drafts of laws of interest to many in connection with taking the oath have been published in the newspapers NARODNAYA ARMIYA and PRAVDA UKRAINY. They include the future laws "On Universal Compulsory Military Service" and "On Pension Support to Servicemen and Workers of Internal Affairs Agencies." As regards social and legal guarantees for servicemen and their families, the corresponding law has already been adopted by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, and it has been published in the press.

We should add to this that the text of the military oath was approved by the Parliament on 6 December of last

year, and interim instructions on taking the oath were approved by the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

What will happen to officers and warrant officers in units and large units that are to be disbanded in the near future (for example the missile forces), and to officers under the command of the former USSR minister of defense, the main command of the ground forces and the troop commander of the Kiev Military District?

Officers assigned to troop commanders of military districts who are socially secure—that is, officers who already have housing and pension support—have the possibility for being discharged into the reserves. As regards those who do not yet have the right to pension support (with a time in service of 20 years), a provision is being written for inclusion in the "Law on Pension Support to Servicemen and Workers of Internal Affairs Agencies." And following adoption of this law, they also will be able to receive discharges into the reserves while retaining their civilian rights and corresponding privileges. Those who are not yet provided with housing are granted the right to remain in service until they receive housing, or to remain on the waiting list in the event that their employment situation is resolved by some other means.

Is there any guarantee that the Ukraine will not switch to the national principle of obtaining officers for the armed forces in the next few years?

Ukrainian citizens will serve in the armed forces irrespective of their ethnic origin. Any discrimination on the basis of language and establishment of an ethnically Ukrainian officer corps are not even topics of discussion.

Will the possibility of using two languages in the Ukrainian Armed Forces—Ukrainian and Russian—on an equal basis be preserved during the transitional period of not less than 3-5 years?

On 1 November 1991 the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Ukrainian Nationalities, the text of which was republished in this year's 10 January issue of NARODNAYA ARMIYA. Article 3 of this document proclaims: "The Ukrainian state insures the right of its citizens to freely use the Russian language."

Isn't the taking of the military oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people a factor making it possible to use their armed forces to resolve certain political and territorial issues that may arise? The military-political situation in the world is such that there is no need to tear the armed forces of the former USSR apart and to create national armies.

According to the law "On the Armed Forces of the Ukraine," they are intended for the armed defense of the independence, territorial integrity and inviolability of the Ukraine. Use of the armed forces in tasks not associated with the state's defense is not foreseen. This

law also prohibits activities by any political parties and movements in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Will the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense create a mechanism by which to allow transfer of servicemen from the Ukrainian Army to the armed forces of other CIS states and back?

Yes, such a mechanism will operate, because it is necessary. It is needed moreover on the basis of interstate treaties and agreements of other form. Proposals regarding this issue are coming in from the local level. They are being studied.

Is there any sense in having officers take the oath if documents had been filled out earlier for their transfer to other districts outside the Ukraine and if they are not aware of the decision, and if they are to be discharged in 1992?

Each officer must himself decide whether he will take the oath depending on his intended place of residence. In any case this will have no influence on pensions.

Will officers who decide not to take the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people and who wish to be discharged from the armed forces in the future be allowed to terminate their service in 1992?

Servicemen who decide to accept a discharge into the reserves this year must themselves make the choice regarding the oath. In any case they will be able to calmly serve out their term.

Are there any guarantees that an officer who has taken the military oath will not be discharged into the reserves in a year or two on the basis of a reduction in forces in the Ukrainian Armed Forces?

This question should not be linked to taking the military oath. The Ukrainian law "On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Families" (Article 8, Paragraph 2) states that servicemen cannot be discharged from military service prior to acquisition of the right to a pension based on years of service, except in specially qualified cases such as, for example, a reduction in the number or strength level of servicemen.

Won't there be a massive discharge of officers of non-Ukrainian nationalities in connection with arrival of Ukrainian officers from other CIS states?

Ukrainian citizenship legislation foresees dual citizenship, which citizens choose as they desire. Dual citizenship is established on the basis of bilateral citizenship agreements between states in the CIS.

What regulations must be followed today, and when will documents governing military service be adopted?

Until approval of new regulations, the activities of the forces will be governed by those presently in effect.

What sort of flags will units have, and will they be unit colors? What will happen with combat decorations, honorary titles and combat histories? What will become of combat traditions?

Unit colors, decorations and honorary titles will be retained by military units in the transitional period. Later, after adoption of state symbols, the corresponding decision will be adopted by the Ukrainian leadership, naturally with regard for the combat history and traditions of the particular unit or large unit.

According to some sources the institution of chaplains will be introduced into the Ukrainian Army. Why are we borrowing everything from foreign armies? Where are our national institutions?

This is not foreseen by any legislative act. The Ukrainian law "On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Families" (Article 6) states that servicemen have the right to profess any religion or to profess no religion, and to openly express and freely disseminate their religious or atheistic convictions.

How will training be organized in military educational institutions of other CIS states? What will become of servicemen who are now taking correspondence courses from them?

Cadets and students of military educational institutions, including correspondence students, will continue their studies. They will be pursued by contract on the basis of treaties signed between CIS states.

Will time of service in the USSR Armed Forces be included in the total time of service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces?

All privileges, time of service, pension support and so on are to be retained in the transition from the USSR Armed Forces to service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Do the President and the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine plan to provide officers with worthy financial support in the armed forces they are creating? When compared with the 5 to 10 time increase in prices, the 1.9 time pay raise is a mockery of them, and a step destining them to poverty.

Officer pay will be indexed in accordance with the Ukrainian law "On Indexing the Population's Monetary Income," in the same way as for all citizens of the Ukraine.

Will servicemen of the Ukrainian Armed Forces retain the privileges they acquired earlier during service in remote, mountain and other locales of the USSR, in Afghanistan and in other countries in the performance of international duty?

All privileges possessed by servicemen and acquired by them during service under the listed conditions will be fully retained.

Will there be any changes made in the pensions of servicemen who move to other states of the Commonwealth, and will they continue to receive pensions?

The rights of servicemen to pension support will not be infringed upon, should they move to other states of the Commonwealth.

How will travel documents be filled out and travel expenses be paid to servicemen of the Ukrainian Armed Forces who travel outside the Ukraine on regular leave?

In the same manner as today.

We feel that it is necessary and extremely important to immediately resolve the issue of providing food rations to officers, given the price increases.

The Defense Ministry is already studying the matter of providing rations to servicemen as of the beginning of this year.

Will Ukrainian legislators grant priority to officers in acquisition of housing, in the granting of land parcels upon retirement, and in providing low-interest loans?

All of this is foreseen in the Ukrainian law "On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Families."

Officer Union Chief Meets with Crimean Servicemen

92UM0617A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
4 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Lt Col N. Gorenko in the column "Rush to Print!": "Admiral Kasatonov: Col Martirosyan Not Welcome"]

[Text] The Crimean organization of the Union of Ukraine Officers held a meeting. It was conducted by Colonel V. Martirosyan, president of the union.

The event is noteworthy, in that the participants voted to release a statement relating to retirement of Black Sea Fleet Commander I. Kasatonov. This was supported by oral and ballot approval on the part of representatives—delegates at the assembly—of units and subunits of the fleet.

As told to this correspondent by Colonel V. Martirosyan, the situation in the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet is being made unnecessarily tense. When I asked Vilen Arutyunovich who is at fault, he replied that it is the fleet commander, in his opinion. Officers are frightened. The fact of the assembly's statement is an indication of the tension attendant to the situation, on the one hand. On the other hand, it points out the state of mind and refusal of the majority to comply with the instructions of the commander. Colonel Martirosyan considers Admiral I. Kasatonov's behavior to be ill-advised.

According to V. Martirosyan, men serving aboard many ships of the Black Sea Fleet are willing to swear allegiance to the people of the Ukraine, but are not permitted to do so. The fate of the commander of the Coast Guard brigade is presently in question. The unit headed by this commander would have already taken the oath, were it not for the dictate issued by the fleet commander. Colonel Martirosyan said that there is doubt about whether "the brigade commander will still be in his post when this article appears in print."

Also noteworthy is the fact that Russians comprise up to 65 percent of the Black Sea Fleet. They all understand the situation and are ready to take the oath, but cannot do this.

The assembly's statement on the commander's retirement is a political step backed up by tens of thousands of persons. Will it be heard and heeded?

Admiral I. Kasatonov failed to receive Colonel V. Martirosyan. According to reliable sources, Admiral I. Kasatonov was heard to say, "When it comes to Martirosyan, I am not available."

A meeting and talk did not take place. Will there come about an understanding of the fact that the Ukraine is building its Army on a legal basis, that the "Navy affair" has reached the point where a considerable part of the fleet does not support its commander?

Baltic Officers Want Transfer to Ukraine

92UM0614A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 Feb 92 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Ukraine"]

[Text] Ukraine has sent food to Ukrainian officers serving in Estonia in units of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States].

Parcels of condensed milk, canned fish, sugar, flour and groats were presented along with an invitation to attend a meeting, at which Vladimir Fedyrko, former deputy military commissar of the Estonian SSR, called upon them to submit requests for transfer to the Ukrainian army. The Tartu airmen refused Ukraine's humanitarian aid and sent it to the Tallin Garrison. It is believed that around 20 officers from Tallin will transfer to Ukraine. Fedyrko noted that Estonia is the first state in which he is recruiting for the Ukrainian army. Not all of the Ukrainians are "suitable," however. Political workers and fervent communists are not accepted. There will be no other obstacles to transfer to the Ukrainian army. It is necessary only to submit a request.

BELARUS

Belarus to Have 50 Thousand-Man Army

92UM0567A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Feb 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Size of Belarus Army"]

[Text] A strength of 50,000 to 80,000 men would render the national army of Belarus commensurate with those of West European countries with respect to ratio of civilians to servicemen. That is the conclusion that has been reached by an expert group of the Belarus Supreme Council tasked with arriving at the strength to be deployed on republic territory. Present troop strength is 160,000 men, with more than a third made up of volunteers.

BALTIC STATES

Baltics Want Compensation for Damage Done by Soviet Troops

92UM0556A Moscow MEGAPOLIS EXPRESS
in Russian No 3, 16 Jan 92 p 21

[Article by Eduard Govorushko: "The Baltics: Leave Your Coat, Go Home"]

[Text] The Baltic countries have decided to keep armaments and equipment with which to provision their national army, after they have sent home the soldiers and officers of the foreign country. Latvia has even passed legislation in this regard. However, the more things change, the more they stay the same: most of the equipment is still in the same hands; some of it is even being stolen.

It is apparent that the immediate future will see little change. The trouble here is that it is necessary to send "home" not simply a corps or division, but each and every officer and warrant officer, with his family, to boot. But where is he to live? No one has built him an abode at his new station, nor is anyone doing so. Also, he needs more than an apartment; he requires a school, kindergarten, a job for the wife, etc. Thus, withdrawal of the Soviet Army from the Baltic countries is not so much a political problem as it is socio-economic. This is the situation that must be taken into account by the world community, to which the heads of the Baltic states are constantly appealing. Incidentally, they themselves must take that into account. In the opinion of experts, that is why they have toned down their new appeal to the heads of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] member countries. At the present time, the heads of the Baltic powers are merely asking for, not demanding, the

initiation—not withdrawal per se—of troop removal from their capitols and republics. In this connection, the Baltic countries are not encumbering the initiation of this process with any particular time schedule.

The recent press conference held by the heads of the three Baltic countries drew the question: How do they intend to encourage troop withdrawal? The most radical point of view on this score was expressed by Vitautas Landsbergis, which incidentally merited approval on the part of Arnold Rüütel and Anatoliy Gorbunov:

We feel that our appeals to the international community will do some good in promoting the withdrawal of the former Soviet troops beyond the borders of the countries. Continued presence of those troops here is illegal and could be taken as an unfriendly intention. The CIS simply has no right to ignore this fact. We also appeal to the West to render economic assistance to the act of withdrawing troops of the former USSR from the territory of our states.

Incidentally, the heads of the Baltic countries did not discount the possibility of demanding compensation, particularly for the ecological harm caused by the Army; Landsbergis also mentioned the poor behavior of Soviet troops. According to his information, the participation of the SA [Soviet Army] in the January events in Vilnius alone saddled the Lithuanian Republic with costs of 60 million rubles.

However, it seems that the West is in no hurry to finance the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltics. It is understood over there that the danger to the world community and the Baltics proper is small compared to the threat posed by hunger and devastation in areas where Soviet nuclear weapons are located. Colonel Vladimir Kandalovskiy, a headquarters representative of the North-Western Group of Forces, told the MEGA-POLIS EXPRESS correspondent that the former Soviet Army will remain in the "territories" for at least three more years.

In this connection, local observers are of the opinion that the heads of the Baltic states are naive—to say the least—in their attempts to equip their future armies with weapons and military equipment left by departing Soviet troops. A case in point is the view of Colonel Kandalovskiy, who feels that the weapons and equipment should be sold, not given away. This incidentally is an issue that can be put on the agenda of future talks. But

with whom can they be held? The CIS? Russia? Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov? The Military Council of the North-Western Group of Forces?

Lithuania Unable to Pay Border Troop Trainees

92UM0567B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA

11 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank V. Ivanov: "Before, the Nuclear Power Station; Now, the Border Troop Center"]

[Text] A center for training Lithuanian border troops was established in Snechkus. A recent occurrence there nearly caused the soldiers to go home. It has come to light that the cause is quite banal. It appears that the men when conscripted for border duty were told that they would be paid 160 rubles a month, with permission to visit their families frequently. However, two months passed before they were paid, and only 80 rubles, at that. And that was possible only with money which Alfonsas Baravikas took out of the canteen treasury, since the government had not made funds available.

It is true that the duties were not particularly hard to take for the future border men. As one of the soldiers reported to the Vilnius newspaper RESPUBLIKA, the men spend their days sitting on stools. They have already completed the one-month program that was set up for them, but they have yet to see any border duty. That is why the men simply decided to go home. Officers tried to block their way, but the men lifted them up and carried them out of the barracks. Only after entreaties were made by the center chief did the men calm down sufficiently to agree to await the arrival of a commission from Vilnius.

Virtually nothing has changed since then. As explained to our correspondent by one of the center authorities, the men may decide to flee once again, since the center has yet to receive funds. On top of that, the source said that the Army drafted men who are definitely not of the best. My source was of the opinion that the commissar of Klaypeda, which supplied most of the men inducted for Lithuanian border duty, acted out of a desire to rid the city of troublesome youths.

There is a reason why the newspaper RESPUBLIKA recently wrote: "The most troublesome place in Snechkus was the nuclear power station, but now it is the training center."

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

New Defense Industrial Conversion Company

92UM0613A Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian
No 4, 20-27 Jan 92 p 14

[Article by Dmitriy Bogdanovich and Igor Kondrashov:
"VPIK: The Businessmen Left, the VPK Remains"]

[Text] The first attempt in national practice to combine the capabilities of the military-industrial complex (VPK) and entrepreneurial structures for the implementation of a conversion program has failed. On 18 January, at the founding meeting of the joint-stock company Military Industrial Investment Company (VPIK), three of the most powerful commercial organizations that are members of the stockholder complement—the RTSB [Russian Commodity-Raw Materials Exchange], the Agency for Economic News (AEN), and the Russian National Commercial Bank (RNKB)—announced their pullout from the company.

According to Sergey Turanov, AEN director, the fact that the council of directors of the Military Industrial Investment Company was practically entirely represented by state organizations associated with the "defense industry" served as the main reason for the withdrawal. Turanov thinks that this inevitably would have involved the establishment of military-industrial complex control over the activity of the company and its transformation into a "budgetary" organization of the military-industrial complex. Konstantin Borovoy, RTSB president, accused the council of directors of illegally collecting money from the military-industrial structure and preparing a new putsch. In his words, "the military-industrial complex tried to exercise command over us through the Military Industrial Investment Company structure," and a situation set in where "the tail was wagging the dog."

But, in the opinion of the chairman of the Military Industrial Investment Company council of directors, Sergey Petrov, the withdrawal of the RTSB, AEN, and RNKB (in which the RTSB is a cofounder) from the Military Industrial Investment Company was prompted by the company's refusal to join the staff of the financial group that Borovoy was attempting to establish on the basis of the military-industrial complex and the RINAKO [expansion not identified] for the implementation of a coordinated policy in the financial-credit sphere of the market economy. However, Petrov believes that the pullout of three of the biggest stockholders—holders of the controlling shares—could not influence the exchange value of Military Industrial Investment Company securities: The portion of stocks paid by them into the authorized capital of the joint-stock company amounts to only one percent.

According to available information, not long before the founding meeting the Military Industrial Investment Company joint-stock company was registered in the State Committee for Antitrust Policy. At the same time,

for the registration of the joint-stock company with the full complement of founders, the State Committee for Antitrust Policy required that the RTSB submit documents on the structure of the disposition of its capital in Russian commercial structures. The state committee did not receive such documents, and therefore stopped the establishment of the RTSB in the Military Industrial Investment Company. However, in the opinion of Valeriy Chernogorodskiy, chairman of State Committee for Antitrust Policy, this did not serve as the reason for RTSB's withdrawal. He believes that from the very beginning the Military Industrial Investment Company created the impression of a "glued structure," inasmuch as military-industrial complex enterprises and businessmen "did not trust each other much."

Observers assume that the withdrawal of RTSB nonetheless creates serious problems for the company, whose financial activity it envisioned implementing essentially at the expense of commercial structures. What is more, Konstantin Borovoy announced plans for the creation of a new military-industrial investment organization, in fact, an alternative Military Industrial Investment Company.

—Telephone for VPIK: (095) 262-77-67

—Telephone for RTSB: (095) 262-80-80

'Mashinostroitel' Faces Final Collapse

92UM0529A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Jan 92 p 6

[Article by F. Orlov: "Aim: 'Turn Away From Democracy' It Could Lead To Acts of Insubordination"]

[Text] Workers of the VPK [military industrial complex], having long lived in strict conformity with the established system, which if not originally, has rightfully been referred to as a state within the state, no longer want to obey its laws, rigid even now. People, who have for decades worked for the holder of the lion's share of the budgetary pie, are today among the groups in the population whose social welfare is least protected, and that are correspondingly the most socially unstable. The replacement of the Soviet flag with the Russian tricolored flag, which was accompanied by declarations of democratic reform, judging from appearances, did not relieve the situation.

In any case, this is precisely how matters stand in the Moscow scientific-production organization "Mashinostroitel." It is one of the leading defense production organizations in Russia, and is subordinate to the Department of Munitions and Special Chemistry within the Ministry of Industry. During the course of an unsanctioned meeting, which took place within its territory, every conceivable action was considered, ranging from a blockade running along near the Leningrad highway to a hunger strike at the White House.

The reasons for the conflict are quite typical. In spite of its particularly civilian sounding name, the NPO [scientific-production organization] worked exclusively on designing new types of military technology. The sharp decline in the number of orders left the enterprise near financial crisis, and the collective near massive layoffs. This, however, had no effect on the policy of the leadership, which continued to place its stake on military production. The workers of the NPO responded by electing a work collective council through whom they expressed their distrust of the entire administrative leadership: the general director, his two primary deputy directors, and the deputy director of policy and personnel. These actions, which the Soviet bureaucracy would have regarded as analogous to mutiny on board a military vessel, naturally did not please the corresponding structures in Russia. Hardly a month after the work collective's decision was made to conclude a contract with their elected leader, the General Director of the Department of Munitions and Special Chemistry, Yurii Starodyb, informed the STK Chairman of an order issued by the Ministry: nullify the contract made with the elected director and appoint to that post one of the primary deputies to the former director. According to the STK Chairman, Victor Nizhevyasov, in response to his query about the motives which prompted this decision, a reference was made in the department to "an aim to turn away from democracy." The reaction to this announcement was the aforementioned meeting. Finally, in the end a decision was made to resort to the traditional gesture of despair, a letter to the president.

In the letter it was written: "The work collective is disturbed by the fact that its opinion is being ignored. A man, in whom distrust was expressed by the collective three times during the course of the whole campaign cannot be its leader. That is, of course, if the call to democratize our society was not simply a lot of hot air." The letter also spoke of the fact that the conflict took place back during the time when the current president was running for people's deputy. Having supported his nomination, the organization collective drew the anger of apparatchiks, maintain the authors of the letter. They stress the fact that they feel confident in their choice, having placed their belief in the now leader of Russia, and apparently, they were hoping for his mutual support. Of course, it is highly doubtful that the letter will go directly to the president, but it is quite apparent that he will in some form or another be faced with the problem of growing tension within the VPK, just as it occurred not long ago in relation to the army.

Moscow Oblast Aid to Conversion

92UM0542A ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian
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[Interview with Vladimir Klimenko, deputy chairman of the Moscow Oblast Soviet of Workers' Deputies, by Sergey Kornilov under the rubric "Conversion": "Over the Barriers"]

[Text] Two or three years ago, when the "fathers of the restructuring" added the word "conversion" to their vocabulary, it seemed that all the national economic problems would very soon be solved as a result.

This did not happen. The conversion proved to be another stillborn of the Gorbachev restructuring. The conversion endeavor of the VPK [military-industrial complex] was unprofitable, but despite this it continued to be "squeezed." As a result of noble efforts by the VPK enterprises, many of them have ended up in the card file in the past two or three years.

We do have people of initiative, however, and they are active. The undertaking which we shall discuss began in Moscow Oblast. Obviously with good reason, since every second person working in production in the Moscow area is employed at a VPK enterprise. For this region conversion is a condition of survival in the new circumstances. Oblast authorities managed to get the Russian government to agree to the privatization of practically all federal property located in the Moscow area.

Today we are interviewing Vladimir Klimenko, deputy chairman of the Moscow Oblast Soviet of Workers' Deputies.

[Klimenko] Several months ago we assigned priority to the conversion of VPK enterprises as our strategic line. And not universal privatization but privatization based on specific programs. For example, the Ibis joint program of the helicopter firm VNTK imeni N. Kamov and France's Aerospatiale for the production of a 5-seat helicopter, the only one of its kind in the world. The French are prepared to finance this program entirely. Yet another program involves production of the 50-passenger Il-114 aircraft at an enterprise producing Migs.

I cannot say all enterprises, but the development of certain enterprises must involve not the production of frying-pans but outstripping development of the enterprise's scientific and technological capability. The conversion will then benefit both the enterprise and the state. For this purpose we are setting up the EKOD open joint-stock company, which will include dozens of large defense enterprises, banks, exchanges and a computerized communication system.

[Kornilov] What is the oblast soviet's role in this? Can the enterprises not unite on their own?

[Klimenko] They can. As the regional authority we have an interest in developing the oblast industrial complex and want this process to be hindered as little as possible by rigid republic structures. The Ministry of Industry set up in Russia is the same sort of monstrosity or even worse than the former Union ministry. Enterprises under its authority regard privatization with great caution.

[Kornilov] Do you want to provide protection for your enterprises?

[Klimenko] Yes, legal protection and protection of information in order to neutralize pressure on the enterprises by the ministry and set up a horizontal structure to replace the vertical structure through which they received something.

The first phase of organizing the campaign is now being completed.

The next phase involves a group of measures to set up the privatization machinery: land relations and funds. An investment fund has already been set up. We are working on the establishment of an international bank for handling accounts in national currencies. One of our most acute problems right now is how to settle accounts with Western investors. The concept of such a bank has already been tested by banking establishments in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

[Kornilov] What is the essential concept of this bank?

[Klimenko] The fact is that each type of goods has its own currency rate. For lumber it is not the insane 150 rubles per dollar, but four. For metal, either one ruble per dollar or two dollars per ruble. Everyone will settle accounts in his own territory at these rates and not the official exchange rate. It is practically a matter of setting up two banks. One to handle accounts with countries of the former socialist camp, where the breakdown of the old relations is especially costly, and a second for accounts with countries of the West.

[Kornilov] Will this not give rise to a large monopoly?

[Klimenko] There is no reason to concern ourselves with this for now. We are beginning with 10 of the 150 VPK enterprises in Moscow Oblast. In addition, they are not bound together in the production of a single product.

We have reached an agreement with the MFTI [Moscow Physicotechnical Institute] that we shall pay for a training course for specialists for EKOD: economists, technologists and marketing specialists. We are negotiating with representatives of business circles in the West on the practical training of our specialists there at their expense. Western nations are allocating funds for this purpose as humanitarian aid, which incidentally, we are not completely utilizing. Last year, for example, France funded practical training for 6,000 specialists from the USSR. The Union sent only 600 specialists to France, however.

[Kornilov] Recently one has particularly frequently heard calls for an increase in the production of weapons and their sale abroad, since the reduction in weapons exports has deprived us of a traditional source of hard currency. How do you regard this idea?

[Klimenko] A large quantity of "special purpose" products has accumulated at the defense enterprises. To years ago, while sharply reducing weapons exports, we nonetheless did not reduce the output of these "products." The wheels of production continued to turn at the former speed. Now there are two choices: either destroy

or sell them. Military equipment worth around 2 billion dollars has accumulated in Moscow Oblast. We have MIG-29 aircraft, for example. The Ministry of Defense does not have the money to pay for its order. Meanwhile, the FRG, which received a number of these MIGs from the former GDR, has given them extraordinarily high marks for quality and is prepared to purchase more. I believe that these weapons should be sold and the proceeds used for retooling the enterprise to produce civilian equipment. This way is not as humane as one would like, but this is the reality of the times. It is better than depending upon humanitarian aid. Consider also the fact that additional funds will be required to destroy the weapons.

[Kornilov] Are you confident that the money earned from the sale of military equipment will go for the purpose and not disappear into the pockets of sharp operators? For trips abroad, for consumer goods?

That is precisely why I am for establishing the EKOD joint-stock company. To prevent these funds from settling in state offices, to see that they remain with the enterprises which produce the products. We have already approached Russia's Supreme Soviet with a request that we be granted a quota of military equipment for sale from a coordinated list.

Political Status of Nuclear Closed Cities

924P0076A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
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[Article by Dmitriy Usachev under "Problem" rubric: "A Settlement With Special Conditions?"]

[Text] Yekaterinburg—Two telegrams were sent to the Kremlin and Krasnopresnenskaya Naberezhnaya from the numbered city Sverdlovsk-44, an hour's drive from Yekaterinburg. The session of the city soviet asked the state leaders: Boris Nikolayevich and Ruslan Imranovich, take the trouble to consult with us deputies of closed cities before presenting to the judgment of the Supreme Soviet a draft law of the Russian Federation: "On the Status of Settlements Operating Under Special Conditions (Closed Administrative-Territorial Formations)." This document, drawn up with the direct participation of the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry, the "owner" of all Russian closed cities, will be considered by the parliamentary Committee on Defense (the committee of V. Lopatin).

There are 10 nuclear cities in Russia—these exclusive settlements around the once supersecret enterprises of the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry. There are rows of barbed wire and military guards at the entrances, whereas inside are islands of quite developed socialism: electrochemical combines with the most advanced ("more advanced" than that of the Americans) technology for the enrichment of uranium, excellent housing, a minimum of banditry, and store counters that have not been completely emptied by perestroika. They are directly subordinate to the Ministry of Atomic Energy

and Industry. The ministry drew up the city budget and supplied, fed, clothed, and pampered them. Those "zones" also had city soviets but they were window dressing even more than in ordinary cities: the combine also decided who would be deputies (at least until the elections in 1990).

In that same year, the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry, which was losing orders and pride, began to relinquish to the city soviets some of its functions in the administration of the city economy. In particular, in Sverdlovsk-44 (soon this city will be called Verkh-Neyvinsk not only customarily but also officially: this was the decision of a referendum), turned over to the balance of the gorispolkom (city executive committee) housing with all of its disadvantages, for the time being keeping for itself trade and public health and also the rights of general builder. But the combine no longer has the same possibilities, supply from centralized sources is being reduced, and it is more and more difficult for the combine to cope with the city economy, whereas the city soviet and administration with their limited powers under the conditions of the "special city" also feel that their arms and legs are tied. They are headed for a dead end, which is very undesirable in a territory with a nuclear facility.

"Twice in the last year," says Sergey Moskalev, chairman of the Sverdlovsk-44 city soviet, we met in Chelyabinsk-70 with the chairmen of the soviets and ispolkoms of the other nine closed cities. We tried to work out an acceptable version and presented our draft law "On the Special Autonomous District [okrug] of the Russian Federation," which would facilitate the entering of our cities into a common economic and democratic area and defined the status of the nuclear cities as cities subordinate to the republic and the full-blooded status of the legislative and executive authorities of these cities. Alas, the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry ignored the reasonable arguments of the mayors and in its draft law on the status of the special settlements our rather large cities (Verkh-Neyvinsk has a population of 90,000) are equated with military posts and the city soviets are entrusted, I quote, with their "logistic support."

The exclusive settlements or technopolises around enterprises with special production could exist in the 1950's and 1960's, Leonid Krivoruchko, chairman of the Committee for the Management of Municipal Property under the administration of Verkh-Neyvinsk, explained to me. But now that same Verkh-Neyvinsk has the very large Urals Motor Vehicle Plant that is not under a nuclear department at all—it is part of the "ZIL" association. Joint-stock companies and private enterprises have appeared. Barbed wire and a high fence are not an obstacle to the market economy. It will still penetrate into the closed "zone" but it will be diminished and hence not very productive. The draft law on the status of special settlements limits not only the freedoms of citizens but also the possibilities for the formation of municipal property; the city authorities are deprived of

the right to own the lion's share of the land. The city cannot survive without the development of enterprise and privatization but the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry is trying to maintain the old order, although it is no longer accepting the full obligation to feed the population. Let the cities remain ours but if things go badly there, then the soviets will be responsible—this is the curious logic of the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry.

In the city soviet and administration of Verkh-Neyvinsk, they told me: we very much need definiteness. Who are we, a city subordinate to the oblast? Then we will go to the head of the oblast administration Eduard Rossel and we will formulate a budget with him. If we become a city subordinate to Russia, which is very reasonable, then we will know that Russia will feed us and will cover the deficit of a half billion rubles that developed in the budget of Verkh-Neyvinsk. If the city stays "under the combine," which results from the draft law of the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry on the status of the special settlements, then what is the purpose of the administrative head and the city soviet? Let the deputy general director of the combine handle everything. At least the draft law on the status of the special settlements does not go along with the prevailing Law of the Russian Federation on Local Self-Government.

These are the moods and passions behind the meager lines of the telegrams sent by the session of the city soviet to Yeltsin and Khasbulatov. The parliamentary committee and the parliament itself certainly have no right not to consider these moods.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Development of U.S. Military Viewed

92UM0430A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Col V. Lukashenkov, candidate of technical sciences, and Col B. Polikarpov, candidate of technical sciences: "In Order To Ensure Leadership: Ten Directions of Development of U.S. Armed Forces and Arms"]

[Text] In connection with the rapidly changing situation in the world, a commission for developing a new military strategy—the "selective deterrence" strategy—was created about three years ago in the United States. The commission includes prominent military experts and politologists.

The following idea was set forth as the basis of their work: to supplement the increasingly less likely classic American war scenario (a massive Soviet nuclear attack and invasion of Western Europe), the increased likelihood of the United States being involved in conflicts of a smaller scale emerging on the periphery of the then still-existent USSR and also in Third World countries in which Soviet arms or arms of a similar technological

level will be used should be taken into account. In doing so, the principle of ensuring superiority of new American arms should be implemented. A special working group was formed under the commission to develop technologies and proposals corresponding to this principle for improving the process of creating them. The group selected the 10 most important directions that would ensure, in its opinion, reaching the goals of the new strategy and superiority of advanced weapon systems by the mid-1990s. Today, these directions have become the determining directions in the future development of the U.S. Armed Forces and their arms. We will briefly describe them.

Using distributed computer networks in training personnel. Modern achievements in the development of computer technologies and the transfer and processing of information make it possible to create thousands of training devices directly at the places where large units and units are stationed, use the ideas of "artificial intelligence" in the training process, and ensure a realistic reproduction of the most complex military operations at many levels of command and control.

It is significant that nonstandard situations can be "played" in doing this. This should help to increase the level of training of personnel and the development of their creative capabilities. The combat effectiveness and combat readiness of units and subunits as a whole will also increase. The SIMNET system, developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the U.S. Army, is a prototype of such an approach to training.

Ensuring low observability of objects (Stealth technology). Use of this technology within the framework of the "selective deterrence" strategy is leading to a significant reduction in losses of weapons platforms. Effective countermeasures against such weapons requires the opposite side to replace currently deployed radar systems with much more complex and expensive systems—those stationed in space, dispersed, and others.

Creating command, control, and intelligence systems in the theater of war based on small satellites. Modern satellite systems used to obtain and transmit intelligence information, support communications, and command and control tend to increase size and cost and can be launched only from a small number of bases. Due to this, they are vulnerable, especially since it is easy to calculate their orbits. Therefore, it is proposed to develop technologies for creating small satellites that can be launched from mobile launchers in the theaters of war. It is assumed that they can be used to create a more reliable system of reconnaissance, communications, and battle management, brought not only to subunits but also to individual weapons platforms carrying out specific tactical missions.

High-accuracy cruise missiles. One of the key elements of the "selective deterrence" strategy is making accurate strikes against the most important targets the entire

depth of the theater of military operations. Modern intelligence assets provide the U.S. Armed Forces with accurate information about such targets; however, existing weapon guidance systems do not guarantee their effective destruction. Therefore, the working group substantiated the need for developing new types of cruise missiles with ranges from tens to several thousands of miles having a high accuracy of delivery to the target (circular error probable of about 1 mile) with nuclear and nonnuclear warheads.

Ballistic missile defense in theaters of war. Much attention in the strategy being developed is given to solving the problem of protection against tactical ballistic missiles. It has been reported that within the framework of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), already in 1993 up to 25 percent of the funds will be used to modernize such systems as the Patriot and Arrow and to create new ones. Ensuring reliable protection of command and control systems and other important U.S. targets will require adversaries to make a substantial increase in appropriations for further improving their tactical ballistic missiles.

Nuclear munitions penetrating deep into the ground. Certain vitally important installations (command and control posts, military factories, and others) can be placed hundreds of meters deep into the ground. Conventional high-precision systems are insufficient for destroying such targets. In such cases, it is planned to use nuclear warheads that penetrate deep into the ground. The underground blast wave that occurs during the explosion is capable of destroying the strongest structures. A concept of modernizing existing nuclear warheads has already been developed.

High-accuracy nonnuclear weapons. According to American experts, the effectiveness of such weapons exceeds the effectiveness of conventional weapons many times over. Especially valuable are such qualities as destruction of armored and other protected targets by artillery and missiles having control and guidance systems with artificial intelligence components. The working group believes that developments of the technology of this adaptive "intelligent" weapon merit major efforts.

Advance aircraft. The United States has achieved considerable success in the development of aerodynamics and the creation of aviation materials, powerplants, and also sensors and miniature computers. New, highly effective aircraft can be created based on these achievements. We should note the use of supercomputers, which have virtually become "digital" wind tunnels, for calculating flow. All this will make it possible in the near future to master the hypersonic area not only for combat aircraft but also for transports and missiles.

Air-cushion vehicles. A large number of air-cushion vehicles are needed to carry out a number of specific tasks typical of the "selective deterrence" strategy. Due to the speed, which can be twice or more that of conventional vessels, the large operating radius, and

sufficient capacity, these vehicles should provide the U.S. Armed Forces with the capability for a truly rapid response.

Submarines and antisubmarine warfare. Further development of new integrated methods and means for detecting and identifying submarines is considered the principal direction of progress in this area in the United States. Much attention is being devoted to improving methods of coordinating the use of submarines in real conditions. It is planned to develop several new advanced submarine designs. Development of these technologies is supposed to ensure U.S. superiority during operations at sea and in antisubmarine warfare.

These are the 10 primary directions under which assets are to be developed to support implementation of the "selective deterrence" strategy. Based on the importance of ensuring technological isolation of the United States, the commission for developing the concept made practical recommendations for creating by the mid-1990s an advanced scientific and technological base to support the Department of Defense. It recommended striving to ensure the stability of financing basic and experimental research, which will make it possible to attract the best scientific forces.

Implementation of this policy, the commission believes, will enable the United States to preserve its leadership in the most important areas of military affairs with a minimum expenditure of resources for developing the armed forces and arms.

Sale of MiG-29 Proposed to Israel

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in Russian 11 Feb 92 p 4

[TASS: "'MiGs' from Russia for Wholesale or Retail Sale"]

[Text] The Israeli military received with surprise a proposal from Russia to sell the MiG-29 combat aircraft, "surface-to-air" missiles, as well as a new type of radar with only one unacceptable condition: payment must be in cash. All of this weaponry until recently was intended to supply the USSR's most reliable allies in the Arab countries.

The Israeli Army, however, is equipped with both American weapons and weapons of their own manufacture and in the near term will not discuss the integration into it of Russian equipment. But on the other hand, military intelligence may be interested in the purchase of separate samples for the purpose of direct study of several models of "MiGs" or missiles.

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